with whom Mowbray, J., agrees, dissenting:
Since I have been unable to glean any factual or legal basis for the position of my brethren in the majority, I must dissent.
The State of Nevada petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to reinstate the original sentence imposed against the defendant, Seymore Husney, after Husney entered a plea of guilty to one count of the infamous *104crime against nature. In my judgment, the district court clearly acted without jurisdiction in modifying Husney’s sentence, and mandamus should have issued. State v. District Court, 85 Nev. 485, 457 P.2d 217 (1969).1
In February and March of 1978, three indictments were issued charging Husney with a total of ten counts of assorted sexual misconduct. Pursuant to the terms of a plea bargain agreement with the State of Nevada, Husney entered a plea of guilty to one count of the infamous crime against nature.2 The conduct upon which the guilty plea was based involved a 14-year-old girl. In return for Husney’s voluntary plea, the remaining counts in all three indictments were dismissed.
On January 8, 1980, the trial judge sentenced Husney to a term of life in prison with the possibility of parole. The following day the judgment of conviction was signed by the sentencing judge and filed in the clerk’s office. Husney commenced serving his sentence at the Nevada State Prison.
During the ensuing months, Husney sought relief from incarceration by moving the district court for a modification and reduction of sentence. Ultimately, after proceedings in this Court which are not germane to the instant proceeding, the district judge granted Husney’s motion. Thereafter, the district court vacated the original sentence, reinstated the sentence of life with the possibility of parole, suspended the sentence and placed Husney on probation for a period not to exceed five years. Probation was conditioned upon Husney’s incarceration in the county jail for six months, a condition which the sentencing judge deemed satisfied by the equivalent period Husney had already served in the Nevada State Prison. Accordingly, Husney was immediately released from prison.
The State now petitions this Court for the issuance of mandamus to compel the district court to vacate its order suspending Husney’s sentence and to reinstate the original sentence. The State contends that under the established law of this State, once Husney commenced serving his sentence, the district court *105was powerless to suspend the sentence. For reasons hereinafter specified, I agree.
The issues presented by this appeal are illumined by focusing first on the basis for the district court’s ruling. Specifically, the sentencing judge entered the following findings: (1) “that the court was mistaken in [accepting as] fact that Husney was really involved in this matter with Mr. Lucas”;3 (2) “after reading the transcript [grand jury] I find that Sharon . . . was not really involved with Sy Husney whatsoever”;4 “that Mr. Husney at that time . . . [did not have] any pictures taken with Sharon nor was he present when any other pictures were taken”; (4) “nor was [sic] any drugs supplied by the defendant Husney”; (5) “that Mr. Koot’s5 argument that Husney was certainly involved with this young girl of 10 or 11 years of age was not intentionally made”; and (6) that Mr. Koot did not intend “to misrepresent to the court [Husney’s involvement with Sharon] at that time, but the court took his word at that time, meaning that Husney was involved.” The judge then concluded: “Therefore, at the time of sentencing on January 6, 1980, I think there was a misstatement of facts before the court. Therefore, I think under that mistaken belief of facts, the court has jurisdiction to entertain this motion to modify sentence.”
I have thoroughly reviewed the same transcript of proceedings before the grand jury which the sentencing judge reviewed prior to both the original sentencing and the subsequent modification thereof. In my view, as revealed by the following analysis, the record does not support the findings upon which the sentencing judge based the lower court’s jurisdiction to modify Husney’s sentence.
1. FINDING THAT HUSNEY WAS NOT REALLY INVOLVED WITH LUCAS.
This finding is undermined by the graphic testimony before the grand jury. Husney’s involvement with Lucas was substantial and continuing. By way of example, on at least two occasions these two men utilized Husney’s residence to engage a *10613-year-old female child in acts of sexual conduct, both men participating simultaneously in cunnilingus and fellatio. Prior to.the first such incident, Husney primed the child with alcohol while Lucas gave her a fourth of a quaalude. Husney even arranged gratuitous accommodations for the unsuspecting parents of their 13-year-old victim. There were other group sex orgies and nude photo-taking sessions involving the two men and girls ranging in age from 14 to 16 which again irrefutably attest to the commonality of conduct and association between the two men. The record also reveals Husney performing various acts in concert with Lucas to enhance the provocative appearance of one or more girls who were photographed in the nude by both men. In short, the evidence of record will simply not sustain the lower court’s finding.
2. FINDING THAT 10-YEAR-OLD CHILD WAS NOT INVOL VED WITH HUSNEY.
This finding involves two aspects. First, the sentencing judge determined that the prosecutor unintentionally misled him into believing that Husney had included the 10-year-old child among his youthful sex objects. I have reviewed the prosecutor’s sentencing argument and am satisfied that no such statement occurred. Indeed, Mr.- Koot plainly declared that Husney “exercised his sexual aberrations on girls ranging from 13 years of age to 16 years of age, and when I refer to the thirteen-year-old girl, she was thirteen by about three months.” Additionally, Husney’s own attorney emphasized at the outset of his argument that Husney had not been sexually involved with the 10- or 11-year-old child, Sharon.6 Furthermore, the grand jury transcript, reviewed by the district judge prior to sentencing, revealed no such involvement. Second, Husney was involved in promoting the corruption of this child by tolerating her presence during at least one photo session when he and Lucas were taking pictures of 15- and 16-year-old girls in semi-nude poses. He also was present when Sharon was given aspirin by Lucas to make her feel as important as the other girls who were receiving quaaludes. Additionally, Sharon had been in Husney’s residence and waited downstairs with Lucas while Husney took her 13-year-old girl friend upstairs to his bedroom for sex. Sharon testified she had been to Husney’s house two or three times, and, although she had not been subjected to sexual advances by Husney, she had been in Husney’s bedroom and described the mirrors situated above his bed. *107Again, the record does not reveal an actual basis for serious misinformation about Husney’s role with Sharon and, in any event, the finding which would negate any involvement “whatsoever” cannot stand for the reasons noted.
3. FINDING THAT HUSNEY DID NOT HAVE PICTURES TAKEN WITH SHARON NOR WAS HE PRESENT WHEN ANY OTHER PICTURES WERE TAKEN.
A fair reading of the prosecutor’s comments would indicate that the district judge could have found that Husney was accused of having taken nude photographs of Sharon. On balance, however, the prosecutor did not single out Sharon by name or age as having been photographed by Husney. Furthermore, the record does reflect that Sharon was present with Husney and Lucas when each was taking photographs of semi-nude girls. The finding that Husney was not present when “any other pictures were taken” is not supported by the record. To the contrary, the record reflects substantial participation by Husney in photographing young girls in nude and semi-nude, provocative poses which he assisted in orchestrating.
4. FINDING THAT NO DRUGS WERE SUPPLIED BY HUSNEY.
There is simply no basis for this finding as a basis for mistake. The prosecutor provided no argument, expressly or impliedly, attributing the dispensing of drugs to Husney.7 The grand jury transcript, however, reveals two instances when Husney prepared and served a mix of vodka and orange juice. The first such instance occurred at Husney’s house immediately preceding the simultaneous and joint victimizing of the 13-year-old girl by Lucas and Husney. A second related occurrence found Husney serving such drinks to young girls ranging in age from 10 years to 17 years. Lucas also provided quaaludes to two of the girls. Thereafter, Husney took one of the girls, a 15-year-old, upstairs where they engaged in fellatio and intercourse. It is thus clear on the record that Husney did, in fact, aid and abet the dispensing of drugs to-children by Lucas, and *108that he served alcohol to girls ranging in age from 10 years to 17 years. And it is equally clear that in both instances alcohol was provided by Husney in order to alter the mind-states of the girls as a prelude to his sexual plans.
5. FINDING THAT PROSECUTOR’S ARGUMENT THAT HUSNEY WAS CERTAINLY INVOLVED WITH A 10 OR 11 YEAR OLD GIRL WAS UNINTENTIONAL.
As previously noted, this finding is a non sequitur since the prosecutor did not fairly argue that Husney was sexually involved with the minor child of age 10 or 11 years.
6. FINDING THA T DISTRICT COURT MISTAKENL Y RELIED ON PROSECUTOR’S ARGUMENT INVOLVING HUSNEY WITH SHARON.
The district court simply could not have misrelied on the prosecutor’s argument involving Husney in sexual activity with 10-year-old Sharon since no such argument occurred. Moreover, the district court reviewed the grand jury transcript prior to the original sentencing, and it was apparent from the testimony of witnesses contained therein,- including Sharon, that no such involvement occurred. Finally, Husney’s attorneys also emphasized that Husney was not sexually involved with Sharon, and they obviously found no fault with Mr. Koot’s representation since they interposed no objection on the subject.8
THE DISTRICT COURT’S LEGAL CONCLUSION
After arriving at the foregoing findings, the sentencing judge concluded that, since there was a misstatement of facts, albeit unintentional, the district court was misled, thereby vesting jurisdiction in the court to entertain Husney’s motion and suspend the sentence.
As the record stands, the district court has asserted jurisdiction to modify or correct Husney’s sentence because of that court’s mistaken belief regarding the facts hereinbefore recited. *109Since the “mistaken” facts concerning Husney’s sexual involvement with the minor child, Sharon, were not supported by the record, it must be assumed that the sentencing judge was the victim of his own misunderstanding on that subject. The other findings are, in my judgment, of no consequence since the facts assumed false by the district court are in fact true according to the record.
Turning now to the legal milieu applicable to this proceeding, Husney sought and obtained relief from the district court on the premise that the court had inherent power to correct a sentence based on material mistakes of fact. Such a proposition was asserted on the strength of this Court’s decision in Warden v. Peters, 83 Nev. 298, 429 P.2d 549 (1967). There, we held that a district court has inherent power to vacate or modify its judgments and orders. Peters had entered a plea of guilty to a crime which he did not commit, and we found it within the inherent power of the district court to vacate the adjudication of guilt. Upon doing so, the judgment of sentence automatically collapsed and the defendant reverted to his status prior to the conviction. On at least two occasions, this Court, in dicta, has interpreted Warden v. Peters as allowing the modification of a sentence on the grounds that the sentence imposed was not provided for by statute. State v. Clark, 90 Nev. 144, 520 P.2d 1361 (1974); State v. District Court, 85 Nev. 485, 457 P.2d 217 (1969). I do not now recede from that reasoning. The imposition of an extra-statutory sentence is constitutionally infirm as a denial of due process, and is thus, by definition, illegal. The sentencing court retains inherent power to correct an unlawful sentence at any time. This inherent power has been legislatively recognized. NRS 176.555 provides, “The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.” See Anderson v. State, 90 Nev. 385, 528 P.2d 1023 (1974); Summers v. State, 90 Nev. 460, 529 P.2d 207 (1974). See also Hayes v. State, 175 N.W.2d 625 (Wis. 1970); State v. Shilinsky, 81 N.W.2d 444 (Iowa 1957); State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn. 1978); People v. Emig, 493 P.2d 368 (Colo. 1972); State v. Fountaine, 430 P.2d 235 (Kan. 1967).
The inherent power of the district court to correct sentencing errors of constitutional magnitude is also legislatively endorsed under certain terms of Nevada’s post-conviction relief statute. NRS 177.320.9 Although Husney’s motion for modification of *110sentence was not characterized or procedurally organized as a petition for post-conviction relief, we may look to the substance of the motion as being in the nature of such a petition.10 Warden v. Peters, supra. In any event, whether Husney’s motion is viewed from the vantage point of the post-conviction relief statute or the inherent jurisdiction of the district court, the standard remains the same, viz, was the alleged mistake in sentencing the result of an error of constitutional dimension.11
The relief available under the authorities announced above applies irrespective of whether a defendant has commenced serving his sentence. Absent constitutional error, however, a district court is without jurisdiction to suspend the sentence of a defendant after a judgment of conviction has been signed by the judge and entered by the clerk pursuant to NRS 176.105. Miller v. Hayes, 95 Nev. 927, 604 P.2d 117 (1979). The latter restriction on the jurisdication of a sentencing court is legislatively fixed by the terms of NRS 176.185(4): “The court shall not suspend the execution of a sentence of imprisonment after the defendant has begun to serve it.”12 The import of this statute is clear. Once a defendant has commenced serving his sentence the district court is without jurisdiction to thereafter suspend it, except, as stated, where the sentence is the product of a denial of constitutional rights.
The foregoing observations distill to the task of determining whether, under the circumstances here present, NRS 176.185(4) deprived the district court of jurisdication to grant Husney relief. The United States Supreme Court has held that, where a *111defendant is sentenced on the basis of extensively and materially untrue assumptions concerning his criminal record, the constitutional demands of due process are not satisfied. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948). The court went on to note that its holding was not related to the severity of the sentence, but rather the pronouncement of sentence “on a foundation . . . extensively and materially false.” Id. at 741. In Lloyd v. State, 94 Nev. 167, 576 P.2d 740 (1978), we held that a sentencing court pronouncing sentence within the statutory limits will not be found to have abused its discretion unless the sentence is based upon information or accusations stemming from facts “supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence.” Id. at 170, 576 P.2d at 742 (emphasis supplied).
Although the Lloyd decision involved an abuse of discretion issue, the criteria for finding such an abuse is equally applicable to the Townsend situation involving a denial of due process in sentencing. If the sentencing court pronounces a statutorily proper sentence in reliance upon information or accusations supported only by false, impalpable or highly suspect evidence, due process has failed and the district court has jurisdiction to modify, suspend or otherwise correct such a sentence.
Similarly, if the sentencing court extensively and materially misperceives a fundamentally accurate informational or evidential base, and the sentence is the product of, or infused with, such misperception, the district court may modify, suspend or otherwise correct such a sentence.
We are thus left with the question of the nature of the mistake which induced the sentencing judge to modify Husney’s original sentence. For reasons previously stated, the original sentence was not the product of reliance upon information and accusations which were supported to any degree by false, impalpable or highly suspect evidence. The prosecutor’s comments at sentencing were not distortive of the facts and were substantially supported by the record of the grand jury proceedings.
The sentencing court likewise did not extensively and materially misperceive the information available to it prior to the original sentencing. As outlined in Townsend, mere misperceptions do not serve as a basis for constitutional challenge. Rather, as mentioned above, the constitutional standard under which a judge’s misunderstanding should be examined is whether it is of such a magnitude as to render the entire foundation upon which sentencing is based extensively and materially false. Such is not the case here. While I do not question the *112bona fides of the sentencing judge in his belief that he was unintentionally misled, any such misperception by the district court in the instant case did not rise to the level of constitutional magnitude.
The sentence first pronounced was within the limits of the applicable statute. Under the circumstances here present, the prohibition of NRS 176.185(4), if it is to have any life at all, must apply. The fact that the sentencing judge later found the original sentence undully harsh or even unwarranted under a greater subsequent enlightenment or clarification does not vitiate the command of the statute.13 Such circumstances may be argued within the confines of the legislative scheme for pardons or parole. As we said in State v. District Court, 85 Nev. 485, 457 P.2d 217 (1969):
In this state the granting of any relief from punishment after incarceration in the state prisión is an executive function authorized by the legislature and performed by the state board of parole commissioners ... or by the state board of pardons commissioners.
Id. at 488, 457 P.2d at 218.14 In harmony with our holding in *113the latter case, I unhesitatingly conclude that the action of the district court in suspending Husney’s sentence constituted a judicial invasion or intrusion into the legislative and executive realms, in contravention of Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution.
My brethren in the majority summarize their opinion by again alluding to the prosecutor’s unintended misrepresentations which, they conclude, provided the sentencing judge with a materially untrue foundation upon which to sentence Husney. My repeated review of the record has revealed no basis for the prosecutor’s role as scapegoat. His argument was forthright and founded on a reliable evidential base. Husney’s counsel obviously agreed at sentencing for they found no basis for objection between the two of them.15
*114As the majority observed, after Mr. Root’s argument at the original 'sentencing, the district judge indicated that he had read the grand jury transcript and had come to the conclusion that Husney had committed “a great wrong.” The content of that transcript has not changed. Even if we assume, arguendo, that the sentencing judge was misled into believing that Husney was involved in direct sexual contact with a 10- or 11-year-old child, I suggest that does not materially lessen the “great wrong” committed by Husney with a child barely beyond the age of twelve. Nor does it lessen the wrong committed with 14- and 15-year-old girls. Moreover, the great wrong is not substantially lessoned by a misperception concerning the dispensing of quaaludes to the young girls. Husney did provide them with alcohol, he encouraged by his unprotesting presence, the consumption of the quaaludes by the girls, and he accepted the advantage of their drug-induced condition by exploiting them sexually. Furthermore, a misperception as to whether Husney took nude photographs of Sharon does not materially lessen the great wrong involved in taking nude and lewd photographs of the other minor children and semi-nude photographs in the presence of Sharon. Finally, the grand jury transcript trumpets loudly the degree of Husney’s involvement with Lucas. Although the majority ascribe the term “partners” to the prosecutor’s description of the relationship between the two men, Mr. Root never once used that term. He did say that Lucas and Husney were “almost a team.” He also said that Husney “stands alone with Mr. Don Lucas” and apart from others who had been previously sentenced. My reading of the record reveals no hyperbole by Mr. Root. In any event, I fail to find a basis for concluding that a misperception by the sentencing judge as to the extent of the relationship between the two men was extensively or materially false. Nor do I find any basis for concluding that the original sentence, which was within the statutory limits, and which applied only to one of the many “great wrongs” committed by Husney, was unfair or unduly harsh.
In my opinion, Mr. Root should not bear the brunt of the State’s frustration over the loss of its reasonable entitlements under the plea bargain.
For the reasons stated above, I dissent from the position of my breathren in the majority, and submit that the State was entitled to have this Court order the reinstatement of Husney’s original sentence.
Curiously, the majority now question the propriety of mandamus as an avenue of relief to the State. In this case we previously issued a writ of mandamus citing State v. Breen, 95 Nev. 208, 591 P.2d 1141 (1979), because the district court had exceeded its jurisdiction in its first attempt to modify Husney’s sentence.
At the time of Husney’s plea, punishment parameters were provided under the following pertinent provisions of NRS 201.190:
Every person of full age who commits the infamous crime against nature shall be punished: (a) . . . where such offense is committed upon the person of one who is under the age of 18 years, by imprisonment in the state prison for life with possibility of parole, eligibility for which begins . . . when a minimum of five years has been served.
Lucas was found guilty of sexual assault, open and gross lewdness and drug-related charges by a jury. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment with possibility of parole for sexual assault; one year in the county jail for open and gross lewdness; and a total of twenty-six years on the drug charges.
The evidentiary base available to the district court at sentencing was a transcript of the grand jury proceedings reflecting the testimony of several minor children who were directly involved with Husney and Lucas, a psychiatric evaluation and a presentence report prepared by the Department of Parole and Probation.
Mr. Koot is the Chief Deputy District Attorney of Clark County who argued on behalf of the State at the sentencing hearing.
Based on the child’s birthdate and the dates when most of the events referred to in this opinion occurred, the child’s age was 10 years. The district court expressed uncertainty as to whether the child was 10 or 11 years of age.
The majority cite Koot’s comments that “in the sexual scenario which is the subject matter of the indictment before the Court, the same thing occurred preceding the sexual acts, photographs, qualudes [sic] and vodka,” as intimating the furnishing of controlled pharmaceuticals by Husney to the victims. The referenced quotation, which was not objected to by either of Husney’s attorneys, merely recited the factual circumstances which frequently — and with respect to the quaaludes invariably— occurred prior to the commencement of the felonious sex acts. The statement provided the context which the grand jury transcripts contained and which the district judge had read prior to sentencing Husney. Mr. Koot did not attribute to Husney the dispensing of the quaaludes, but the giving of the drug to the girls by Lucas was an integral part of the “sexual scenario” accurately depicted by Mr. Koot.
It is significant that the two able and experienced attorneys representing Husney at the original sentencing interposed no objections to any of the areas characterized by the sentencing judge and the majority of this Court as prosecutorial misrepresentations. The plea bargain agreement specifically granted defense counsel the right to “make objections as to relevancy, hearsay, etc. as to any argument or testimony proffered to the Court by Plaintiff at the time of sentencing.” Having thus failed to object, this Court should give deference to’ the well established rule that, absent doubt regarding guilt, such failure will preclude appellate review of those matters concerning which objections were not raised. Kelso v. State, 95 Nev. 37, 44, 588 P.2d 1035, 1040 (1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979). Such appellate restraint need not be exercised, of course, in the face of constitutional error, but if, indeed, any error exists in this case it does not remotely approach that magnitude.
NRS 177.320 provides:
The jurisdiction of the district court in post-conviction relief hearings to find in favor of a petitioner is limited to those cases in which the court finds that there has been a specific denial of the petitioner’s constitutional rights with respect to his coviction or sentence.
We note that NRS 177.375(1) states:
“If a petitioner’s conviction was upon a plea of guilty, all claims for post-conviction relief are waived except the claim that the plea was involuntarily entered.”
This statute does not prohibit Husney from making a post-conviction challenge to his sentence. The terms of the statute suggest that the waiver of “all claims” concerns only claims regarding the conviction itself, and not the imposition of sentence. Where a sentence is based upon grounds which are constitutionally infirm, even though a guilty plea has been entered, a petitioner is not precluded by NRS 177.375(1) from challenging the imposition of that sentence on constitutional grounds through a motion for post-conviction relief.
Absent good cause shown for delay, relief under the post-conviction relief statute is available only if sought within one year of final judgment or one year after a final decision on appeal. NRS 177.315(3). Relief accorded by exercise of the inherent power of the district court is not so limited and may be pursued at any time by means of habeas corpus. State ex rel. Orsborn v. Fogliani, 82 Nev. 300, 417 P.2d 148 (1966).
When Husney’s sentence was modified, the referenced statute was included as part of NRS 176.185(3).
The concurring opinion by Brennan, D. J., if followed, would selectively abrogate NRS 176.185(4). The sound requirement of an extensively and materially false record or misapprehension by a sentencing judge would be eliminated and supplanted by an undefinable standard which would admit of any qualitative or quantitative reconsideration by the judge. Sentences could be restructured by a judge later concluding that he focused too heavily on one aspect of a case and too little on another. Imaginative defense counsel could return again and again in an endeavor to circumvent formal parole or pardon procedures and requirements by attempting to convince the sentencing judge that the sentence was unduly and unfairly harsh because of misperceptions, misunderstandings or misplaced emphasis. Subjective considerations could supplant an extensively and materially false perception or evidential base as justification for sentence modification. The law aside, such latitude in resentencing after a defendant has commenced serving his original sentence would not bode well for a criminal justice system which appears to be moving away from greater judicial discretion in sentencing.
Interestingly, Zenoff, J. writing for the majority in State v. Clark, 90 Nev. 144, 520 P.2d 1361 (1974) concluded that a district court was without jurisdiction to modify the sentence of defendant Clark under circumstances far more compelling than the instant case. There, the sentencing judge erroneously interpreted the policy of the Board of Parole Commissioners and fashioned the sentencing in accordance with his misperception. The district judge declared that he intended the defendant to serve one year in prison and thereafter receive the benefit of continuing guidance and supervision while on parole status. Upon discovery that his understanding of the board’s policy was incorrect, and that Clark would have to serve time never intended by the judge on the occasion of Clark’s sentencing, the judge sought vainly to modify the sentence to comport with the court’s original intention. There we held such relief could be properly sought only before the State Board of Pardons Commissioners.
The majority suggests that if the State’s petition were allowed, credence would thereby be placed on the sworn testimony taken in the grand jury proceedings, and Husney would be precluded from arguing that his sentence was based, at least in part, on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. It is necessary to refocus on the fact that Husney entered a voluntary guilty plea to one of ten felony counts in consideration of the State’s dismissal of the remaining counts. At sentencing, Husney readily admitted that he had no defense to the crime which constituted the subject of his plea. In accordance with the plea bargain, the State was allowed to argue at the time of sentencing. Mr. Koot made it clear that he was relying on the grand jury transcripts which supported his factual recital. Husney’s combined counsel made no suggestion that the transcript constituted unreliable testimony, let alone evidence that was “impalpable or highly suspect.” Indeed, the sentencing judge never suggested that the transcript of the grand jury’s proceedings was unworthy of belief or suspect to any degree. I therefore find it strange that this Court, sua sponte, raises such an implication concerning the transcript. It is well settled that a court may rely on information which would not even qualify for admission at trial so long as the information is not impalpable or highly suspect. As we said in Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 93-94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976), “The sentencing proceeding is not a second trial and the court is privileged to consider facts and circumstances which clearly would not be admissible at trial. ... So long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence, this Court will refrain from interfering with the sentence imposed.” (Citations omitted.)
An analysis of the grand jury proceedings presents no basis for concluding that the testimony of the young girls victimized by Lucas and Husney was impalpable or highly suspect. In any event, as the United States Supreme Court observed in Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. at 740, “Counsel, had any been present, would have been under a duty to prevent the court from proceeding on . . . false assumptions and perhaps under a duty to seek remedy elsewhere if they persisted.” As noted previously, the two attorneys representing Husney made no objection to either the argument of the prosecutor in the areas at issue or the reliability of the transcript of the grand jury testimony. To the contrary, the primary thrust of defense counsel’s argument was that the girls were teenaged prostitutes, and that Husney and other adult males (other than Lucas) who had engaged them in sex were greater victims than the girls.