dissenting.
I agree with the majority that our decisions in Burkey v. Royle, 233 Neb. 549, 446 N.W.2d 720 (1989), and Edgerton v. Lawry, 235 Neb. 100, 453 N.W.2d 743 (1990), provide an appropriate framework for analysis of this case. I respectfully disagree with the manner in which the majority applies those decisions to the evidence in the record.
In my view, the critical inquiry is whether the motorist knew or should have known of a road surface condition which would affect his ability to stop or control his vehicle at the time and place of the accident. In Burkey, the motorist testified that sleet was falling and that there was ice and packed snow on the road surface where the accident occurred. She was aware of these conditions just before the accident and realized that they affected her ability to control and stop her vehicle. We held that because of this knowledge, she was not exonerated from application of the range of vision rule and was negligent as a matter of law.
However, in Edgerton we affirmed a judgment in favor of a motorist whose vehicle hit a patch of ice and slid into another vehicle, stating: “Unlike the situation in Burkey, there was . . . no ongoing storm nor were the streets covered with ice or snow, circumstances which should put any reasonable driver on notice of the prevailing dangerous conditions and on specific notice of the fact the streets were slippery.” (Emphasis supplied.) 235 Neb. at 102, 453 N.W.2d at 745. We further noted that although there had been recent freezing and thawing, neither driver had encountered any ice prior to reaching the scene of the collision and that the defendant had no reason to be aware of the ice on the roadway until it was too late to avoid the collision. Id.
I disagree with the majority in that I read these cases as requiring some form of “specific notice” that a road surface is *979slippery before a motorist can be held negligent as a matter of law for failing to avoid a collision despite slippery conditions. Roth admitted that he was generally aware of gravel on the streets of Omaha during the winter, but he testified that its presence that day had not affected his ability to stop his vehicle prior to the collision. The record indicates that he did not actually see the “unusual amount” of gravel on which he slid until after the accident. In fact, he had no opportunity to see this particular section of the road surface until the vehicle ahead of him changed lanes to avoid colliding with Martin’s stopped vehicle. He testified that he applied his brakes immediately after this occurred, but was unable to avoid the collision because his vehicle “slid” on the gravel.
I agree with the Court of Appeals that the material facts of this case are more similar to Edgerton than Burkey. Like the defendant in Edgerton, Roth had no awareness of the slippery road condition caused by the presence of gravel until moments before the collision. Giving Roth the benefit of all reasonable inferences, as required on a motion for directed verdict, a reasonable person could find that Roth had no actual knowledge of, or reason to anticipate, gravel on the road surface in an amount sufficient to affect traction and braking until it was too late to avoid the collision. Thus, in my view, the issue of whether Roth was negligent in operating his vehicle was properly submitted to the jury for decision, and I would therefore affirm.
Caporale, J., joins in this dissent.