(dissenting). I adhere to the view that peremptory reversal should be reserved for cases in which the law is settled and no factual assessment is required.1 In the instant case, as indicated in the majority opinion, a legal assessment is required. Peremptory disposition is not appropriate.
The meaning of the phrase, "within one hundred and eighty days after [the prisoner] shall have caused to be delivered” to the prosecutor and the *125court, written notice and request for formal disposition (Interstate Agreement on Detainers, MCL 780.601; MSA 4.147[1]), is not so free from doubt that peremptory disposition is appropriate.
The paraphrase of the quoted words by the United States Supreme Court, set forth in the majority opinion, who then has 180 days to bring the prisoner to trial,2 does not indicate whether the 180 days begin to run when notice is given or sent by the prisoner, or, rather, when notice is received by the prosecutor and court. The integrity of, and judicial reliance on, congressional committee reports, has been questioned.3 The weight of authority is surely worthy of consideration, but has not been thought to be controlling, or a sufficient reason, in itself, for decision.
Cavanagh, C.J., concurred with Levin,
Roek v Chippewa Valley Bd of Ed, 430 Mich 314, 322; 422 NW2d 680 (1988) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Grames v Amerisure Ins Co, 434 Mich 867, 868-875 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 769-770; 456 NW2d 237 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Wrenn, 434 Mich 885, 885-886 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Harkins v Northwest Activity Center, Inc, 434 Mich 896, 899 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Dep’t of Social Services v American Commercial Liability Ins Co, 435 Mich 508, 515; 460 NW2d 194 (1990) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Yahr v Garcia, 436 Mich 872 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Universal Underwriters Ins Co v Vallejo, 436 Mich 873, 873-874 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Stephens, 437 Mich 903, 903-910 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Berkey, 437 Mich 40, 54; 467 NW2d 6 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); Turner v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 437 Mich 35, 38-39; 467 NW2d 4 (1991) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Lepior v Venice Twp, 437 Mich 955, 956-966 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting).
See Schweiker v Hansen, 450 US 785, 791; 101 S Ct 1468; 67 L Ed 2d 685 (1981) (Marshall, J.,.dissenting) ("A summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved by this Court for situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error”); Leis v Flynt, 439 US 438, 457-458; 99 S Ct 698; 58 L Ed 2d 717 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Summary reversal should be reserved for palpably clear cases of . . . error.’ Eaton v Tulsa, 415 US 697, 707 [94 S Ct 1228; 39 L Ed 2d 693 (1974)] [Rehnquist, J., dissenting]”).
Ante, p 120.
“[W]e are a Government of laws not of committee reports.” Wisconsin Public Intervenor v Mortier, 501 US —; 111 S Ct 2476; 115 L Ed 2d 532, 553 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).