dissenting.
I dissent.
The presumption set forth in the pertinent statute is that
[w]henever a railroad abandons a railroad easement, all right, title and interest in the strip, piece or parcel of land constituting the abandoned easement shall be presumed to be vested in those persons, firms or corporations owning lots or parcels of land adjacent to the abandoned easement, with the presumptive ownership of each adjacent landowner extending to the centerline of the abandoned easement. In cases where the railroad easement adjoins a public road right-of-way, the adjacent property owner’s right, title and interest in the abandoned railroad easement shall extend to the nearest edge of the public road right-of-way.
N.C.G.S. § l-44.2(a), para. 1 (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
The application of the presumption in the case at bar is dependent upon the meaning to be given the word “adjoin.” I conclude that Judge Greene, who wrote for the majority on the panel below, correctly interpreted N.C.G.S. § l-44.2(a) as follows:
In applying statutes we must presume that the legislature intended that the words used in statutes be given the meaning they have in ordinary speech. LaFayette Transp. Serv., Inc. v. County of Robeson, 283 N.C. 494, 500, 196 S.E.2d 770, 774 (1973). Courts use the dictionary to determine the ordinary meaning of words. State v. Martin, 7 N.C. App. 532, 533, 173 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1970). Objects “adjoin” when they are “close to or in contact with one another.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 56 (9th ed. 1984). Therefore, the word “adjoin,” as used in the second sentence of N.C.G.S. § l-44.2(a), applies whenever the abandoned easement touches a public road right-of-way, whether within the abandoned easement or at its boundary.
Because the OB Road right-of-way is located within the abandoned easement, they adjoin, and the exception in the second sentence of N.C.G.S. § l-44.2(a) applies. Title to the disputed strip therefore is vested in the Church as adjacent property owner. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Nelson was error.
*139Nelson v. Battle Forest Friends Meeting, 108 N.C. App. 641, 646, 425 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1993).
The dictionary definitions cited by the majority demonstrate the various shades of meaning that the word embraces, and reasonable minds could read them to support a different result. I believe that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the word “adjoin” carries out the intention of the legislature.
As this Court has stated many times, the cardinal principle of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature is controlling. State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E.2d 338 (1978). “Where possible, statutes should be given a construction which, when practically applied, will tend to suppress the evil which the Legislature intended to prevent.” In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 96, 240 S.E.2d 367, 372 (1978). It is my view that the “evil” that the sentence of the statute emphasized above is designed to prevent is the loss of access to a public road enjoyed by owners of land lying adjacent to the railroad easement prior to its abandonment. The legislature was no doubt aware that, over the course of the many miles of railways in this state, many landowners can gain access to a public roadway only by crossing over a railroad easement. This circumstance is true whether the roadway traces the edge of the railway easement, is partially contained within it, or is completely contained within it. Under the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the statute, a landowner in such a position will, upon abandonment of the easement, be presumed to own the land over which it is necessary for him to cross to gain access to the roadway.
It is my view that the majority’s interpretation of the word “adjoin” severely and unnecessarily limits the purpose of the presumption and is contrary to the intent of the legislature. “A construction which will defeat or impair the object of the statute must be avoided if that can reasonably be done without violence to the legislative language.” In re Hardy, 240 N.C. at 96, 240 S.E.2d at 372. I do not believe that the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals does violence to the language of the statute, and I would hold that the second sentence of the statute applies in this case.
The Court of Appeals’ majority remanded this case to the trial court for consideration of the question of the constitutionality of the statute in question. The majority of this Court, however, *140declines to interpret the statute as did the Court of Appeals so as to avoid the constitutional question that such interpretation presents. It is true that “[w]here one of two reasonable constructions will raise a serious constitutional question, the construction which avoids this question should be adopted.” In re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 642, 231 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1977) (quoted by the majority). It is nonetheless also true that “[i]n matters of statutory construction, our primary task is to ensure that the purpose of the legislature, the legislative intent, is accomplished.” Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Electric Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991). In addition, the Court is “ ‘not at liberty to give a statute a construction at variance with [the legislature’s] intent, even though such construction appears to us to make the statute more desirable and free it from constitutional difficulties.’ ” Delconte v. North Carolina, 313 N.C. 384, 402, 329 S.E.2d 636, 648 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 520, 243 S.E.2d 338, 350 (1978)).
I believe that this Court’s interpretation of the statute circumvents the intent of the legislature and that such interpretation should not be chosen for the purpose of avoiding a constitutional question. I vote to affirm the Court of Appeals.
Chief Justice Exum and Justice Whichard join in this dissenting opinion.