concurring.
I concur fully in the majority opinion and write only to point out that, contrary to the position taken in the other concurring opinion, nothing in Division 2 of Jackson v. State, 276 Ga. 408 (577 SE2d 570) (2003) supports or even intimates a proposition contrary to the well-established rule set forth in Division 4 of this opinion regarding induced error. The other concurrence is attempting to validate a position rejected by this Court in Jackson and endorsed solely by the concurrence’s author in his dissent in Jackson, namely, that the error in that case (the return of a mutually exclusive verdict by the jury) was subject to an “induced error” analysis. Even assuming, arguendo, that the defendant in Jackson was solely responsible for the charge that misled the jury,2 a void judgment is void, regardless of the behavior of the parties. Id. at fn. 2.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson and Justice Hines join in this concurrence.
The transcript in Jackson reveals that, contrary to the misleading language in the other concurrence, the charge given by the trial court was agreed upon by the prosecution as well as the defense. Although a senior district attorney initially objected to the charge (correctly recognizing that it created the potential for a mutually-exclusive verdict), her objection was implicitly abandoned when her superior, the deputy chief assistant district attorney, in discussion with the trial court and defense counsel, agreed with the defense that the charge should be given, disagreeing only on how any conflict in the verdict should be resolved upon sentencing.