I dissent from the majority opinion because I disagree with its conclusion that at the time of the motion for summary disposition no reasonable trier of fact could have found that the defendant *218breached the standard of care causing the plaintiffs’ claimed damages. Rather, I would hold that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary disposition because there was a genuine issue of fact over which reasonable minds could differ. Mr. Paul’s and Dr. Lee’s testimony conflicted regarding whether Dr. Lee informed Mr. Paul that a follow-up sperm test was necessary and of the possibility of late failure years in the future. Mr. Paul testified that because he did not have this information, he was unaware of the risk involved in discontinuing all other contraceptive precautions. Because of this evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from it, there was an issue of fact for the jury to resolve. Therefore, the summary disposition motion was properly denied.
I. CAUSATION
The majority acknowledges that there was a factual dispute at the time of summary disposition. Ante at 215-216. However, it reasons that these factual discrepancies are not material because even if this Court accepts Mr. Paul’s version of the events, “Dr. Lee’s alleged failure to advise him to obtain sperm testing two months after the procedure could not have caused the Pauls to lose their opportunity to prevent the pregnancy because recanalization occurred only shortly before conception.” Id. at 216. The majority reasons that the trial court and, likely, the jury overlooked the plaintiffs’ burden to establish causation.
Further, the majority reasons that discrepancies concerning the subject of periodic sperm testing or alternative forms of contraception are immaterial because the standard of care does not require a doctor to advise the patient about these matters. The *219majority reasons that only this advice could have prevented the pregnancy. Because this advice was not required to be given, the plaintiffs could not establish that a breach of the standard of care caused their damages.
I disagree with the majority’s reasoning. The standard of care required Dr. Lee to advise Mr. Paul to have a two-month follow-up sperm test to ensure the success of the surgery. Mr. Paul claims that Dr. Lee did not give him that advice. The standard of care also required Dr. Lee to advise Mr. Paul that the operation could fail many years into the future, even with successful surgery, through no fault of the surgeon. Even though Mr. Paul signed a consent form stating that he realized that “occasionally, through no fault of the Surgeon, the tube may reunite, thus allowing pregnancy to occur,” he understood this risk to be present only in the first two months after the surgery and did not realize reunification could occur years into the future.
Accepting Mr. Paul’s allegations as true, there was a factual dispute at the time of the summary disposition motion. Although the majority concedes this point, it holds that the summary disposition motion should have been granted anyway, because the plaintiff could not prove that his claimed damages were caused by Dr. Lee’s breach of the standard of care. It is with that conclusion that I disagree.
The crucial information that a vasectomy patient must be given is included within the standard of care. This advice is required in order to give the patient an opportunity to determine whether the benefits derived from the surgery outweigh any risks that are presented. In this case, the tubes reunited over five *220years after the surgery, and pregnancy occurred as a result. Accepting Mr. Paul’s allegations as true, he was not aware of that risk. Not being aware of that risk, he could not protect himself against it. Even though the standard of care did not require Dr. Lee to advise Mr. Paul to have periodic sperm tests or to use alternative methods of birth control, Dr. Lee’s failure to advise Mr. Paul according to the standard of care made it more likely that Mrs. Paul would become pregnant than if he had been properly informed. The policy behind informed consent law is to give the patient all the relevant information and then let him decide what to do with it. Because the breach of the standard of care and causation were established, the motion for summary disposition was properly denied.
H. CONSENT FORM
Additionally, the majority reasons that any claim that Dr. Lee failed to advise Mr. Paul that the procedure could fail after the initial two-month period was properly precluded by the trial court because the signed consent form clearly spelled out the possibility of late failure. Again, I disagree with this conclusion and would hold that the trial court did not err in finding that the consent form was not clearly and equivocally intended to release the defendant from liability for negligence.
in. CONCLUSION
At the time of the summary disposition motion, a reasonable trier of fact could have found that Dr. Lee breached the standard of care and that the breach caused the plaintiffs’ damages. Thus, I would hold that the motion was properly denied and would affirm the jury verdict in the plaintiffs’ favor.