Michael Rochelle Wilson was convicted by a jury of possession of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. The trial *631judge sentenced him to twenty-five years imprisonment and fined him $50,000. On appeal, Wilson asserts the trial judge committed reversible error by allowing the State to introduce evidence of a prior drug transaction under Rule 404(b), SCRE, and State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923). We reverse and remand for a new trial.
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 24, 1995, police executed a search warrant on a motel room in the Downtowner Hotel in Sumter, S.C. The room was occupied by Wilson and his girlfriend, Mona Lisa Mitchell. As officers entered the room, Wilson came out of the adjoining bathroom. Officers searched the room and found a South Carolina identification card belonging to Wilson, a beeper, razor blades, and .78 grams of crack cocaine. They also found more than $700 in currency, a beer can modified for use as a pipe, and four small cellophane bags. Both Wilson and Mitchell were arrested and charged with possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute it.
In the week prior to Wilson’s trial, Mitchell was allowed by the State to plead guilty to the lesser offense of possession of crack cocaine in return for her agreement to testify against Wilson. According to Mitchell, she and Wilson were no longer boyfriend and girlfriend. During trial, Wilson objected to Mitchell’s testimony concerning an alleged drug transaction involving Wilson which she claimed to have witnessed in the hallway of the motel two days before the arrest. In the in camera hearing -which followed, Mitchell testified she saw Wilson hand a woman a plastic bag containing what appeared to be a white rock in exchange for twenty dollars. Mitchell characterized the substance as “drugs,” but during cross-examination explained that her basis for this assumption was that she recognized the person who took it as someone “who usually smoke.” However, she did not know the identity of the woman.
Wilson objected to the testimony on the grounds that it was not clear and convincing and the prejudice outweighed the probative value. The court ruled the testimony admissible to demonstrate Wilson’s intent to distribute the crack in the *632hotel room under State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923).
LAW/ANALYSIS
On appeal, Wilson argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts. He alleges the evidence (1) did not constitute clear and convincing proof of a prior crime, (2) was irrelevant, and (3) was extremely prejudicial.1 We agree that the State failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of the prior drug sale, and the evidence should not have been admitted.
Evidence of a person’s other bad acts is inadmissible to prove the person’s propensity to commit a crime. Rule 404(b), SCRE. Such evidence is admissible to demonstrate “motive, identity, the existence of a common scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or intent.” Id.; Lyle, supra. In a criminal case, evidence of other crimes or bad acts must be clear and convincing if the acts are not the subject of a conviction. State v. Parker, 315 S.C. 230, 433 S.E.2d 831 (1993); State v. Berry, 332 S.C. 214, 503 S.E.2d 770 (Ct.App.1998).
We conclude the uncorroborated testimony of Mitchell was not clear and convincing evidence of a prior crime.2 We first note that Mitchell unquestionably had a stake in the outcome by virtue of her involvement in the crime. To the extent she could place the blame for possession of the drugs upon Wilson, she obviously benefitted in her plea negotiation and in lessening her degree of culpability for sentencing purposes. Her credibility was thus diminished. Second, we note that her description of the prior sale was very scant, and almost casual. *633On one hand, she testified she only saw a bag containing a white substance, which she “guessed” contained drugs. On the other hand, she testified she “knew” the bag which was exchanged contained drugs, yet her only basis for that knowledge was her identification of the recipient as someone “who smoke” (sic), we assume, crack cocaine. This conclusion is further suspect, however, because she could not even identify the recipient. Finally, we note there is no independent indicia of reliability or corroboration.
Essentially, then, the only evidence of this prior drug sale was Mitchell’s description of it, which is subject to the inescapable conclusion that it could just as easily have been made up for personal gain as to have been truthful. Consequently, the evidence of a prior drug transaction was not clear and convincing. Where the issues of possession and intent to distribute are at stake, as they were here, the prejudice to the defendant is obvious, and requires no further elaboration.
For the forgoing reasons, Wilson’s conviction is
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOWELL, C.J., and HOWARD, J., concurring. HUFF, J., dissenting in a separate opinion.. The State contends Wilson's argument is not preserved because he failed to object during Mitchell’s testimony. After ruling Mitchell could testify concerning Wilson’s prior drug sale, the trial judge stated, "this is a continuing objection, so you do not have to renew it and any cross-examination or examination of it, it will not have to be renewed.” Because of the court's ruling, Wilson’s issue is preserved despite the lack of a contemporaneous objection.
. Because the evidence of a prior drug transaction was not clear and convincing, and should not have been admitted for that reason, we need not address the remaining arguments.