concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s affirmance of appellant’s adjudication of guilt. However, for the reasons explained in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in Wilson v. State,36 I would stay ruling on the constitutionality of appellant’s sentence of death by electrocution until receiving guidance from the United States Supreme Court on that issue.37
Appendix.
Speed v. State, 270 Ga. 688 (512 SE2d 896) (1999); Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851 (507 SE2d 419) (1998); Davis v. State, 263 Ga. 5 (426 SE2d 844) (1993); Hill v. State, 250 Ga. 277 (295 SE2d 518) (1982); Wallace v. State, 248 Ga. 255 (282 SE2d 325) (1981); Stevens v. State, 247 Ga. 698 (278 SE2d 398) (1981); McClesky v. State, 245 Ga. 108 (263 SE2d 146) (1980); Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553 (261 SE2d 364) (1979).
271 Ga. 811, 824 (525 SE2d 339) (1999).
In all capital cases, this Court is obligated to undertake a sua sponte review of the death sentence to determine, among other things, whether the penalty is excessive. OCGA § 17-10-35. “This penalty question is one of cruel and unusual punishment, and is for the court to decide” in all cases. Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292, 297 (236 SE2d 637) (1977).