¶ 35. (concurring). I agree with both the majority opinion and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's concurrence that this is not a typical anonymous jury. The circuit court judge merely replaced the name of each potential juror with a number during the voir dire process; the district attorney and the defendant still had access to each juror's name.
¶ 36. Even though this is not a typical anonymous jury, this court should be concerned about the decision of the circuit court to refer to the jurors by number only. I believe that fundamental constitutional rights, namely the right to a presumption of innocence and an *506impartial jury, are potentially implicated when a circuit judge deviates from the standard practice of full disclosure of juror information. It is therefore imperative that appellate courts properly scrutinize the effect that a deviation from the standard practice has on a defendant's constitutional rights.
¶ 37. I write separately to explain that the majority opinion's harmless error analysis misses the mark. The majority focuses only on the sufficiency of the evidence to convict and fails to assess whether the fundamental constitutional rights of the defendant were violated.
¶ 38. The majority concludes that a circuit court's erroneous decision to withhold juror information on voir dire is subject to the harmless error analysis established in State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189. Harvey holds that an error is harmless if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.1 In the present case, the majority opinion asserts that the evidence of the defendant's guilt was so "overwhelming" that no rational jury would have failed to convict her.2 Thus, according to the majority opinion, juries selected behind closed doors or by blindfolded defendants will be acceptable in Wisconsin courts as long as the evidence of a defendant's guilt is "overwhelming."
¶ 39. In short, the Harvey harmless error standard employed by the majority opinion is improper because it assesses for a harm unrelated to the alleged *507error.3 The improper withholding of juror information during voir dire does not become harmless simply because the evidence against the defendant is strong.
¶ 40. In this case the court's task is to determine whether the defendant may have been convicted by jurors biased against her as a result of a selection process conducted in partial secrecy. The Harvey standard of a rational jury considering the evidence is inapplicable because our inquiry is whether the jury was rational, that is, whether the jury was impartial and unbiased, not whether an error during trial was harmless.
¶ 41. The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that an impartial judge and jury are "basic protections" without which "a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence . .. and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair."4 A finding of guilt by a jury biased against the defendant is a "defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself."5 Justice Bradley's concurrence correctly identifies the alleged error in this case as an alleged structural defect.
¶ 42. Here the alleged error is an alleged structural defect because it is in the framework of the trial, the composition of the jury, not in a single event during *508trial. A defendant has a constitutional right to a presumption of innocence and an impartial jury.6 The presumption of innocence and an impartial jury are cornerstones of our criminal justice system and guaranteed by the due process clause of the United States Constitution.7 When juror information is withheld during voir dire of a criminal trial, violence may be done to a defendant's right to an unbiased and impartial jury.8 A natural inference jurors selected under secretive circumstances may draw is that the defendant is a dangerous person from whom they need protection, thereby implicating the defendant's constitutional rights.
¶ 43. Moreover, information kept from defendants may interfere with their ability to effectively exercise their strikes, thereby further jeopardizing their right to an impartial jury.9
¶ 44. Consequently, an appellate court can only conclude that the withholding of juror information was "harmless" if it determines that the defendant's due process rights were nevertheless protected.10
¶ 45. In the present case, I am convinced that a structural error did not occur. The defendant was convicted by an unbiased and impartial jury and her *509constitutional rights were protected despite the fact that the circuit court withheld information about the jurors. The only information. withheld in the present case was the names of the potential jurors, and that information was only withheld from the public. The defendant and the State had access to juror names because they possessed the juror questionnaires. Indeed, the defendant does not identify any information that she or her attorney were unable to obtain from the juror questionnaires or through voir dire.
¶ 46. More importantly, the defendant in the present case was given extensive opportunity to conduct voir dire, including asking questions about the presumption of innocence. The record does not indicate that the defendant had any difficulty exercising her peremptory challenges, and the defendant does not argue that she was forced to accept jurors who indicated an inability to presume her innocent until proven guilty *510during voir dire. Furthermore, the circuit court instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof at the end of the trial.
¶ 47. Lastly, while it was not a planned instruction, the circuit court judge explained to defense counsel in front of the venire that it was a regular practice "to refer to the jurors by number," thereby minimizing the likelihood that jurors would infer that their anonymity was required by the defendant's character in the present case.
¶ 48. If the withholding of juror information had infected the defendant's trial by compromising the presumption of innocence or jeopardizing the impartiality of the jury, a structural error would have occurred and we would be obligated to reverse the conviction, regardless of the strength or sufficiency of the evidence. Structural error defies harmless error review.11 The Harvey test for harmless error set forth in the majority opinion does not apply in the present case. However, because I am convinced that none of the harm that can be caused by withholding juror information injured the defendant here by causing a structural error, no reason exists to overturn her conviction.
¶ 49. For the foregoing reasons, I concur.
State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶ 49, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.
Majority op., ¶ 26.
There may be several harmless-error tests depending on the nature of the right violated. In re Jayton S., 2001 WI 110, ¶ 40, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (quoting 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 27.6(b), at 938-39 (2d ed. 1999)).
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986)).
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).
See, e.g., United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 650 (7th Cir. 2002).
See United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1364 (2d Cir. 1985) ("the presumption of innocence is of significant importance, and is protected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment").
See Mansoori, 304 F.3d at 650 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., United States v. DiDomenico, 78 F.3d 294, 301 (7th Cir. 1996).
See Wis. Stat. § 805.18 (2001-02), which provides as follows:
*509(1) The court shall, in every stage of an action, disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party.
(2) No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new trial granted in any action or proceeding on the ground of selection or misdirection of the jury, or improper admission of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to which the application is made, after an examination of the entire action or proceeding, it shall appear that the error complained of has affected the substantial rights of the party seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to secure a new trial.
See also State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶¶ 69-82, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223 (holding that whether a conviction will be reversed on an alleged error in jury selection focuses on whether the jury that actually sat on the case is impartial).
Neder, 527 U.S. at 8. See also Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶ 37.