The majority concludes that, at least in this case, an attorney’s interest in suing a present client takes precedence over the client’s right to discharge an attorney who no longer enjoys the client’s full trust and confidence. I do not agree.
My primary objection is not to the majority’s interpretation of statutes and disciplinary rules but, rather, to its failure to see the problem from the client’s perspective. This failure is evident in the majority’s belief that there can be “general antagonism between lawyer and client” due to litigation between them without “actually compromising] client representation.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 547, 552.) Experienced attorneys may have no difficulty meeting as friends after facing each other as adversaries in court. But the same is not to be expected of clients, who justifiably feel that they are entitled to their advocates’ unquestioned loyalty. “When a client engages the services of a lawyer in a given piece of business he is entitled to feel that, until that business is finally disposed of in some manner, he has the undivided loyalty of the one upon whom he looks as his advocate and his champion. If, as in this case, he is sued ... by his own attorney, who is representing him in another matter, all feeling of loyalty is necessarily destroyed, and the profession is exposed to the charge that it is interested only in money.” (Grievance Com. of Bar of Hartford County v. Rottner (1964) 152 Conn. 59 [203 A.2d 82, 84].)
Because clients do expect loyalty, I find no reason to doubt the sincerity of the members of the board of supervisors who testified that being sued by their own attorneys has “greatly affected” their “level of trust and confidence” in the latter. The majority, I submit, tacitly concedes that the supervisors’ fears are reasonable by holding that the supervisors, “to respond to the lawsuit,” may reorganize the county counsel’s office and reassign members of the Association to matters outside the field of labor relations. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 557.) What is the point of such a reorganization unless file supervisors have actually lost confidence in their attorneys’ ability to represent the county effectively, at least in the area of labor relations, on *559account of their attorneys’ decision to accuse the county in open court of violating the labor relations laws?
The majority, in concluding that these attorneys may sue their clients, places far too much weight on the absence of a specific disciplinary rule to the contrary. If anything can be inferred from the absence of such a rule it is not that this court, or the bar, implicitly endorses such conduct. Instead, the more reasonable inference is that in most cases no rule is necessary. From my experience, any lawyer in private practice so bold as to sue his client can expect to be fired on the spot. As one court put it, “[t]he almost complete absence of authority governing the situation . . . indicates to us that the common understanding and the common conscience of the bar is in accord with [the view] that such a suit constitutes a reprehensible breach of loyalty . . . .” (Grievance Com. of Bar of Hartford County v. Rottner, supra, 152 Conn. 59 [203 A.2d at p. 85].)
In the rare cases in which an attorney has become the client’s adversary in litigation, the resulting appearance of impropriety has been found too serious to countenance. Thus, we have enjoined the Attorney General from suing the Governor, his client, on the ground that he was bound by the same ethical principles that prevent other attorneys from representing adverse interests. (People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 150, 155-160 [172 Cal.Rptr. 478, 624 P.2d 1206].) Similarly, other courts have held that a criminal defendant who was sued by his attorney for fees while in jail awaiting sentencing was entitled to have his conviction reversed on account of ineffective assistance without proving that the lawsuit actually affected his counsel’s performance (Clark v. State (1992) 108 Nev. 324 [831 P.2d 1374,1377]), and that an in-house attorney who represented a corporation on employment matters was properly terminated for filing a discrimination suit against the corporation (Jones v. Flagship Intern. (5th Cir. 1986) 793 F.2d 714, 726, cert. den. (1987) 479 U.S. 1065 [93 L.Ed.2d 1001,107 S.Ct. 952]).
The county’s brief nicely illustrates how the appearance of impropriety arises in such cases and why it is so serious: “the County will be greatly disadvantaged in defending itself against the Association’s proposed lawsuit. The Association members have been privy to the most confidential internal communications within the County government for years. As plaintiffs, they will have an awareness of their defendants’ strategies, resources and legal opinions that would be protected from any other plaintiff by the attorney-client privilege. This insider’s familiarity will give the Association an invaluable advantage in making legal argument, but particularly in pursuing settlement. The County will be put in the untenable position of having to rely on outside counsel that knows less about the Supervisors and the inner workings of the County client than does the party suing it.”
*560In this way, when governmental and other in-house lawyers sue their clients, the former relationship of trust and confidence becomes an unfair tactical and informational advantage that the client may well view as a serious betrayal. This, in my view, is something that this court should prevent and has the power to prevent. We have always accepted the ultimate responsibility of regulating the practice of law and claimed the prerogative of doing so as one of “the inherent powers of the article VI courts.” (Hustedt v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 329, 336 & fn. 5 [178 Cal.Rptr. 801, 636 P.2d 1139]; see also The People v. Turner (1850) 1 Cal. 143,150.) Indeed, we have held to be unconstitutional statutes that purported to usurp that prerogative. (Hustedt v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 336; Merco Constr. Engineers, Inc. v. Municipal Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 724, 728-729 [147 Cal.Rptr. 631, 581 P.2d 636]; In re Lavine (1935) 2 Cal.2d 324, 329 [41 P.2d 161].)
It is unfortunate that today the majority takes a step backwards by concluding that the general statute authorizing courts to issue the writ of mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) somehow supersedes our inherent power to regulate the bar, unlike the other statutes that have come into conflict with that power. The majority asserts that the petition for mandate, “[a]s a statutory right, ... is for the Legislature to delineate” and that “[t]here is therefore no room for a common law limitation on the right to writ relief.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 542.) But the majority’s reasoning is faulty. This court’s power to regulate the practice of law is grounded in article VI of the state Constitution rather than the common law. (Hustedt v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 336 & fn. 5.) When the Constitution conflicts with a statute, the former must control.
Finally, I doubt whether the majority’s holding will be good for governmental and other in-house attorneys. In recent years the status of in-house attorneys has improved as governments and businesses have increasingly relied upon them in their drive to save legal costs. This is good for society, because attorneys with intimate knowledge of and constant access to their clients are in an excellent position to advise responsible behavior and compliance with the law. However, in-house attorneys enjoy this trust and confidence in large measure because they have been held to the same high ethical standards as all other attorneys. If, through decisions such as this, the perception arises that in-house attorneys are not being held to the same ethical standards, their professional standing and usefulness to their clients and society will diminish to the detriment of attorney and client alike.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 19, 1994.
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.