(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In this case the parties have agreed to joint custody. Our task, like the district court’s, is to determine the physical care arrangement most likely to accomplish the custodial objectives provided in Iowa Code section 598.41. These objectives include an arrangement which assures maximum continuing contact with both parents and shared parental rights and responsibilities in raising the children. Id. The result reached by the majority fails to accomplish these objectives.
The record includes ample evidence supporting Carla’s allegations of domestic abuse. The severity and frequency of domestic violence in this case has not been disputed or minimized. Bruce accepted responsibility for his abusive behavior and the resulting negative consequences for the children. The dis-*58triet court expressly noted the sincerity of Bruce’s contrition and assigned considerable weight to his testimony. Although not bound by the district court’s findings of fact, we are deferential to the district court’s assignment of credibility. Iowa R.App. P. 14(f)(7). In an unprecedented departure from this basic rule of appellate review, the majority, without explanation, ignores the district court’s finding concerning the sincerity of Bruce’s testimonial contrition. We are greatly aided in our appellate determination by deference to the credibility assessment by a wise and discerning trial judge. The majority is mistaken in its failure to do so.
Vindication of an abused spouse and advancement of the children’s best interests are seldom mutually exclusive remedial objectives. However, a history of domestic violence does not presumptively require an award of physical care to the victimized parent. Domestic violence is one of many considerations the court is required to consider in making its custodial determination. In re Marriage of Wilson, 532 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Iowa App.1995); In re Marriage of Brainard, 523 N.W.2d 611, 614-15 (Iowa App.1994).
The majority is extravagantly presumptuous in its declaration that evidence of domestic violence is more compelling than any other consideration mandated by these authorities. This is not a domestic abuse case in which urgent circumstances require the court to resort to such presumptions. Moreover, the statutory scheme of presumptions favoring an award of sole custody to an abused spouse is not applicable because the parties have agreed to an award of joint custody. Iowa Code § 598.41(4).
The majority’s misplaced reliance on contextually inapplicable presumptions favoring Carla and its unexplained disregard of the district court’s credibility findings casts considerable doubt on the equity of its custodial award. I strongly disagree with the majority’s willingness to rely on presumption and attribution in a physical care dispute. Children are better served in these matters by the court’s consideration of all of the facts and circumstances present in each case. To hold otherwise permits sensibility and indignation to displace critical judgment. It is simply wrong for the majority to presumptively deny Bruce consideration for physical care.
The record also indicates Carla denied Bruce all contact with the- children for ten months following a February 1995 altercation despite Bruce’s efforts to obtain visitation with the children. Contrary to Carla’s contentions, the evidence supports Bruce’s claim that she sought to extract custodial concessions from Bruce by denying him visitation unless he signed a stipulation awarding her physical care. Carla remained unyielding in her refusals until the district court ordered her to return the children for visitation with Bruce and she learned contempt proceedings were imminent.
Although Bruce’s behavior may have justified Carla’s initial interruption of visitation, I fail to see how the interests of these children were served by denying them any contact with their father for ten months. Moreover, I, like the district court, find Carla’s explanation of her steadfast refusal to allow any visitation less than compelling. Carla’s attempt to use these children for leverage in settlement negotiations with Bruce reflects adversely on her custodial judgment and substantially compromises the joint custodial objectives referred to earlier.
An award of joint custody is more than a consolation prize for the parent denied physical care. As joint custodians each parent’s rights and responsibilities included equal participation in decisions affecting the children’s legal status, medical care, education, extracurricular activities, and religious instruction. Iowa Code § 598.41(5). Although the majority is liberal in its attribution of Bruce’s negative parental qualities, it is ironically content to endorse a custody arrangement which empowers him to the foregoing extent. It is also difficult to reconcile a successful exercise of the rights and responsibilities inherent in a joint custody arrangement with Carla’s demonstrated disdain for Bruce’s equal parental participation.
Despite the majority’s dire assessment of the children’s future in Bruce’s physical care, the record indicates that they are comfort*59ably and happily situated in their present circumstances. Justin has made remarkable progress in school. Both children have benefited from their association with Bruce’s extended family. The record also reveals no evidence indicating the children display any signs of lingering emotional or behavior problems as a result of past parental conflict.
When this evidence is viewed solely from the perspective of the children’s best interests, the wisdom of the district court’s custodial award is apparent. The district court noted the children’s needs for long-term stability and concluded their present circumstances offer a better opportunity for its achievement. I, like the district court, find it more important to preserve this opportunity for the children’s long-term security and stability than it is to vindicate past spousal misconduct. I would affirm the district court.
SACKETT, J., joins this dissent.