Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Ass'n, Inc.

Carley, Justice,

dissenting.

“ ‘It is the duty of this court to raise the question of its jurisdiction in all cases in which there may be any doubt as to the existence of such jurisdiction. (Cits.)’ [Cit.]” Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). Here, Owners’ notice of appeal invokes this Court’s jurisdiction on the ground that this is an equity case. Under our constitution, this Court “shall have appellate jurisdiction of. . . All equity cases . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. Ill (2). The majority concludes that this is not such a case and, as the support for its holding, broadly posits that “appeals addressing the trial court’s grant or denial of equitable relief for the breach of restrictive covenants do not come within the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.” I believe that this is an erroneous statement of the law, as it is completely contrary to the holding in Beauchamp v. Knight, 261 Ga. 608, 609 (2) (409 SE2d 208) (1991) that this Court’s equity jurisdiction does not depend upon the allegations of the complaint. As I construe Beauchamp, it is immaterial to appellate jurisdiction that the trial court’s order was entered in connection with the Owners’ alleged breach of restrictive covenants. The constitution confers upon this Court appellate jurisdiction over all equity cases, and makes no exception for an equity case involving an alleged breach of restrictive covenants. Unlike the majority, I believe that the controlling factor is whether a substantive issue in this appeal involves the legality or propriety of the equitable relief granted by the superior court with regard to the covenants. Saxon v. Coastal Dialysis & Med. Clinic, 267 Ga. 177, 178-179 (476 SE2d 587) (1996). In my opinion, the existence here of an issue involving the equitable defense of laches mandates that this be considered an equity case within the appellate jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by our constitution. Therefore, I dissent to the majority’s unconstitutional transfer of this appeal for resolution by the Court of Appeals.

It is clear that, pursuant to this state’s constitution, we do not have jurisdiction over an appeal involving a plaintiff’s action at law in which the defendant raised an equitable defense. Alderman v. Crenshaw, 208 Ga. 71 (65 SE2d 178) (1951) (action at law for partitioning), overruled on other grounds, Wiley v. Wiley, 233 Ga. 824, 826 (1) (213 SE2d 682) (1975); Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Bischoff, 179 Ga. 255 (175 SE 560) (1934) (suit at law on insurance policy); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 191 Ga. App. 139 (381 SE2d 84) (1989) (suit on a note). However, this case involves the Association’s action for an injunction, which is equitable, not legal, relief. Therefore, the prin*753ciple that the mere assertion of an equitable defense does not transform an action at law into an “equity case” within this Court’s jurisdiction is not applicable here.

Where, as here, equitable relief was sought in the superior court, jurisdiction does not rest in the Court of Appeals simply because a legal issue is raised in the appeal. Instead, this Court’s jurisdiction attaches so long as “a substantive issue on appeal involves the legality or propriety of [the] equitable relief sought in the superior court — whether that relief was granted or denied.” Beauchamp v. Knight, supra at 609 (2). Thus, contrary to the majority’s analysis, the mere presence in this appeal of a legal issue, such as the construction of the restrictive covenants, does not divest this Court of its constitutional jurisdiction. We must retain jurisdiction if, in addition to that legal issue, the appeal raises an equitable issue concerning the substantive injunctive relief which the superior court granted by the order which was appealed by Owners. Although an action at law does not become an equity case within this Court’s jurisdiction simply because an equitable defense is pled, this Court does have jurisdiction of an appeal wherein an issue is presented as to the propriety of the disposition of the equitable claim if the resolution of that issue requires consideration of an equitable defense. Since this case involves an underlying action for equitable relief, the dispositive jurisdictional question is whether the issue on appeal involves the legality or propriety of the injunctive relief which was granted in the superior court. Saxon v. Coastal Dialysis & Med. Clinic, supra at 178-179; Beauchamp v. Knight, supra at 609 (2).

This Court does not have jurisdiction over a case simply because it involves the equitable defense of laches or any other equitable defense. It does, however, have jurisdiction over all equity cases. Standing alone, the raising in the superior court of an equitable defense, even in an equitable action such as this, is not sufficient to bring a case within our equity jurisdiction. There is a clear distinction to be drawn between a litigant’s pleading of an equitable defense below and an appellant’s assertion on appeal of the substantive issue of the propriety of the superior court’s disposition of the claim for injunctive relief. For purposes of appellate jurisdiction, the pleadings are completely irrelevant, because the issue on appeal controls. Therefore, if the dispositive appellate issue in an equity case is not equitable, but legal, then jurisdiction is within the Court of Appeals, regardless of whether an equitable defense was or was not pled below. See Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Professional Assn., 263 Ga. 66 (428 SE2d 328) (1993) (injunctive relief ancillary to dispositive legal issue of contract construction). However, Pittman does not stand for the proposition that this Court has no jurisdiction over cases which seek injunctive relief for the breach of restrictive covenants. To the *754contrary, Pittman recognizes that this Court does have jurisdiction over such a case if the issue on appeal involves the legality or propriety of the injunctive relief granted or denied by the superior court. Thus, if the controlling issue in the appeal in an equity case is equitable, not legal, then jurisdiction is in this Court, even if that issue relates to an equitable defense. In this case, the legal issue of the construction of the restrictive covenants is not the only issue raised on appeal. Compare Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Professional Assn., supra. In addition, the equitable defense of laches was raised below and the superior court, by issuing the injunction pursuant to its grant of summary judgment against Owners, actually ruled on that defense as a matter of law. On appeal, Owners enumerate as error the ruling on that issue. Therefore, the decisive jurisdictional question is whether the superior court’s ruling on the equitable defense of laches is itself an equitable issue which is related to the propriety of the trial court’s disposition of the equitable claim for injunctive relief.

Because restrictive covenants are a legal matter, there is no requirement that they be construed by a court invested with equity jurisdiction. Pittman and similar cases were brought in the superior court only because relief in the form of an injunction was being sought for an alleged breach of covenants. In those cases, the dispositive issue of construction of the covenants was exactly the same as if damages, rather than injunctive relief, had been sought. Unlike the issue of covenant construction, however, laches can never be addressed by a court lacking equitable jurisdiction. “The doctrine of laches is a purely equitable defense and is not applicable to a complaint for the enforcement of a legal right. [Cit.]” Stuckey v. Storms, 265 Ga. 491 (1) (458 SE2d 344) (1995). Because it is a purely equitable matter, laches requires the superior court to “balance” numerous factors so as to determine the fairness of the competing interests.

“In determining whether there has been laches, various things are to be considered, notably the duration of the delay in asserting the claim, and the sufficiency of the excuse offered in extenuation thereof, whether during the delay the evidence of the matters in dispute has been lost or become obscure, whether plaintiff or defendant was in possession of the property in suit during the delay, whether the party charged with laches had an opportunity to have acted sooner, and whether the party charged with laches acted at the first possible opportunity. To constitute the defense of laches the delay must have been such as practically to preclude the court from arriving at a safe conclusion as to the truth of the matters in controversy, and thus make the doing of equity either doubtful or impossible, due to loss or *755obscuration of evidence of the transaction in issue, or where the lapse of time has been sufficient to create or justify a presumption against the existence or validity of the plaintiff’s right, or to justify a presumption that, if the plaintiff was ever possessed of a right, it has been abandoned or waived, or has been satisfied.” [Cits.]

Hodges v. Libbey, 224 Ga. 509, 510 (162 SE2d 716) (1968). As this Court held in Beaulieu of America v. L.T. Dennard & Co., 253 Ga. 21-22 (1) (315 SE2d 889) (1984), “[Haches is peculiarly a factual defense, the resolution of which will rest in the sound discretion of the trial judge, sitting as a chancellor in equity, and without the intervention of a jury. [Cit.]” Thus, laches invokes the discretion of the superior court as to the legality or propriety of the equitable claim being asserted. It follows that a review of the decision reflecting the exercise of such discretion is within this Court’s jurisdiction, since the superior court’s ruling on a laches defense is a primary equitable issue related to the propriety of the disposition of the equitable claim for relief. This is the precise holding of our recent decision in McGhee v. Johnson, 268 Ga. 731 (492 SE2d 893) (1997), wherein each and every member of this Court concurred fully. This jurisdictional holding in McGhee is consistent with an unbroken line of cases. See also City of Dalton v. Carroll, 271 Ga. 1 (515 SE2d 144) (1999); Beaulieu of America v. L.T. Dennard & Co., supra. Compare Saxton v. Coastal Dialysis & Med. Clinic, supra; Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Professional Assn., supra; Beauchamp v. Knight, supra.

It is important to note that, as authority for its contrary conclusion that appeals in cases involving injunctive relief for breach of covenants in which laches is an issue on appeal are not within this Court’s jurisdiction, the majority cites no case from this Court. Indeed, it cannot do so, as heretofore we have always taken the contrary view. See McGhee v. Johnson, supra. Instead, the majority is forced to cite two Court of Appeals cases as the ostensible support for its conclusion regarding this Court’s jurisdiction. It is unclear whether King v. Baker, 214 Ga. App. 229 (447 SE2d 129) (1994) was a legal action for declaratory judgment wherein injunctive relief was merely ancillary or was a true equitable action seeking an injunction as the primary relief. If the former, then jurisdiction clearly was in the Court of Appeals, since that court has jurisdiction over appeals in declaratory judgment cases. If the latter, then King was erroneously transferred, because of the long-standing rule that jurisdiction over such cases is in this Court. This is aptly demonstrated by the fact that each and every case cited in the discussion of the laches issue in King, supra at 232 (3), was a decision rendered by this Court, rather than by the Court of Appeals. Moreover, subsequent to the transfer of *756King to the Court of Appeals, this Court has consistently recognized that it has jurisdiction in equity cases wherein a laches defense is raised and ruled on below and remains an issue on appeal. City of Dalton v. Carroll, supra; McGhee v. Johnson, supra. Therefore, King does not support the proposition that jurisdiction over such a case is in the Court of Appeals and, to the extent that it may stand for such an erroneous principle, it should be overruled. Levingston v. Crable, 203 Ga. App. 16 (416 SE2d 131) (1992) did not involve any equitable issue at all, because the only question on appeal was the legal issue of whether the consent order was a final judgment. Therefore, Levingston is not inconsistent with that long line of cases recognizing this Court’s constitutional mandate to exercise jurisdiction over equity cases wherein the issue of laches is raised on appeal.

If the only matter presented for resolution on appeal in this equity case was the construction of the restrictive covenants, jurisdiction would lie in the Court of Appeals because that is a legal, not an equitable, matter. Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Professional Assn., supra. The grant or denial of injunctive relief in such a case would be “merely ancillary” to the construction question or a “matter of routine” once that legal issue was resolved. Beauchamp v. Knight, supra at 609 (2). In addition to the legal issue, however, the superior court’s ruling on the equitable defense of laches is raised on appeal. Under these circumstances, the grant or denial of injunctive relief to the Association does not follow automatically based upon resolution of the legal, question, but is dependent upon an appellate determination of the superior court’s discretionary ruling on the purely equitable defense of laches. Thus, the superior court’s grant of injunctive relief in this case is not merely ancillary to the construction of the covenants, or a matter of routine once that legal issue is resolved. Instead, an additional substantive issue on appeal is whether the superior court erred when, acting in its equitable capacity, it balanced the factors and rejected Owners’ defense of laches. I agree that by simply interposing their laches defense below, Owners did not ensure that any appeal ultimately would be brought to this Court. However, the superior court’s ruling on that defense authorizes and, indeed, requires Owners to invoke the constitutional provision conferring exclusive jurisdiction over such an appeal upon this Court, rather than the Court of Appeals. The question of whether the superior court, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, ruled correctly on the Owners’ defense of laches and thereby properly granted injunctive relief is a substantive equitable issue over which this Court, and only this Court, has jurisdiction. Because this is an equity case within our jurisdiction, we should proceed with our constitutional obligation to address the appeal on its merits.

By failing to adhere to the general mandate of Beauchamp and *757the specific holding in McGhee, the Court today has, in effect, shifted to the Court of Appeals the appellate jurisdiction over equity cases which the Constitution of Georgia confers upon this Court. The simple truth of the matter is that henceforth, this Court will exercise its equity jurisdiction only over those equitable issues it wishes to resolve, and will serve as a mere conduit for transferring all other “equity cases” to the Court of Appeals. Because the Georgia Constitution does not authorize this Court to pick and choose which “equity cases” it will hear, I must dissent.

Decided November 23, 1999. Chilivis, Cochran, Larkins & Bever, Nickolas P. Chilivis, John K. Larkins, Jr., Brian V. Patterson, for appellants. Weissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco, Leigh M. Wilco, Derek W. Johanson, for appellees.

I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.