Ricky Joe Archuletta appeals his conviction by a jury of burglary.1 His claims of error are: (1) that he was denied a speedy trial; (2) that evidence was improperly admitted as to (a), his confession and (b), of the fact that he had previously been in prison.
On February 8,1976, the home of Johnny and Judy Delgado in Ogden was burglarized while they were away. When they returned and discovered the burglary they notified the police. Investigation showed that the entry had been by breaking a bedroom window; and that a television, stereo system with speakers, and a hunting rifle had been taken. Significantly, a hair brush, which was later identified as belonging to defendant, was found among the broken glass near the window.
Defendant is a cousin of Johnny Delgado. He had been in the Delgado home earlier on the day of the burglary, when Johnny showed the defendant his new rifle. Also while he was there, there was some discussion about the defendant having to pay a fine, and the proposition was discussed that the items above referred to and others might be pawned in order to raise the money to pay the defendant’s fine, but no such plan was agreed upon.
Mr. Delgado told the police that he had reason to believe that the defendant Ricky Archuletta and one Ralph Gomez may have committed the burglary. In their investigation the police contacted the defendant. He was given the “Miranda warning.” Some contention is made that he could not read or write English and that he did not fully understand the import of this questioning session by the officers. However, he was offered an interpreter, which he refused, stating that he understood “good enough.” From the questions asked, and his responses, the trial court was satisfied that he did understand and participate in the conversation. Sparing the detail thereof, in his answers he told about himself and Ralph Gomez breaking into the Delgado home and stealing the television, stereo system, and the rifle. He also acknowledged that he had no permission to take them and offered to assist the police in recovering some of the items, which he later did. The essential questions and answers were reduced to writing and read to the defendant, and upon request of the police he signed the statement.
Concerning defendant’s contention that he was not given a speedy trial, the essential facts are these: Defendant was arraigned on March 30, 1976, and a trial date was set for April 30, 1976. It was later discovered that April 30, was a legal holiday (Arbor Day) and thus the trial date was stricken from the calendar. Defendant filed a demand for a speedy trial on May 3, 1976. The court attempted to arrange a trial date for June 3rd, but it appears that the defendant’s then counsel was unavailable for that setting; and the trial was set and carried out six days later, on June 9, 1976.
There is no doubt about the importance of complying with the requirements of both the United States and Utah Constitutions:2 that one accused of crime is entitled to a prompt trial setting and disposition of the charge if he so desires and requests.3 The purpose of those constitutional provisions is to guard against any intentional delay which may be oppressive or persecutorial iñ nature.4 In order to avoid any such baneful effect the requirements of the law should be respected and complied with insofar as can be achieved within the practical operations of the courts. However, the court does not lose jurisdiction because of such a delay and, unless there is some intentional *549delay of an oppressive character, which results in prejudice to the defendant, the processes of justice should not be wholly defeated thereby. It is for this reason that this court has consistently held that the statutory time within which a trial shall be had is directory and not mandatory.5 As the facts recited above show, there was no such abuse in this case.
Defendant’s argument that evidence of his confession and/or admissions concerning the crime was improperly admitted is based mainly on his assertion that he could not read or write the English language and therefore did not understand the conversation with the police officers. Whether he could read or write the English language is immaterial and would not render his confession invalid.6 That question was primarily for the trial court to determine and the evidence clearly supports its ruling that the defendant so understood and that his confession was voluntary.
The reference to the fact that the defendant had been in prison came from a voluntary statement in his mother’s testimony; and in fact there had been a previous similar reference during the trial. In addition to those facts, there was neither objection nor motion to strike when the statement was made. For these reasons there was no impropriety in the occurrence of which the defendant can now complain.7
Other errors urged are without merit. For the reasons stated herein, the conviction is affirmed. No costs awarded.
MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.. Section 76-6-202, U.C.A.1953.
. U.S.Const., Sixth Amend.; Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12.
. Section 77-1-8, U.C.A. (1953) provides in criminal prosecutions, the defendant is entitled to have a speedy public trial and every defendant in a criminal action unable to get bail shall be entitled to a trial within thirty days after arraignment.
. U. S. v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966).
. State v. Lozano, 23 Utah 2d 312, 462 P.2d 710 (1969); State v. Rasmussen, 18 Utah 2d 201, 418 P.2d 134 (1966).
. Birkenfeld v. State, 104 Md. 253, 65 A. 1 (1906).
. Stagmeyer v. Leatham Brothers, Inc., 20 Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968).