(concurring specially).
I concur with the result reached by the majority, but write separately to express my concern about the standards of determining the admissibility of “reverse Spreigl ”1 evidence.
Although I agree that the foundational requirements for admissibility of reverse Spreigl evidence are identical to those foundational requirements for admissibility of Spreigl evidence, I disagree with the conclusion reached by both the majority and the dissent that the analyses within each foundational requirement for admissibility of reverse Spreigl evidence are the same as the analyses within each foundational requirement for admissibility of Spreigl evidence. Whereas Spreigl evidence is offered to show that prior crimes committed by the defendant make it more likely that the defendant *437committed the crime for which the defendant is charged, see State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 491, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (1965), reverse Spreigl evidence is offered to show that prior crimes committed by third parties make it less likely that the defendant committed the crime for which the defendant is charged, see State v. Bock, 229 Minn. 449, 458, 39 N.W.2d 887, 892 (1949). Because the purposes for which the two types of evidence are offered are so divergent, I am unconvinced that the same standards should apply for admission of both Spreigl and reverse Spreigl evidence.
The majority correctly states that the party proffering “other-crime” evidence must show by clear and convincing evidence that the “other crime” has been committed; that evidence of the “other crime” is relevant and material to a party’s case; and that the probative value of the “other-crime” evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice. See State v. Landin, 472 N.W.2d 854, 859 (Minn.1991). The majority also is correct in asserting that these foundational requirements apply whether the party offering the evidence is the state or the defendant. Both the majority and dissent incorrectly assume, however, that the determinations within each of these three requirements are the same regardless of whether the party offering the evidence is the state or the defendant. A rather obvious example of the inherent difference between the determinations within each of the requirements occurs within the first requirement: Whereas the state must show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant participated in the “other crime,” see State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 179, 149 N.W.2d 281, 285 (1967); the defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence that someone other than the defendant committed the “other crime,” see State v. Willis, 364 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Minn.App.1985). Likewise, there is an inherent difference.between the determination of whether “other-crime” evidence is relevant and material to the party’s case.
When the state is offering “other-crime” evidence, it is attempting to show that prior crimes committed by the defendant make it more likely that the defendant has committed the crime for which he or she is charged. Because evidence of all prior crimes committed by the defendant make it more likely that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she is charged, all “other-crime” evidence is relevant. See Minn. R. Evid. 401; Spreigl, 272 Minn. at 495-96, 139 N.W.2d at 172; see also 1A John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 58.2 (Tillers rev. ed.1983).2 Because the Minnesota Rules of Evidence generally prohibit the use of “other-crime” evidence for the purpose of showing subsequent conforming behavior, however, the state must show that the “other crime” fits within one of the many exceptions to this general prohibition. See Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). The state also must show that the probative value of this “other-crime” evidence substantially outweighs its danger of causing unfair prejudice. State v. Frisinger, 484 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Minn.1992). As such, we allow evidence only of those “other crimes” that are substantially similar to the crime for which the defendant is on trial. State v. Cogshell, 538 N.W.2d 120, 123-24 (Minn.1995). When it is the state that proffers evidence of “other crimes” committed by the defendant, therefore, the question is not so much one of relevancy as it is one of legal admissibility. Although relevant, “other-crime” evidence generally is inadmissible because we fear that juries will unfairly punish the defendant for past acts. As such, we allow evidence of “other crimes” only when those crimes are sufficiently similar to the charged crime to figuratively tip the probative side of the equation past the unfairly prejudicial side.
*438When it is the defendant who proffers “other-crime” evidence, however, the analysis centers not on the unfairly prejudicial nature of otherwise relevant evidence, but on the issue of relevance itself. Unlike “other crimes” committed by the defendant, “other crimes” committed by third parties typically are irrelevant to the determination of whether the defendant committed the crime for which he or she is charged. As a general matter, evidence of other murders, burglaries, robberies or rapes committed in the same city, county, state or country do not make it more or less likely that a certain criminal defendant committed the murder, burglary, robbery or rape for which he or she is charged. As such, evidence of “third-party crimes” generally will be inadmissible, not because we fear such evidence will unfairly prejudice a jury, but because evidence of “third-party crimes” makes it neither more likely nor less likely that the defendant committed the crimes for which he or she is charged. See Minn. R. Evid. 401. That all changes, however, when the “third-party crime” is so similar to the one for which the defendant is charged that we begin to question whether the state has charged the proper person. See Bock, 229 Minn. at 458, 39 N.W.2d at 892. In those instances, we allow the defendant to offer evidence of a “third-party crime” for the purpose of casting doubt on the state’s claim. Id. Unlike evidence of “other crimes” committed by the defendant, which are always relevant, evidence of “other crimes” committed by third parties becomes relevant only when the similarity of the “third-party crime” to the crime for which the defendant is charged is such that it can be inferred that the same person who committed the “third-party crime” also committed the crime for which the defendant is charged.
Before a court can properly determine the relevance and materiality of “other-crime” evidence, therefore, it must identify the party proffering the evidence. If the party proffering the evidence is the state, the question is whether the “other crime” was sufficiently similar to the charged crime to ensure that the “other crime’s” probative value substantially outweighs its danger of unfair prejudice. If the party proffering the evidence is the defendant, however, the question is whether the “third-party crime” was so similar to the charged crime that it can be inferred that the third party also committed the crime for which the defendant is charged. Because I agree that the “other crime” offered by the defendant in this case was not so similar to the charged crime that it can be inferred that the third party also committed the crime for which the defendant was charged, I join the result reached by the majority.3
Despite this conclusion, I cannot agree with either the majority or dissent in applying a rule whereby a criminal defendant can establish the relevance of a “third-party crime” by showing only that the “third-party crime” is “substantially similar to the crime charged.” Crime statistics demonstrate the existence of many similar crimes, closely related in time, committed by many unrelated persons. In the case of a drug-related murder committed with a handgun at night in a large city, for example, a creative defense attorney might be able to find any number of “substantially similar” murders committed within any given area and time. Without more distinguishing characteristics, such “substantial similarities” — although sufficient to increase the probative value of already relevant evidence — do not magically transform otherwise irrelevant evidence into relevant evidence.
I do not feel it is necessary at this time to define the appropriate standard for determining when “third-party crimes” become relevant. At the same time, I feel it is necessary to accentuate the differences between the admissibility requirements for evidence of “other crimes” committed by the defendant and “other crimes” committed by third parties. Failure to recognize such distinctions not only will allow criminal defendants to parade every “substantially similar” crime before the jury for the purpose of casting doubt on the defendant’s guilt, it will *439serve the interests of neither justice nor efficiency. As a result, I can join the majority in its result only.
. Spreigl evidence encompasses "other crimes” committed by the defendant. See generally State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965). Reverse Spreigl evidence encompasses "other crimes” committed by third parties. See State v. Robinson, 536 N.W.2d 1, 2 n. 1 (Minn.1995); see generally State v. Willis, 364 N.W.2d 498 (Minn.App.1985). Because evidence of "other crimes” committed by third parties is not the reverse of evidence of "other crimes” committed by the defendant, I feel the better terminology is “other-crime evidence” and "third-party crime evidence.”
. As we noted in Spreigl:
That such former misconduct is relevant, i.e., has probative value to persuade us of the general trait or disposition, cannot be doubted. * * * It may almost be said that it is because of this indubitable relevancy of such evidence that it is excluded. It is objectionable, not because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much. The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal — whether judge or jury — is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge.
272 Minn. at 495-96, 139 N.W.2d at 172 (citation omitted).
. At no time did the defendant offer proof that the act of using a .22 caliber handgun to shoot five or six bullets into a vehicle filled with Asian-Americans was so unusual or unique to provide an inference that the third party also committed the crime for which the defendant was charged.