(dissenting). The question answered by the majority is one that has been the subject of much debate. Reasonable people have differed. See State v. Seifert, 155 Wis. 2d 53, 454 N.W.2d 346 (1990); State v. Harp, 150 Wis. 2d 861, 443 N.W.2d 38 (Ct. App. 1989); Walter Dickey, David Schultz, James L. Fullin, Jr., The Importance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide: The Wisconsin Revision, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 1323, 1343-44 (1989); Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instruction 1017 Committee Comment at p. 11 (1991). Given the obvious ambiguity surrounding both the pre-1987 statute and the 1987 revision, I choose to look beyond the ambiguous words of the statutes and the ambiguous legislative history and turn to the policy and concerns underlying the criminal law in order to ascertain the *887legislature's intent. In doing so, I am forced to disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority.
In punishing for homicide, the law is concerned with culpability. Today, the majority says that a person who has an actual, although unreasonable, belief that he or she is being unlawfully interfered with is just as culpable as one who intentionally murders another without such a belief. In other words, one who kills with an actual but unreasonable belief of unlawful interference is as culpable as one who murders solely for the sake of taking a life or one who with premeditation murders solely for the sake of taking a life. It strikes me that there is, or that there ought to be, a difference in punishment between these two types of people. The former is less culpable them the latter. A person who has previously been the victim of a violent crime who later panics and under an unreasonable but actual belief takes the life of another because he or she actually believes that his or her person is in danger is not as culpable as one who kills in cold-blood for no reason other than to murder another. These two people should not be treated the same.
Furthermore, it is important to note that by concluding that these two people should not be treated the same, is not to say that the person who acts with an unreasonable belief as to an interference with his or her person will not be punished. It appears the majority would like us to believe the opposite with its repeated assertions that these people will "escape" a conviction for first-degree murder. Persons who act with unreasonable beliefs as to interferences with their persons are guilty of imperfect self-defense manslaughter (2nd degree intentional homicide) and do not escape punish*888ment. They are severely punished, but to a lesser degree than those who kill solely for the sake of killing.1
Furthermore, the public policy expressed by the majority to the effect that if the law did not require an objective element every defendant who claimed an actual belief in the need to use force would escape conviction for first-degree murder is inaccurate. It does not hold up under close scrutiny. Essentially, the majority's statement must be read to mean that if the law required only an actual belief, the defendant's assertions of such a belief could never be disproved, i.e., he would automatically be convicted of imperfect-self defense manslaughter. In other words, the State could never disprove such a belief because it is subjectively held by the defendant. This assertion seems odd in light of the majority's own recognition that in three cases this court had no difficulty in concluding that a defendant did not have an "actual" subjective belief regarding the use of force necessary. See State v. Johnnies, 76 Wis. 2d 578, 251 N.W.2d 807 (1977); Roe v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 226, 290 N.W.2d 291 (1980); Bedford v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 357, 222 *889N.W.2d 658 (1974). The majority's misstep is asserting that a defendant may merely "claim" an actual belief in order to show imperfect self-defense manslaughter. As the three cases cited above indicate regarding actual beliefs, a defendant may not merely "claim" an actual belief; he or she must put forth evidence in order to prove such a belief or one will not be found under the law.
In conclusion, there is authority for treating these two types of people differently under the criminal law. I recognize there is arguable authority for treating them the same. However, given the policy behind the criminal law, I conclude that the legislature must have intended that they be treated differently. See State v. Seifert, 155 Wis. 2d 53, 74-75, 454 N.W.2d 346 (1990) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice NATHAN S. HEFFERNAN and Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON join in this dissent.
The current section 940.01, Stats., provides that one who is convicted of first-degree intentional homicide is guilty of a Class A felony. The penalty for conviction of a Class A felony is life imprisonment. Section 939.50(3)(a). A person who is convicted of imperfect self-defense manslaughter is guilty of 2nd degree intentional homicide and is guilty of a Class B felony. Section 940.01 (2)(b), sec. 940.05. The penalty for a Class B felony is imprisonment not to exceed 20 years. Section 939.50(3) (b).
Under the 1985 statutes, intentional homicide was a Class A felony with a penalty of life imprisonment. The 1985 statute governing imperfect self-defense manslaughter, sec. 940.01, Stats., provides that anyone convicted under the statute is guilty of a Class C felony. Section 939.50(3)(c) (1985-86) provides that the penalty for conviction of a Class C felony is a fine not exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both.