Altree v. Head

Quillian, J.

1. In reviewing this case it is first necessary to decide whether the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the adoption proceedings. The act of 1941 (Ga. L. 1941, p. 300), as embodied in Code (Ann. Supp.) § 74-401, provides in part that “The superior courts of the several counties shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters of adoption. All petitions for adoption shall be filed in the county in which the adopting parent or parents reside,” except for certain immaterial particulars not germane to this case. This court held in Herring v. Graham, 87 Ga. App. 291 (73 S. E. 2d 572), that a proceeding for adoption in which the child is not domiciled in this State is void. So, the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Bartow County depended upon whether the child was legally domiciled in that county at the time the proceedings were begun. Code § 79-404 provides that the domicile of a minor child is that of his parents.

Code § 74-108 reads: “Until majority, the child shall remain under the control of the father, who is entitled to his services and the proceeds of his labor. This parental power shall be lost by: ,1. Voluntary contract, releasing the right to a third per*605son. 2. Consenting to the adoption of the child by a third person. 3. Failure of the father to provide necessaries for his child, or his abandonment of his family. 4. Consent of father to the child’s receiving the proceeds of his own labor, which consent shall be revocable at any time. 5. Consent to the marriage of the child, who thus assumes inconsistent responsibilities. 6. Cruel treatment of the child.” As was held in Shope v. Singleton, 196 Ga. 506 (27 S. E. 2d 26), “Where a father relinquishes the custody and control of his minor child to another, the latter, if a suitable and proper person to have such custody and control, is legally entitled thereto.” In Durden v. Johnson, 194 Ga. 689 (2) (22 S. E. 2d 514), it is held: “Where, after the death of the father, the mother becomes entitled to the custody and control of a child, such parental power and right may be lost by her just as in the case of the father . . . and a clear, definite, and certain voluntary contract releasing her right to the child to a third person becomes binding upon her, and is not subject to revocation without good cause shown.” And, in Manning v. Crawford, 8 Ga. App. 835 (3) (70 S. E. 959), this court held: “The contract by which it is sought to establish that a parent hafe relinquished his parental rights must be clear, definite, and certain; but, though these essentials are required in order to create and constitute the contract of relinquishment, it is' not required that the evidence as to the contract shall be undisputed. If the evidence by which it is sought to establish a contract to relinquish parental control is itself vague and indefinite, or shows that the minds of the contracting parties failed to meet—that there was a variance between the offer and the answer thereto— then a failure to prove the contract results. But a mere denial on the part of the defendant that the contract was made, or an assertion that the terms of the contract differed from those asserted by the plaintiff (even though supported by proof), raises merely an issue of fact as to whether the contract or gift sought to be asserted—if it be clear, definite, and certain in its terms— was or was not made.”

It is patent, under the authorities above cited, that the domicile of Pearl Louise, the child involved in the instant case, was originally the domicile of her natural mother and father by adoption, Mrs. Renee and Arthur Altree; and if nothing had *606happened to change that status, there would be no question that her legal domicile would now be in Middlesex County, England, and not in Bartow County, Georgia. On the other hand, if that status has changed by reason of the Altrees’ relinquishing the right of custody and control of the child in any of the methods enumerated in Code § 74-108, the little girl’s domicile was not from the time of such relinquishment or forfeiture in Middlesex County, but was in the county of the person who thereafter had legal custody of her. If the Altrees had by their conduct been divested of their right of custody to the child, and Mrs. Nannie Head became legally vested with the same, the domicile would be in the county of Mrs. Head’s residence, Bartow County. The court was authorized to find from the testimony of the little girl herself that Arthur Altree forfeited all of his parental rights and every privilege incidental thereto, including the right of custody, under § 74-108 of the Code. While the Altrees disputed the child’s testimony, it was for the trial judge to say whether lie would believe the evidence supplied by this child that Arthur Altree had beaten her until she was black and blue, and had failed to furnish her with the necessaries of life. The court was further authorized to find that Mrs. Altree condoned and became a party to the mistreatment of Pearl Louise by her husband, by reason of the fact that, despite the mistreatment of the child by Altree, she continued to live with him and to keep the child under his dominion. The court was also authorized to find from the evidence of Mrs. Nannie Head—though her testimony was also denied by the Altrees—that she received a letter from Mrs. Altree, in substance as follows: that she did not love the child as she should on account of the circumstances of the birth of the child, and that her present husband was not good to the child and mistreated the child, and that she would be happy for either the petitioner or her son to have the child, and that she would send the child to them if they would pay for its passage from England to the United States.

Thus, after Arthur Altree had forfeited his parental rights to the child, it appears that Mrs. Altree made an offer to relinquish the custody of the child to Mrs. Head. This offer contained every necessary element of a contract for that purpose. It appears from the evidence of Mrs. Head that originally the child *607was sent to Florida upon the agreement of Naith Head to adopt her, and that Naith Head’s wife paid for the transportation of the child from England, and that later Naith was unwilling to go forward with his agreement, whereupon, before the offer contained in the letter referred to above was withdrawn, Mrs. Nannie Head, the applicant in this case, accepted that offer and furnished sufficient consideration for the same by repaying to Mrs. Naith Head the money that she had paid for the child’s passage to America, and by taking the child into her home and generously giving the child all the necessities and some of the luxuries of life. The court was authorized to find also that Mrs. Head was a suitable person to rear the child. Thus, the domicile of Mrs. Head became the domicile of the child, and the Superior Court of Bartow County had'jurisdiction of the proceedings.

2. The evidence, which we held in the foregoing division of this opinion sufficient to authorize the trial judge to find that the parental rights to the child had been lost by the Altrees’ mistreatment of her and by Mrs. Altree’s contract agreeing to relinquish her parental rights, was also sufficient to authorize the trial judge to determine that the child had been abandoned by the Altrees within the meaning of Code (Ann. Supp.) § 74-404, so that neither notice to her parents nor their consent to her adoption by Mrs. Head was necessary.

There was no abuse of discretion in entering the decree. The trial judge had for consideration and comparison the background and previous behavior of Mrs. Head and that of the Altrees, their apparent affection or lack of affection for the child, and their respective financial statuses. His decision, in view of the competent evidence in the case, was sound and just.

3. The plaintiff in error insists that the decree was invalid because predicated on hearsay evidence. While there was much evidence of no probative value introduced without objection— being objectionable as hearsay—there was much competent evidence in the record sufficient to sustain the decree. In these circumstances, nothing to the contrary appearing, the decree will be presumed to have been entered upon the legal evidence. What is written here is not to be construed as a holding that, under ordinary circumstances, consent to adoption and placing a child *608in the temporary custody of the prospective foster parents is of itself abandonment.

Judgment affirmed.

Gardner, P. J., Townsend and Nichols, JJ., concur. Felton, C. J., and Carlisle, J., dissent.