concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with part II of the majority’s opinion holding that the ordinance is preempted by State DOT regulations. Affirming for petitioner on preemption is sufficient without further addressing the trial court’s interpretation of the ordinance. Since the majority reaches and reverses the trial court’s interpretation of the ordinance, I address that issue as it affects other signs in the city which fall out*606side of DOT preemption. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that defers to the Board’s interpretation of the ordinance and reverses that portion of the superior court’s judgment. I would affirm the entire trial court’s order.
I Standard of Review
The majority grounds its decision on deference given to the Board’s interpretation of the ordinance. The majority’s opinion correctly states that reasonable discretion is allowed, but only “in the absence of error of law . . . .” Rauseo v. New Hanover County, 118 N.C. App. 286, 289, 454 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1995). The majority’s opinion also correctly states, “[questions involving interpretation of zoning ordinances are questions of law,” which we review de novo. Hayes v. Fowler, 123 N.C. App. 400, 404, 473 S.E.2d 442, 444 (1996). The record reflects that the Board stated that the superior court is the proper forum to determine the interpretation of the ordinance. Donna McPhail, a board member, moved to adopt the zoning officer’s interpretation of the ordinance, stating:
I think that I’m going to make a motion to uphold Mr. Pearson’s recommendation on the grounds that the big thing we had facing us today was interpretation, your interpretation of a message or a sign face, and the young lady that spoke for the DOT, and then everyone else. We are not that in tune with all the legal aspects of it. We’re citizens of the City of Gastonia. We serve on this board and we do the very best we can and we really take everything into consideration, but you know, we’re not attorneys. I don’t feel like it’s something that we can properly address, so I think by your appealing it on up to Superior Court, they are more — that’s more who you need to be in front of, . . . As far as the interpretation of the zoning ordinance, I think Superior Court would just really be your audience.
Board member John McDonald seconded the motion made by Ms. McPhail and stated, “I would like to ditto what Ms. McPhail said.”
On review of a Board decision, the trial court “sits as an appellate court and may review both (i) sufficiency of the evidence presented to the municipal board and (ii) whether the record reveals error of law.” Capricorn Equity Corp. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 334 N.C. 132, 136, 431 S.E.2d 183, 186 (1993). The whole record test applies to findings of fact and compels a determination of whether the findings of fact of the Board are supported by competent evidence in the record. Id. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. at 137, 431 S.E.2d at *607187. Petitioner’s petition to the superior court asserted the Board’s action was an error of law. The zoning officer’s interpretation of the application of the zoning ordinance to petitioner is a question of law. Tucker v. Mecklenburg Cty Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 148 N.C. App. 52, 55, 557 S.E.2d 631, 634 (2001), aff’d in part, rev. improv. allowed, 356 N.C. 658, 576 S.E.2d 324 (2003).
Zoning ordinances derogate common law property rights and must be strictly construed in favor of the free use of property. See Yancey v. Heafner, 268 N.C. 263, 266, 150 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1966); City of Sanford v. Dandy Signs, Inc., 62 N.C. App. 568, 569, 303 S.E.2d 228, 230 (1983). “When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, ‘words in a statute must be construed in accordance with their plain meaning unless the statute provides an alternative meaning.’ ” Procter v. City of Raleigh Bd. of Adjust., 140 N.C. App. 784, 785-86, 538 S.E.2d 621, 622 (2000) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Village Council, 138 N.C. App. 79, 86, 530 S.E.2d 338, 343 (2000)).
Lambeth v. Town of Kure Beach, — N.C. App. —, —, 578 S.E.2d 688, 691-92 (2003).
The majority reverses the trial court’s de novo interpretation and holds that the “broad language of the statute could reasonably be interpreted to include all those materials which form the constructed sign, including the sign frame.” Zoning ordinances are strictly construed in favor of free use of property and are not broadly construed. Yancey v. Heafner, 268 N.C. 263, 266, 150 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1966); Lambeth,-N.C. App. at-, 578 S.E.2d at 691.
The trial court interpreted section 17-181(c) of the Gastonia City Code to only prohibit the moving of the sign in its entirety or replacement of the sign structure. The trial court determined that changing a poster face panel, standing alone, was not moving a sign or replacing a sign structure, which requires a permit under the ordinance, and that replacement of the poster face panel does not violate section 17-181(c). Further, subsection (f) allows the message to be changed as long as there are no new nonconformaties.
Although the trial court’s interpretation of the ordinance need not be reviewed because the case is decided on preemption, I would also affirm that portion of the trial court order holding the Board committed an error of law in its interpretation of the ordinance. I respectfully dissent.