(dissenting). I would affirm the court of appeals, because, as it stated in its decision, the case was not in a posture for disposition on summary judgment, for the affidavits filed showed that material facts were in dispute. For example, the defendant, Frank Bercker, denied that any episode of incest, as stated in plaintiffs complaint, had ever occurred.
I do, however, disagree with the court of appeals' recitation of the applicable law, because Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Ct. App. 1987), did not "hold" that the statute of limitations did not commence to run until such time as the plaintiff, the alleged incest victim, was psychologically able to shift the blame from herself to her father or, as stated by the court of appeals, "until. . . she had the ability to overcome her alleged guilt." I conclude, even could a reading of Hammer result in that interpretation, the subsequently enacted statute of limitations effective in 1989 specifically applicable to the "discovery" of incest did not incorporate the plaintiffs gloss on Hammer. It merely made applicable the discovery rule of Borello (Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986)) to cases of incest. I also conclude that the "shift*1049ing of blame" language relied upon by the plaintiff constituted no part of the holding in Hammer under the facts of that case. It is at the most dicta.
While the court of appeals in the present case appears, tacitly at least, to have acquiesced in the plaintiffs theory of "shifting the blame," its actual holding in reversing the summary judgment was based primarily on the evidence of disputed material facts that made summary judgment inappropriate.
Accordingly, I would remand the cause to the circuit court for the determination by the factfinder — both parties have requested a jury — to determine when "discovery" occurred and, hence, when the statute of limitations commenced to run.1 I would direct the circuit court to instruct the jury that such finding of fact be in accordance with the legislative directions of sec. 893.587, Stats.,2 and not in accordance with the plaintiffs interpretation of the Hammer dicta, which I conclude is insupportable as a matter of law.
I agree with the statement of facts set forth in the majority opinion.
A fair reading of the plaintiffs affidavits and filed depositions and the facts as set forth in the majority opinion reveals that, by mid-July 1986, plaintiff was aware of the alleged sexual abuse by her father over forty years previously and that by December of 1986 she knew *1050that she had been told by her therapists that this history of incestuous assault was the cause of her current emotional distress.
Depositions taken of the plaintiff indicate that, from the time of the alleged assaults to the time of the "flashbacks" following the auto accident, she had no history of emotional trauma and, even when her recollection was refreshed, she had no recollection of any physical injury or pain connected with the alleged incestuous assaults. The "flashbacks" also included visualizations or memory recalls that her mother had sexually assaulted her by the repeated use of enemas. She stated, however, that she always had recollections of the conduct of her mother but never considered them to be sexual assaults until her therapy treatments in 1986 or 1987 following the accident. When asked whether she contemplated suing her mother, she responded saying, "I don't really know."
The affidavit and deposition of her father filed with the court deny any sexual contact with the plaintiff and assert that the plaintiffs personality changed following her head injuries and that, at no time prior to the events of 1986, did the plaintiff ever exhibit any physical or mental problems consistent with any sexual abuse. The mother, Jane Bercker, denied any knowledge of any of the acts alleged and denied that any enemas were ever administered except on the orders of a physician. On the one occasion she could recall, the enema had been administered by a registered nurse.
It is apparent from the record on summary judgment that factual matters that are of material importance, in light of the allegations of the complaint, are in dispute. Hence, the cause should be remanded to the circuit court for the resolution of these facts by the jury. *1051The court of appeals correctly so held in reversing the circuit court.
In addition to deciding the disputed facts of the asserted incest and its denial, an additional and significant initial factfinding is required of the jury, i.e., the determination of when discovery occurred and, hence, when the statute of limitations began to run.
This factfinding implicates a question of law, incorrectly asserted by the plaintiff, which I conclude was not dealt with adequately by the court of appeals.3
I do not quarrel with the court of appeals decision in Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Ct. App. 1987), in respect to which this court denied review.
As I view Hammer, it simply adopted, for incest cases, the discovery rule previously stated by this court in Borello. The court of appeals in Hammer stated, at 264:
We hold, as a matter of law, that a cause of action for incestuous abuse will not accrue until the victim discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the fact and cause of the injury. See Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 411, 388 N.W.2d 140, 146 (1986).
The general discovery rule was first approved in Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983). Hansen held that the cause of action accrued on the date the injury was discovered, not on the date of the act that resulted in injury. Borello went a step fur*1052ther and held that, although an injury was known at an earlier date, the cause of action did not accrue or limitations commence to run until, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the injured party discovered the cause of the injury. In Borello the injury was a respiratory ailment that was apparent to the injured party but it was not until two years afterward that she acquired factual information to a reasonable probability that a defective furnace was the cause of the injury. This court held that on the date she acquired that information her cause of action accrued.4
It is clear that in Hammer the court of appeals simply and correctly applied the Hansen-Borello discovery rule to incest cases, i.e., that the period of limitations commences when the act of incest is discovered to be the probable cause of the injury.
I agree with the court of appeals that the summary judgment record reveals disputed material facts. The court of appeals decision recites that the affidavits of the psychologist and counselor both state that the plaintiff discovered the cause of her injuries in 1989, while the defendant's arguments based on affidavits contend that the discovery date for the cause of the injury was at least as early as December 1986.
The holding of Hammer is precise and applies Hansen and Borello to incest claims. The plaintiff asserts, however, that Hammer, a published opinion never reviewed by this court and, hence, precedential, adopted a special rule of law applicable to incest cases, a rule stated by the plaintiff as requiring that the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff is capable psy-*1053chologicaliy of commencing a lawsuit. Thus, plaintiff argues that, although she knew the identity of the abuser, has been told by reliable therapists and diagnosticians that the cause of her problems was the incestuous abuse suffered, and she is aware of the statements of her therapists, the cause of action does not accrue until she could "shift the blame" to her father for what occurred.5 The defendant points out, correctly I conclude, that the Hammer opinion of the court of appeals does not so hold. Defendant also asserts that to adopt the rationale of the plaintiff would simply mean that the statute of limitations would not in any case commence until the plaintiff "felt up to it."
I do not comment upon the defendant's argument in the latter respect, for Hammer furnishes no support that "shifting the blame" is an integral part of the holding of that case. Plaintiff places her reliance solely upon footnote 7, page 266, of Hammer, which on its face does not purport to supplement or explain the court's holding set out with precision on page 264, as quoted above. Footnote 7 states:
'[E]ven though a daughter may know that she has been injured, until such time as she is able to shift the blame for the incestuous abuse of her father, it will be impossible for her to realize that his behavior caused her psychological disorders. As with discovery of injury, discovery of cause can take years.' Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 609, 630 (1983).
*1054A fiill reading of the excellent student comment from which footnote 7 is an excerpt reveals that it was the author's thesis that, because of the psychological complexities resulting from incestuous abuse, the traditional date of injury — date of accrual tort formula — should be abandoned in favor of a discovery rule, which appears on page 629 of the comment: "The basic postulate of the exception is that the statute of limitations can be tolled until such time as the plaintiff knows, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of her injury and its cause." This is the rule adopted by this court in Hansen-Borello and the rule that constituted the holding in Hammer. The quoted comment did not purport to urge the adoption of a different rule. The rule urged in the comment is precisely that which this court has adopted. The Golden Gate Law Review comment, which the court of appeals footnoted, constitutes at most an evidentiary observation. The plaintiffs interpretation of Hammer is incorrect.
Moreover, sec. 893.587, Stats., Incest: limitation, effective July 1, 1989, was passed subsequent to the mandate of Hammer and acknowledgedly pursuant to it. Yet, the legislature stated the discovery rule applicable to incest to be the exact "holding" of Hammer and Hansen-Borello. I conclude, therefore, that the legislative interpretation of Hansen does not require as a matter of law that discovery of the fact and cause of injury resulting from incest includes the element of being able to "shift the blame" at a time subsequent to knowing the fact of the injury and its cause.6
*1055While the psychological process may have some part in ascertainment of cause, it is not a separate test to determine that a plaintiff, after ascertaining the nature of the injury and its cause, must separately be found to have shifted the blame from herself to the abuser. That shift of blame — if one there be — is subsumed in the concept of cause. To conclude that it is a separate element to be applied subsequently or sequentially would leave the discovery date to be whenever the victim decided to commence the lawsuit. While the objective test must be applied considering the actual circumstances of a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position, to tack "blame shifting" onto the discovery test codified in sec. 893.587, Stats., would comport neither with the Hansen-Borello rationale nor the statute.
Initially, one is disturbed by the possible consequences of what the plaintiff urges — the bringing of a newly discovered cause of action for events that occurred almost fifty years ago. Insofar as the record reveals, the plaintiff had no social or emotional problems even arguably related to any form of sexual abuse, had no feelings of unworthiness until she sustained her auto accident injuries, and over the years had good relations with her parents, although she did in her deposition state that she wanted her father to pay more attention to her after the birth of a brother.
*1056She was apparently asymptomatic until after the time of her accident when "flashbacks" included a belief — which she now acknowledges as false — that the doctors were sexually molesting her and that she was of Native American ancestry, although it is asserted that this is probably incorrect.
Nevertheless, the public policy of the state in respect to the time within which one is required to bring civil cases for incest has been defined by this court and has been statutorily restated by the legislature. What remains is the application of that law to the facts to be found by the factfinder. The mere passage of time before discovery, no matter how great, does not ipso facto dictate a dismissal of the cause, although the lapse of a great period of time might affect a factfinder's view of the credibility of the facts alleged.7
*1057This court has frequently stated that, upon determining that material facts are in dispute, a summary judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for the resolution of those facts. This court has stated that the determination of the date of discovery of the facts essential to a cause of action resulting in the commencement of the running of limitations is a jury question.8
Both parties have requested a jury trial. The jury or other factfinder will be required to perform the usual function of deciding the factual issues on the basis of the credibility of all witnesses and the qualifications of experts, all subject to the instructions of the court.
While the circuit court's opinion and findings are quite cursory, it appears that it dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff was "aware" of her problems in 1986. As the court of appeals held, this is not a complete formulation of the test of discovery, which must include the discovery of the injury and the discovery of the cause of the injury. Thus, the judgment of the circuit court was in part based on an error of law. Moreover, material facts *1058were in dispute and the case was not one appropriate for decision on summary judgment. I conclude that the discovery rule that applies to cases of incest is the rule stated in Hansen-Borello and codified in sec. 893.587, Stats. It does not include any other elements. What evi-dentiary factors are relevant in a particular case to determine the time of discovery of injury or the cause of the injury are matters of factual proof to be determined on a case-by-case basis. I would therefore affirm the court of appeals' mandate to reverse and would remand for factfinding and further proceedings.
I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. BABLITCH joins in this dissent.
And, of course, for the trial to determine the merits if that becomes appropriate.
Section 893.587, Stats., provides:
893.587 Incest; limitation. An action to recover damages for injury caused by incest shall be commenced within 2 years after the plaintiff discovers the fact and the probable cause, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the fact and the probable cause, of the injury, whichever occurs first.
(1987) a. 332, effective July 1, 1989.
As stated above, the reliance on the plaintiffs "shifting of the blame" theory was not explicitly relied upon for the court of appeals decision, but the imprecise dicta apparently has fortified the plaintiffs assertion that its interpretation of Hammer v. Hammer is correct.
Section 893.04, Stats., provides in part:
... a period of limitation within which an action may be commenced is computed from the time that the cause of action accrues until the action is commenced.
As mentioned above, the court of appeals in the instant case referred to this asserted rule of law, but only in recounting the contents of plaintiffs affidavits and no more incorporated it as a legal holding in this case than it did in Hammer.
"Shifting the blame" may be a shorthand term intended to convey the meaning that the victim has concluded, or should in the exercise of reasonable diligence have concluded, that the family member caused the injury. That concept is not a separate test to be applied at a time subsequent to the discovery of the injury *1055and the discovery that the injury was caused by the alleged assault.
It should be noted, however, that Counselor Judy Loudin in her deposition stated that it was her opinion that the plaintiff was unable to determine the cause of her injury until she saw herself as a victim and not as a perpetrator of the sexual misconduct. Obviously, this is precisely the kind of a factual issue to be resolved by a factfinder and is dependent upon the factfinder's appraisal of the witness' expertise and her credibility.
A technique frequently resorted to by therapists is based upon what is known as the repression theory. Under that theory, the act of repression blocks painful or dangerous memories of past events from gaining consciousness. An integral part of the repression theory is that, in the course of therapy, persons may regain the memories of childhood trauma.
It should be emphasized that this is a theory only. Professor Elizabeth Loftus, Professor of Psychology at the University of Washington, has conducted experiments which cast doubt on the repression theory, and she emphasizes that the repression theory has never been demonstrated by scientific experimentation.
Paul McHugh, Director of the Department of Psychiatry and Behaviorial Sciences at John Hopkins University, contends that "most severe traumas are not blocked out by children but are remembered all too well." He points out that the childhood memories of the Holocaust and concentration camps are well remembered. See Lawrence Wright, The New Yorker magazine, May 24, 1993, pp. 69, 70.
It is clear that the use of psychological evidence in a case of this nature requires the factfinder to assess the credibility of the *1057evidence and the witness in respect to the theory espoused and also in respect to the scientific credentials of the witness. Jury instructions should be tailored by the trial court to assure that credibility of these witnesses be given appropriate scrutiny.
See Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis. 2d 630, 638, 436 N.W.2d 308 (1989) (question being one of diligence); Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 268, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Ct. App. 1987) (question when plaintiff should have discovered her injuries); Hennekens v. Hoerl, 160 Wis. 2d 144, 465 N.W.2d 812 (1991) (question of diligence ordinarily a question of fact to be resolved by the factfinder unless facts are undisputed and fact question can be resolved as a matter of law); see, also, dissent in Hennekens, 160 Wis. 2d at 168, wherein cases are collected demonstrating that, when facts are disputed on matters of discovery, remand should be made to the circuit court for appropriate factfinding.