(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
The record indicates that the police knew the informant in this case, Robert McEwen, was a longtime friend of defendant. The police were also *127aware that McEwen was unemployed and needed money, and that he was willing to buy cocaine from defendant for $100 a transaction. Moreover, during the course of their pursuit of a case against defendant, the police discovered that defendant would not sell cocaine to anyone but McEwen, and then only with some reluctance. The record also suggests that McEwen came to realize that the police needed his cooperation to build a case against defendant. This culminated in an agreement that the police would pay McEwen $5,000 for his assistance in buying more cocaine from defendant — payable in installments of $2,000 upon defendant’s arrest and $3,000 upon defendant’s conviction. According to McEwen, the police also promised him an additional $5,000 out of funds obtained - from later forfeiture proceedings. In short, the police allowed the informant to pick out defendant as a target, created a situation whereby the informant had a monetary stake in the outcome of the case against defendant, and allowed the informant to parlay the pursuit of defendant into a livelihood.
In People v Fabiano, 192 Mich App 523, 526; 482 NW2d 467 (1992), this Court held that the Supreme Court decision in People v Juillet, 439 Mich 34; 475 NW2d 786 (1991), effectively changed the nature of the objective test for entrapment so that entrapment is present if the police either engaged in impermissible conduct that would induce a law-abiding person similarly situated to the defendant to commit the crime or engaged in conduct so reprehensible that it cannot be tolerated by the Court. People v Williams, 196 Mich App 656; 493 NW2d 507 (1992). Entrapment exists if either prong of this test is met. Id. Under the circumstances of this case, where, in the face of defendant’s reluctance to sell, the police capitalized on *128both the informant’s desire to make money and his longstanding relationship with defendant, I would conclude that the police conduct was so reprehensible that it should not be tolerated. Accordingly, I would reverse.