concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the holdings of sections III and IV of the majority opinion that White Mountain had no right to contribution from Permanent Builders and that the Compensation Act is constitutional. I therefore join in the majority opinion as it relates to those matters. However, I cannot agree that summary judgment should have been granted on the issue of whether an oral contract of indemnity was created and therefore dissent from section II of the majority opinion.
This case is before us on review of the district court’s order granting a motion for summary judgment filed by Permanent Builders, the third-party defendant. White Mountain contested this motion, although it did enter into a stipulation of facts.
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy. E.g., Southard ex rel. Southard v. Miles, 714 P.2d 891 (Colo.1986); KN Energy, Inc. v. Great Western Sugar Co., 698 P.2d 769 (Colo.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1022, 105 S.Ct. 3489, 87 L.Ed.2d 623 (1985); Ginter v. Palmer & Co., 196 Colo. 203, 585 P.2d 583 (1978). Summary judgment should not be granted where there appears to be any controversy concerning material facts. E.g., Blue Cross v. Bukulmez, 736 P.2d 834 (Colo.1987); KN Energy, Inc., 698 P.2d 769; Ginter, 585 P.2d 583. All doubts as to the presence of disputed facts must be resolved against the moving party which, in this case, was Permanent Builders. E.g., KN Energy, Inc., 698 P.2d 769; Ginter, 585 P.2d 583. As we stated in Southard, “summary judgment should be granted only when the moving party demon*431strates the existence of both the evidentia-ry and legal predicates for its entry.” 714 P.2d at 895.
Although the parties stipulated to certain facts for the purpose of the summary judgment motion, the factual setting of this case is anything but clear. The majority concedes that Frank Wright’s statement, “Don’t worry about it — we will take care of it if anything happens,” was ambiguous. At 426. The majority then lists several possible interpretations of this statement, including that it could have referred to “some other concern known only to the parties.” At 426.
The stipulation is ambiguous or incomplete in at least one other important respect. In paragraph 8, the parties stipulated that Scott Barton of White Mountain contacted Wright after the plaintiff’s injury and Wright stated that “Permanent Builders would take care of any problems.” The phrase “any problems” is out of context and ambiguous. We are not informed what Barton said and we do not know if, for example, Barton and Wright discussed the plaintiff’s injuries and the two companies’ potential liability to the plaintiff. All we know is that the conversation took place after the plaintiff was injured. The majority also concedes that this statement was ambiguous. At 427.
Even if some facts are stipulated, a trial court must deny a motion for summary judgment if the stipulation is equivocal or if a genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute despite the stipulation. Counsel for the Hearing Impaired v. Ambach, 610 F.Supp. 1051 (E.D.N.Y.1985); 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, and M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2724, at 75 (1983); see, e.g., Williams v. Chick, 373 F.2d 330 (8th Cir.1967); Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass’n. v. United States, 317 F.2d 859 (9th Cir.1963). Plainly, that is the situation presented by this case. We cannot determine from this stipulation whether an oral contract of indemnity was created, and I would reverse the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment on this issue.
I am authorized to say that Justice " LOHR joins in this concurrence and dissent.