dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the decision of this court. In terns of the appellate process, this is a fact-sensitive case1 when *257related to Art. 1, §§ 10 and 11, of the Wyoming Constitution2 and the Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The deputy sheriff, after arriving at the Cowley homicide site, arrested appellant and took her the approximate five miles to Lovell by car. Prior to that time, appellant had been consuming alcoholic beverages intermittently for over a 12-hour period, and when tested some more than two hours later, still had a .23 percent blood-alcohol content.
On that short drive, the following occurred as related by the deputy sheriff:
“Q. Now then, after you got Mrs. Griffin down to the Big Horn County Sheriff s Office, what, if anything, took place there?
“A. On the drive from Cowley to Lovell she advised that she would like to speak to an attorney.
“Q. Okay.
“A. I told her once we get to Lovell and got things started squaring away, I would let her speak to one.”
Then, in Lovell, for a time clearly in excess of an hour and in the late morning without making any effort to afford her the right to the requested attorney, the arresting officer first gave the accused her Miranda rights,3 and then turned her over to police officer Lewis to “sit with her” while he “conducted another interview.” *258So Carol Griffin sat there for an hour with the officer watching her while she waited to be given the opportunity to see an attorney and the arresting officer waited to take her from Lovell to the county seat, Basin, approximately 36 miles further away.4
The officer testified:
“Q. You knew she was about to make some incriminating or what you thought to be incriminating statements, didn’t you?
“A. I did not know that.
“Q. You didn’t know what she — she was going to, after she started them, did you know the general train of the conversation that would be there?
“A. Not until she actually spoke the words.
“Q. Did you ever tell her maybe she ought to consult her lawyer?
“A. Yes, I did.
“Q. When did you do that throughout the statement?
“A. She asked if she could call her attorney. I told her that when Officer Lewis came back he would have made arrangements for her to call and then she said, do you think I should lie and tell them somebody else shot him? I said, maybe you shouldn’t make any more statements until you talk to your attorney.
“Q. At that juncture that was the end of it?
“A. Yes. Sergeant Lewis came out and I told him that she had been making some statements. He told me to write them down and I did.
“Q. Did you write them down as they were made after that time after Sergeant Lewis came in?
“A. That was when I went and wrote them down, at that time.
“Q. After Sergeant Lewis came in?
“A. Yes.”
At trial, appropriately refreshed by reading his notes, the officer further testified:
“Q. I am going to hand you a document, Officer, and ask if you can recognize that?
“A. Okay.
“Q. What is that document you just referred to?
“A. This is my written statement that I made that day.
“Q. That was the statement that you made that day?
“A. Yes.
“Q. After the part where she asked you if you hunted, do you recall what she said next?
“A. Well, I was mistaken in the sequence. She says, I have never even killed a deer before, and she asked me if I ever killed anybody and I said, no, and then she asked me if I ever went hunting and I said, yes, and then she says, it was premeditated, I was tired of him beating me up.
****#>|c
“Q. That’s when you told her that Officer Lewis would see that she got to call her attorney?
“A. Yes.
“Q. What happened from that point?
“A. Well, then I told her that she— that’s when she said, should I lie and tell them somebody else shot him? I told her she probably shouldn’t make any more statements until she talked to her attorney.
“Q. Was there anything further said by her?
“Q. She said, Oh, and then said, he attacked me, and Officer Lewis walked out of the room and I walked out and wrote my statement.”
Not so surprisingly, right after the incriminating statement was made, the original officer reappeared to make arrangements and take Mrs. Griffin to Basin, where sometime later that day she was *259first permitted to contact an attorney.5 The confused state of the accused is clearly demonstrated by the factually unsustainable, shock-induced, alcoholic-related confinement statement in saying that “it [the offense] was premeditated, I was tired of him beating me up.” To the contrary, the undisputed trial evidence, lacking conflict or contrary implication, proved that the decedent “busted” into her residence and verbally accosted her and the visiting friend with demonstrable intent to commit physical violence of the character which had permeated their short and violently disturbed marital relationship, including a large number of incidents of her physical abuse by him. The record portrays neither semblance of premeditation nor justification for any portion of the death-resulting conduct, except in the nature of a temper-induced, uncontrolled willingness to effectively put himself in a condition of, paradoxically, committing suicide by inviting what somewhat expectedly then happened.
However, prosecuting counsel then said in closing argument:
“You have already been instructed that whoever kills another human being purposely and with premeditated malice commits first degree murder. What’s the evidence show about that? You remember Tom Irwin, the Lovell police officer who testified about last Wednesday and what he testified to, his report’s in evidence. That report says while watching Carol Griffin in Sergeant Nick Lewis’s office she was talking about the incident. I did not ask any questions of her. She said, I have never even killed a deer before, have you ever killed anybody, no, it was premeditated, I was tired of him beating on me, do you go hunting, yes, Mom just had a stroke, I don’t know how she is going to take it, his Mom, I don’t know what I am going to do with Mom and Dad. Mom is eighty-eight and Dad is ninety-one I just killed their son. He looked awful. Can I call my attorneys. Do you think that I should lie and say somebody else shot him? Until you talk to your attorney maybe you shouldn’t say anything. Okay. He attacked me. “Why does that statement have the ring of truth? Let’s go through some of these things that happened at the trial. “We do know that on January 26, 1986, about 10:30 a.m. Clyde Griffin was shot and killed in his residence at Cowley, Wyoming.”
Recognizing that some literary license in prosecutorial closing argument is justified, the pervasive inaccuracy of whose house was the site of death is also inexplicable, since the death did not occur at his residence nor at a place where he had any defined right of return except upon invitation, which had not then been given. Characteristic of this record is that decedent, who had weighed 350 pounds before his stomach was stapled, was a man of about 240 pounds at death, and the physically abused defendant was about 93 pounds.6
*260Presented relevantly as the issue to be addressed, Mrs. Griffin was defined to the jury as having asked for an attorney twice and having made an incriminating statement that she might lie and had committed the offense with premeditation.
Appellant accurately characterizes the essential transaction:
“Since Appellant made an un equivocal request for counsel, the only question is whether the suspect reinitiated contact with the police following the request.”
The testimony of Sergeant Lewis offers no basis for concluding that the Miranda warning occurred because appellant reiniti-ated contact with the police. The time sequences were to the contrary. In fact, the officer’s testimony indicates that he never intended to honor her initial request for counsel by arrangements to be made at Lovell, although his response to her request was, “I told her once we get to Lovell and got things started squaring away, I would let her speak to [an attorney].” Apparently the squaring away was providing the Miranda warning and getting a statement. See Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 105 S.Ct. 1065, 84 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985). It is not surprising that when appellant took the witness stand she testified that she had no recollection of making the statements upon which her trial objection to introduction was premised, as she testified that her first knowledge of the contended statements came in trial preparation by reading the police officer’s notes.7
This court justifies introduction of the incriminatory information by citation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974, reh. denied sub nom. California v. Stewart, 385 U.S. 890, 87 S.Ct. 11, 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966); Arizona v. Mauro, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 95 L.Ed.2d 458, reh. denied — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3278, 97 L.Ed.2d 782 (1987); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, reh. denied 452 U.S. 973, 101 S.Ct. 3128, 69 L.Ed.2d 984 (1981); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); and the Wyoming cases of Best v. State, Wyo., 736 P.2d 739 (1987); and Mayer v. State, Wyo., 618 P.2d 127 (1980).
It is my conclusion that this court is wrong in that neither under appropriate precedent defining the United States Constitution nor under the criteria of the Wyoming Constitution should the incriminatory material have been admissible if rights to counsel and against self-incrimination are to be maintained as constitutionally justified protection for the accused individual. Cf. Erickson, The Unfulfilled Promise of Miranda v. Arizona Symposium, 24 Am. Crim.L.Rev. 291 (1986). It is possible that with a fair trial, even in this jurisdiction, the defendant might have been similarly convicted, although the probabilities are singularly unpersuasive either for Big Horn County or anywhere else in Wyoming.8
*261It is apparent that Wyoming precedent in Cheatham v. State, Wyo., 719 P.2d 612 (1986); Daniel v. State, Wyo., 644 P.2d 172 (1982); and Best v. State, supra, has no application since these cases consider the question of equivocal requests for counsel, which question does not apply to this case involving a request for counsel which was clear, unequivocal, absolute and immediate. Unfortunately, by any question asked or an answer given, the record in this case does not reflect why the arresting officer did not comply with his agreement to afford an opportunity to get an attorney in Lovell.
It is recognized that the test of admissibility of a confession as enunciated in Mayer v. State, supra, 618 P.2d at 128, “whether or not under the totality of the circumstances the waiver of constitutional rights and subsequent statements were given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently,” is applicable as effected by violation of an accused’s right to counsel.
Defendant included in the motion in li-mine filed April 4, 1986:
“4. Any statements of Defendant purporting to be made to Officer Irwin, Officer Lewis, or other officers after her arrest and made at the Lovell Law Enforcement Center, or made after the time that she was taken into custody by the authorities, including specifically the memo purportedly written by Officer Irwin relating to statements voluntarily made by Defendant in his presence. This Motion is based upon the fact that Defendant was so under the influence of alcohol and mentally unbalanced at the time that the statements alleged to have been made are far more prejudicial than probative of any relevant facts herein under consideration.”
No hearing on the motion was held prior to trial in the fairhearing mode as clearly contemplated by our precedent, Hayes v. State, Wyo., 599 P.2d 558 (1979), and by Rule 16, W.R.Cr.P. The procedure followed and rule announced in Dodge v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 303, 308 (1977) was unexplainably not followed here, where, prior to trial, a hearing was held in which the defendant sought to suppress statements made by her to the police on the grounds that they were not voluntary:
“The trial judge followed the approved procedure in conducting a separate hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine the voluntariness of the statements. There must be a separate fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness in front of the judge alone before the statements may be received in evidence at the trial for jury consideration.”
A fair-hearing and reliability determination on the issue of voluntariness as a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession, is a standard unequivocally established in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1964), and then clearly reaffirmed in the Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972) decision. It is my conclusion that where the issue of voluntariness of a confession or other incriminatory statement is raised pursuant to Rule 16, W.R.Cr.P., at a time prior to trial, a hearing in the constitutional context required by Jackson v. Denno, supra, should be held also in advance of trial, so that counsel would know what the rules of the game would be in trial, and also so that the obviously pervasive effect of introduction, if subsequently permitted, will not permeate the atmosphere of the jury evaluation as derived from the recess for hearing otherwise required. Dodge v. State, supra. Attention is specifically directed to Lufkins v. Solem, 554 F.Supp. 988 (D.S.D.1983), aff’d 716 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1219, 104 S.Ct. 2667, 81 L.Ed.2d 372 (1984), in both the procedural and ineffectiveness contexts.
A further problem is first raised in this case by appellant’s brief discussing a trial defect not initially pursued at trial by specific objection or motion in limine. The prosecution was permitted to introduce into evidence defendant’s request to see an at*262torney, to then be multiplied in trial harm by measured noncompliance until an incriminatory statement is obtained. It is recognized that specific objection to the admitted testimony of the request for an attorney was not made, and that the subject is consequently only here on a plain-error inquiry. The strategic finesse against comment on the privilege against self-incrimination is to present to the jury the testimony of the request for an attorney. Both are exceptionally prejudicial and similarly contravene the accused’s constitutional rights. State v. Rogers, 32 Ohio St.3d 70, 512 N.E.2d 581 (1987).
This case presents an intoxicated individual without regard for the no-see, no-hear, no-explanation of the arresting and witnessing officers, a request for counsel promised and denied, and a strategy which may be related to a how-to book or seminar on interrogation, deliberately'structured to elicit incriminating statements from the defendant in the absence of requested counsel. If this critique appears overblown, the factual events require reanalysis, including promise, process, denying opportunity to call from Lovell, unexplained delay in delivery to the county seat with two people, one a police officer and the second the person who has just been involved in a homicide, sitting together for an undisclosed time for an undisclosed purpose. Then, almost by magic, after something is said that was deemed incriminatory, the attendant officer leaves the room to draft his notes, while the other officer returns to the room and makes arrangements for transfer of the accused through car travel to the office in Basin. I would not find that the Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) notation of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), and United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980), affords a justification for admission by its differentiation from the fundamental principles defined in Massiah and Henry. Clearly, a deliberate elicitation plan is portrayed in the events, including factors of time, place, circumstance, and prompted response by Miranda-form utilization. United States v. Henry, supra. The test of Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at 300-301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-1690, “a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent,” is presented by rational application of the objective standard. The psychological pressure which was of concern to Justice Stevens dissenting in Innis is even more obviously portrayed here. Certainly this is not an Arizona v. Mauro, supra, case. Patton, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: Government Circumvention Through Surreptitious Interrogation, 20 J.Mar.L.Rev. 567 (1987). See also Brewer v. Wiliams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424, reh. denied 431 U.S. 925, 97 S.Ct. 2200, 53 L.Ed.2d 240 (1977); Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880; Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682; Note, Moran v. Burbine, The Decline of Defense Counsel’s “Vital” Role in the Criminal Justice System, 36 Cath.U.L. Rev. 253 (1986).
VOIR DIRE
A fair and impartial jury is a firm constitutional command of the Wyoming Constitution, Art. 1, § 9 and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Chief Justice John Marshall in 1807 established the fundamental standard for American adjudication:
“The great value of the trial by jury certainly consists in its fairness and impartiality.” United States v. Burr, 25 Fed.Cas. 49, 50 [¶¶ 14,692-14,694] (1807).
See Lee v. State, Wyo., 743 P.2d 296 (1987); and Summers v. State, Wyo., 731 P.2d 558 (1987), Cardine, Justice dissenting, and Urbigkit, Justice dissenting.
The method provided by rule and statute for achievement of the constitutionally guaranteed liberty interest is an effective voir dire. All people are not equal when perceived and evaluated by basic prejudices, determined social values, and intrinsic attitudes. Expert trial attorneys and forensic psychologists conclude that in 90 percent of the cases, a jury trial is likely preordained at a time before the first witness is called to testify. The aim of the *263protagonist advocate, and particularly so in criminal defense, is to lower the 90-10 relationship to afford a better opportunity for reason and fairness considerations.9
Although not in itself determinative in this case by virtue of an exercised peremptory challenge, as undeterminable from this record to have been provided by whichever party, the stark example is demonstrable. This case factually and forcefully demonstrates the long-time concern held by this writer about the constitutionality of Rule 701(d)(4), Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming,10 as applied in criminal cases, and its advocacy and propriety if misused in civil cases, whereby adequate inquiry is not afforded to properly exercise challenges for cause, or to knowledgeably utilize the rights to peremptory challenge. Neither the court nor counsel can determine the impartiality question unless an adequate voir-dire examination is authorized and pursued. Cf. Summers v. State, Wyo., 725 P.2d 1033 (1986), aff'd 731 P.2d 558 (1987); Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 991 (1984). See National Jury Project, Inc., Jurywork, Systematic Techniques, Ch. 2, Improving Voir Dire Conditions (2d ed. 1986).
To understand the scenario of this case, it must be noted that no complete list of witnesses to be used by the State was furnished; no pretrial conference was held; and no Jackson v. Denno hearing was provided in pretrial process. Subpoenas issued prior to the commencement of trial include a significant number of names, but obviously, in retrospect, not all the witnesses were called by the State to testify. Among the veniremen called for examination was Charles Scheeler, number 42.
In voir-dire examination of venireman Scheeler, we find:
“MR. THARP: You heard the Court just go over an explanation of the functions ' of the Court and jury. With what you *264know about Clyde and his family, do you think you could be a fair juror, to be able to judge the case based on what comes from the witness stand?
⅛ sfc * * * *
“THE COURT: How about you, Mr. Scheeler, you indicated you knew Clyde Griffin or members of his family?
“JUROR SCHEELER: I knew them when I moved to Byron. I run a business up there. Run into them.
“MR. THARP: How long you lived in Byron?
“JUROR SCHEELER: Seven years.
“MR. THARP: Would what you know about Clyde or his family, would that cause you any problems sitting here as a juror?
“JUROR SCHEELER: I don’t think so.
“MR. THARP: What about Carol Griffin, you know her?
“JUROR SCHEELER: Yes.
“MR. THARP: Would your acquaintance with her cause you any problems being a juror in this case?
“MR. SCHEELER: I don’t think so.”
After inquiry, the prosecuting attorney gave the names of a large number of potential witnesses, and inquired of the veniremen separately as to whether any association or acquaintanceship would adversely affect their fairness that “would cause you any problems being a juror.” After these names had been separately listed in considerable detail, the following occurred:
“THE COURT: Gone through all your witnesses?
“MR. THARP: I think pretty much.[11]
“MR. SPERRY: Covered the waterfront, Your Honor.”
It was established that Scheeler had been a military policeman in the Korean War; he didn’t know what circumstance might “necessitate the taking of human life,” and thought that drunkenness should not be used as an excuse to commit a crime because “I don’t think it should be used, I sell it.”
Then, in answer to the inquiry of defendant:
“MR. SPERRY: Mr. Scheeler, you might well have heard some opinions expressed. You said you sold liquor; is that right?
“JUROR SCHEELER: I have that business.
“MR. SPERRY: I bet you have heard some opinions expressed, haven’t you?
“JUROR SCHEELER: You hear all kinds of things in my place.
“MR. SPERRY: Well, have you ever expressed an opinion?
“JUROR SCHEELER: No. When I do, I do it in my own mind because I can’t come out in the open. I got customers. I might lose a customer over it.
“MR. SPERRY: But you have formed in your own mind an opinion in this case, haven’t you?
“JUROR SCHEELER: Well, I never did actually ever know what the truth really was. You hear so many different stories and different people come in there and I just listen to this and listen to that, might as well forget about it and get the real truth when it comes to Court.
“MR. SPERRY: You heard the Judge talking to you a minute ago about something relayed and several people hear it and pretty soon you can’t really remember exactly. Do you think you would have any trouble if you would go to the jury room and sit there trying to help in deliberation separating out of your mind what you hear from this witness stand from what you have heard out there in the Byron Bar?
“JUROR SCHEELER: I don’t think that would have any effect on me actually.
“MR. SPERRY: Are — you think you could be fair and impartial?
“JUROR SCHEELER: I believe I could, because you got to if you are going to have, get along with your customers without fights or anything in the bar, too, you got to work with them and keep the peace. You got to work both sides. I work with women and men both, but I hate to tell you which one is the worse.
*265“MR. SPERRY: We wouldn’t get you into that.”
Selection of the jury was completed on the day the trial commenced, April 28. On May 2, a subpoena for Carol Scheeler, who was obviously the wife of the prior venireman, was issued without any record reflection of notice of her name or anticipated testimony. Then, as she was called in rebuttal to testify, we find her testimony in regard to an incident in the bar operated by the Scheelers in Byron, involving the defendant and a Frank Fitzgerald who was clearly antagonistic to the decedent as a prior employer of the defendant and who had previously testified for defendant. This testimony came late in the evidentiary stage in the midst of the accusative “been eating oyster” testimony as hearsay relating Charles Kellogg to a friend of Mrs. Griffin. The entire scenario bespoke of the problems evidenced in Schmunk v. State, Wyo., 714 P.2d 724 (1986), and Frias v. State, Wyo., 722 P.2d 135 (1986). The elicited testimony was:
“BY MR. THARP:
“Q. Would you state your name, please?
“A. Carol Scheeler.
“Q. Where do you live, Mrs. Scheeler?
“A. Byron, Wyoming.
“Q. You work outside your home?
“A. Yes. My husband and I own the Byron Bar and Cafe.
“Q. How long have you run the Byron Bar?
“A. Six years.
“Q. Do you know Clyde Griffin or did you know Clyde Griffin?
“A. Yes.
“Q. How about Carol Griffin?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Do you know Frank Fitzgerald?
“A. He has been in a few times as a customer is the only way I know him.
“Q. You know who he is?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Do you recall when Clyde Griffin would have been in jail in Cody in November of 1985?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And do you know why he was there?
“A. I believe he had a DWI.
“Q. During that time do you recall Mrs. Griffin and Mr. Frank Fitzgerald being in your bar?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Do you remember what time of day this was?
“A. Oh, it was in about middle of the afternoon.
“Q. Were you personally present?
“A. Yes. I was working.
“Q. Were you tending bar?
“A. Yes.
“Q. What did they come in to the bar, you say, about the middle of the afternoon. Where did they sit in the bar?
“A. About the middle of the bar.
“Q. Did you see them?
“A. Yes. •
“Q. Could you describe what they did while they were there?
“A. Well, I believe they said they had been to a sale and talking about something, about delivering a television and they had, I think, two drinks and they were giggling and Mr. Fitzgerald was playing with Mrs. Griffin’s breasts.
“Q. Playing with Mrs. Griffin’s breasts?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Describe what he was doing.
“A. Well, they were just sitting very close together and he was playing with her breasts and they were kissing.
“Q. Kissing in the bar?
“A. Yes.
“Q. You observed this?
“A. Yes.
“Q. How long did this go on?
“A. Oh, approximately twenty minutes.
“Q. And how long were they in the bar?
“A. Probably thirty minutes.
“Q. And have they ever been back in there together since?
“A. No.
“MR. THARP: I have I don’t believe I have any further questions.
*266“MR. SPERRY: I have no questions, Your Honor.
“THE COURT: Beg your pardon? [An audio recording at this point for tone-of-voice perception would be most interesting.]
“MR. SPERRY: No questions.
“THE COURT: You may step down.”
The record does not portray that counsel for defendant ever recognized what hit him, as initiated by inconclusive voir dire and the unlisted rebuttal witnesses. Obviously, the significance of these events would be much greater if Scheeler had stayed on the jury, even though we cannot tell whether the peremptory challenge which denied that result was by the State or the defendant. The point to be made in any confined voir-dire opportunity and obligation is, how many venirepersons of this character are not discovered and consequently not excused? Again, we have the same problem which existed in Braley v. State, Wyo., 741 P.2d 1061, 1070 (1987), Urbigkit, J., dissenting.
It is of the essence of this nation’s criminal system that the trial by a jury of a defendant’s peers include an essential ingredient of that right that the jury consist of impartial or indifferent jurors. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). The necessity of a thorough voir-dire inquiry to identify bias is recognized in Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984), and cases cited in n. 13 at 1038, 104 S.Ct. at 2892, including In re National Broadcasting Co., 209 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 653 F.2d 609, 617 (D.C.Cir.1981); United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 865 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 871, 100 S.Ct. 148, 62 L.Ed. 2d 96 (1979); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, n. 45 at 209 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied sub nom. Calley v. Hoffman, 425 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 1505, 47 L.Ed.2d 760 (1976). The Delaware Supreme Court, while recognizing that the practice favors limited voir dire, carefully reviewed the importance in constitutional terms by assessing before reversal “whether defendant was allowed to take adequate steps to make sure that he was tried by a fair and disinterested panel of jurors.” Hughes v. State, Del. Supr., 490 A.2d 1034, 1041 (1985).
I categorically differ with the conclusion of this court that appropriate examination of the obvious areas of prejudice and antagonism cannot and should not be explored on voir dire. Perhaps the question was not as artfully composed as it might have been, but the subject of a singular issue of defense was perhaps a major responsibility of defending under the factual circumstances evidenced in this case. The whole field of the abused-wife syndrome, physical-violence proclivities, and retreat-to-the-wall criteria are inseparably invoked in the constitutional-fairness requirement of the individual juror.12
I would adopt the carefully stated and specifically applicable constitutional analysis in a current opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, King v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 257, 259 (5th Cir.1987):
“The right to an impartial jury is basic to our system of justice. This right carries with it the concomitant right to take reasonable steps designed to ensure that a jury is impartial. Perhaps the most important device to serve this end is the jury challenge, a device based on voir dire examination. Although the proper scope of voir dire is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court, that discretion is not unfettered. Limits on voir dire that create an unreasonable risk of bias or prejudice infecting the trial process violate due process.”
I would reverse for a proper, fair, and reasonable trial, with improper evidence excluded. It is not only possible, but highly likely, that upon retrial, a Frias v. State, supra, result would be achieved by second-proceeding jury acquittal.
. In the pejorative attack on the character of defendant by rewritten majority opinion, one could discern the direction used to attempt essentially to eviscerate the adjudicative validity of the dissenting opinion. This writer remains persuaded that rewriting majority opinions in response to dissents is constructionally unproductive. Consequently, the dissent will not be rewritten to respond to the conclusory characterizations which intertwine legal analysis in present majority dissertation. Temptation, albeit fortuitously suppressed, exists to attach the original opinion by footnote or appendices so that communicative validity in the course of dialog could be preserved. However, nothing we now do, in rational assessment that none of the participants were angelic and that defendant acted rather predictably to the uncontrolled bad-temper conduct of decedent, as now followed by critique of the adequacy of process and representation, to be emotionally weighed by juristic fact conflict, will afford future prece-dential domination in legal rules and standards to be derived from this tragic episode.
*257I would only conclude, after the editing process of the court’s opinion now achieved, that the court’s contention of nonexistent wife abuse is not sustainable from the police-call records, evidenced physical injury to defendant, written separation agreements, or the entire trial transcript as evidencing a course of wife abuse which was a substantial feature of defense. Confirming these established facts were the two separation agreements, one of May, 1985, and the second of July, 1985, as somewhat restated in the second edition, providing:
"2. That HUSBAND agrees not to contact, harass, or interfere with WIFE in any manner until he has obtained psychological counseling and until such time as the treating psychologist states that HUSBAND'S emotional state is substantially more stable than now and is of no harm to WIFE. HUSBAND agrees not to verbally or physically threaten WIFE." (Emphasis added.) Agreement signed May 14, 1985.
Not choosing to rewrite this dissent in further factual response, I leave this case to litigants in rehearing request for argument about the facts, or to legal scholars for historical analysis. A fair current example is found in Johann and Osanka, “I Didn’t Mean to Kill Him”, Barrister (Fall 1987) at 18:
"Women are abused by spouses. Women do kill their men. And lawyers must defend them, and must understand society and today’s criminal justice system,”
and I would add: within which scenario appellate courts and their individual members are only participatory functionaries.
. "Right of accused to defend.
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to defend in person and by counsel, * * *.” Article 1, § 10, Wyoming Constitution.
"Self-incrimination; jeopardy.
"No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case, * * *.” Article 1, § 11, Wyoming Constitution.
. The Miranda form used contained the following information:
“LOVELL POLICE DEPARTMENT
"Lovell, Wyo.
"YOUR RIGHTS
"PLACE Lovell, Wyoming
"DATE 1-26-86
“TIME 11:24 A.M.
"Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.
"You have the right to remain silent.
"Anything you say may be used against you in court.
“You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have him with you during questioning.
"If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning, if you wish.
“If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you still have the right to stop answering at any time.
“You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.
"WAIVER OF RIGHTS
"I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.
"Detaining Officer:....
Signed: /s/ Carol Griffin
"Witness # 1: /s/ Thomas Irwin
Time: 11:27 A.M. Date Jan. 26, 1986
“Witness #2:....
Address P.O. Box 733
Cowley, WY 82420” (Emphasis added.)
. The attorney who had represented Mrs. Griffin in the litigative involvements of the marital problems with decedent was Kenneth Koski from Powell, with an office in Lovell, and the attorney who had represented decedent was L.R. Garrett, from Lovell. Consequently, no benefit was served in leaving Lovell to go to Basin in order to contact counsel.
. It belies the power of contemplation why an arresting officer in a murder case in Lovell would leave the individual to whom he had promised a right to call an attorney so that he could "interview another witness” in an apparent disassociated situation. Unfortunately, this record does not define, through either sharply directed motion in limine or suppression proceedings by detailed cross-examination, information which could possibly dispel the obvious skepticism engendered from this appeal record.
It is particularly curious that having asked for an attorney on the way to Lovell and then being detained on an apparent subterfuge, the Miranda warning was first given and then the arresting officer left the room to pursue the other duties for the next hour. The only possible purpose of the Miranda warning was to initiate and validate what happened — a conversation which might contain incriminating content.
It is also curious that the two officers were unable to observe any particular alcoholic influence or shock-related mental disturbance, even though some two hours later Mrs. Griffin still registered a blood-alcohol content of .23 percent.
. In May, 1985, the parties admitted the domestic intranquility. Agreement was made wherein it was recognized that they were not living together, and for a 60-day period the husband agreed not to "contact, harass, or interfere with WIFE” or “to verbally or physically threaten WIFE.” Events seemed to have improved during that period. When the agreement ended, the problems restarted, and a similar agreement was entered into July 24,1985, for an additional 90 days. After expiration of that period, the *260problems recommenced in full fury until the separation on December 22, 1985 which would have ended on January 27, 1986 by the return of decedent to the trailer house owned by Mrs. Griffin, except that one day earlier, when he barged into the residential unit, his return was untimely ended. On January 9, 1986, he had written a painstakingly detailed request to be permitted to return and resume the marital relationship. Unquestionably he was a man of uncontrolled urges and violence in the classical mode of the physically abusive and wife-injuring husband. The case is also classic in the finally-too-much standard of the abused-wife homicide case, except here the husband was not in a mutually occupied residence when killed, and consequently the break-in and terrorizing attribute was added to the only too-frequently displayed societal panorama.
. The series of events would be as clearly paraphrased in her intent in the statement, "I am not going to be beat up again. Stop or I will shoot you.” He did not; she did.
. Factually, we have a big male bully bursting into the residence of the separated, small wife, knowing she had been drinking and that she had recently purchased a firearm with which she was not familiar. A medal for the resulting disaster may not be appropriate, but neither was penitentiary confinement of the attacked and defensive female. Negligently, intentionally, or in pursuit of uncontrolled temper, the decedent suicidally approached. Whether fairly defined or not, decedent asked for what he got, and other bullyboys and woman-beaters, should be forewarned. The converse of this is found in Ramirez v. State, Wyo., 739 P.2d 1214 (1987), where the female was not killed, and the male *261went to prison for a long term. Specific attention is also directed to Cutbirth v. State, Wyo., 663 P.2d 888 (1983), where the abused wife was killed.
. An exhaustive and specific analysis of this trial requirement is presented in an excellent treatise by the National Jury Project, Inc., Jury-work, Systematic Techniques (2d ed. 1986):
“Systematic jurywork is an overall approach to trial preparation for any jury trial. Two general premises underlie this approach.
“First, the trial team can and should concern itself with structural issues in the jury system and the. jury selection process. Issues such as the procedures employed for conducting voir dire and empanelling juries, the manner in which peremptory challenges are used, and the extent to which jury pools are representative affect the fairness of an individual trial, and thus, every case that goes to trial.
'The second premise in this approach is that the conduct of an effective voir dire and the selection of a jury best suited to hear a particular case require that the perspectives jurors bring to the courtroom be integrated into the process of trial preparation for a case. If trial preparation includes careful examination of the witnesses, evidence, and jury instructions; concerted efforts to identify possible juror reactions to that material; and systematic analysis of the reasons that different jurors might react differently to the same evidence and argument, a case presentation can be developed that will be well received by jurors who have been carefully chosen for their ability to hear a particular case.” Id., § 1.01 Introduction, at 1-1.
. Rule 25, W.R.Cr.P. states in pertinent part:
“(a) Examination of jurors. — The parties, or their attorneys, may conduct the examination of prospective jurors, but such examination shall be under the supervision and control of the court, and the court may itself conduct such further examination as it deems proper."
Rule 701, Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming states:
“(a) The only purpose of voir dire is to select a panel of jurors who will fairly and impartially hear the evidence and render a just verdict.
“(b) The court shall not permit counsel to attempt to precondition prospective jurors to a particular result, comment on the personal lives and families of the parties or their attorneys, nor question jurors concerning the pleadings, the law, the meaning of words, or the comfort of jurors.
“(c) The court may inquire of the prospective jurors.
"(d) In voir dire examination counsel shall not:
“(1) Ask questions of an individual juror that can be asked collectively;
"(2) Ask questions answered in a juror questionnaire except to explore some answer in greater depth;
“(3) Repeat a question asked and answered;
“(4) Instruct the jury on the law or argue the case;
“(5) Ask a juror what his verdict might be under any hypothetical.
“(e) The court may assume voir dire if counsel fails to follow this rule. If the court assumes the voir dire, it may permit counsel to submit questions in writing.”
11. See Bailey and Rothblatt, Successful Techniques for Criminal Trials, § 6:19 Compelling the prosecutor to disclose his witnesses, at 175 (2d ed. 1985).
. The obvious problem on this record is that Creese also was not included among the final jury membership, although it may be, but is not, determinable that the peremptory-challenge removal was required of defendant, then causing appellant to retain another undesired member on the jury.