dissenting in part.
I dissent to Division 2 of the majority opinion.
Code Ann. § 56-3403b (b)(1) provides for “compensation to insured injured persons, without regard to fault, up to an aggregate minimum limit of $5,000 per insured injured person for: (1) all necessary medical expenses not to exceed $2,500 arising from a motor vehicle accident including necessary medicine, drugs, surgical, dental x-ray and rehabilitative services, including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, all as prescribed, authorized, approved or rendered by an attending physician, including any person licensed to practice a healing art and any remedial treatment and care rendered in accordance with a recognized religious healing method ...” I cannot believe the legislature intended that the term “nursing services” as used in Code Ann. § 56-3403b (b)(1) be given the narrow construction advanced by *577the majority. An injured party may not require the level of composite nursing services which necessitates hiring a licensed practical or registered nurse and yet be in need of care.1 In this regard, it may be noted that Code Ann. §. 84-6811 provides: “The provisions of this Chapter [Licensed Practical Nurses] shall not prohibit an orderly, attendant, aide, or maid from engaging in work or performing tasks customarily performed by such persons.” In addition, Code Ann. § 84-1012 states: “The provisions of this Chapter [Nurses] shall not prohibit... (d). The performance of auxiliary services in the care of patients, when such care and activities do not require the knowledge and skill required of a person practicing nursing as a registered professional nurse, and when such care and activities are performed under orders or directions of a licensed physician, licensed dentist, licensed podiatrist, or person licensed to practice nursing as a registered professional nurse . . .” In my view, the level of services required in a given case should be a matter of professional judgment by the “attending physician.” It is indeed incongruous that “care rendered in accordance with a recognized religious healing method” is compensable under Code Ann. § 56-3403b (b)(1) while “nursing services” performed by an orderly or attendant under the direction of a physician are not. However, this is the law under the majority opinion.
Furthermore, I find nothing in the language of Code Ann. § 56-3403b (b)(1) which renders authorized nursing services performed by a relative of the injured party uncompensable.2 Compare Code Ann. § 56-3403b (b)(3), which provides for “expenses, not to exceed $20 per day, reasonably incurred during a period of disability in obtaining ordinary and necessary services from others, excluding members of the injured person’s household, in lieu of services that, had he or she not been injured, the injured person would have performed, not for income but' for the benefit of his or her household.”
Under a proper construction of Code Ann. § 56-3403b (b)(1), appellee has not pierced appellant’s complaint with respect to the *578claim for nursing services. See Watkins Products, Inc. v. England, 123 Ga. App. 179, 182 (180 SE2d 265) (1971). The judgment should be reversed as to this portion of the complaint.
I am authorized to state that Justice Undercofler and Justice Clarke join in the dissent.
The difference in cost between a licensed practical or registered nurse, on the one hand, and an attendant or orderly, on the other, is presumably rather substantial. Were an injured party’s physician to decide that the injured party only required the services of an orderly, he would, under the majority opinion, nonetheless have to authorize the services of a licensed nurse in order for his patient to recover no fault insurance benefits. To this extent, the majority opinion promotes unnecessary-costs in the health care system.
The majority apparently would allow recovery for “nursing services” provided by a licensed nurse even though this individual was related to the injured party.