(concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although I concur in the result reached by the majority, I wish to register my disagreement with use of the so-called "objective” test as the basis for resolving claims of entrapment.
Unless police conduct in a given situation is so reprehensible as to violate constitutional standards imposed by the Due Process Clause,1 I do not believe that one who is guilty of committing a criminal act should be exonerated by the judiciary simply because it disapproves of conduct on the part of another branch of government. While constitutional limitations must be strictly observed, it is my view that the defense of entrapment, which has no constitutional base whatever, should be eliminated. Short of that, we should at least move to the "subjective” standard for judging entrapment, a position already taken by courts in the federal system and in the overwhelming majority of our sister states.2_
*99It is my hope that when a more appropriate case is presented, this Court will reconsider its adherence to the so-called objective test for entrapment. In the meantime, while a Court majority persists in using the so-called objective test for resolution of entrapment claims, I wish to make clear that I prefer, and associate myself with, the version of that test articulated by Justice Brickley.
See anno: Modern status of the law concerning entrapment to commit narcotics offenses—state cases, 62 ALR3d 110.