dissenting and joining in the dissent of THOMAS, Justice.
I join in the dissent of Justice Thomas which, for me, contains just one more cogent reason why the appeal should not be settled in accord with the majority opinion. I dissent on the additional grounds that I believe the majority has extended the scope of the declaratory-judgment remedy beyond that which is contemplated by law. While agreeing with that portion of the majority opinion which holds sovereign immunity to be inapplicable, I would hold that the trial judge correctly decided that the late filing of appellant’s1 declaratory judgment action dictated dismissal because the court was then without jurisdiction to entertain appellant’s challenge to the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) regulation.
As a third reason for supporting the trial court’s decision, I would have gone on to hold that, under the facts of record, there is no justiciable issue upon which a declaratory judgment could be rendered in this case.
I would have affirmed.
The Declaratory-Judgment Question
The appellants argue that the district court erred in holding that — under the facts of this case — declaratory relief is not available. I would have held that declaratory relief is available in other related circumstances but not under the facts of this case.
The rules in issue here were promulgated by DEQ and are alleged to affect the rights of Rocky Mountain and other appellants. The regulation which appellants question became effective September 4, 1980, and provides in pertinent part:
“Section 3. Applicability; General.
“a. These regulations shall apply to any discharge to the subsurface including the vadose zone which could render any groundwater of the State unsuitable or degrade it for all uses for which it was suitable prior to discharge.
“b. A permit for a discharge shall not be required if the discharge is part of a facility for which an application has been made to the Division for a Permit to Construct, Install or Modify Public Water Supplies and Wastewater Facilities.
“c. Discharges, for the purpose of these regulations, are described and identified as:
“(1) Discharges of commercial, municipal and industrial wastes, which include but are not limited to:
* * * * * *
“(d) Oil field wastes including water produced with oil and gas;”
Appellants further charge that Section 4 of Chapter IX of these Rules and Regulations set out terms and conditions under which all new surface discharges of oil-field wastes, including water produced with oil and gas, would be allowed by the Department but that subsurface discharges would be prohibited unless permits were obtained pursuant to DEQ rules and regulations. *1170DEQ did exclude from the operation of such section certain discharges associated with described drilling operations as well as certain discharges which are associated with enhanced recovery operations for oil and gas. The regulation did not, however, exclude from its permit requirements the underground injection and/or disposal of salt water, nonpotable water and other oil-field wastes produced in association with oil and gas through wells used to facilitate the production of oil and gas.
Rocky Mountain says that the authority to regulate all phases of the drilling and operation of oil and gas wells and disposal wells in connection with oil and gas production operations is vested exclusively with the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, by authority of § 30-5-104, W.S.1977. In this respect, it is urged that the relevant statutory language provides as follows:
“(d) The Commission has authority:
“(ii) To regulate, for conservation purposes:
“(D) Disposal of salt water, nonpotable water, and oil-field wastes;”
Rocky Mountain further alleges that § 35-ll-103(c), W.S.1977 excludes from the regulatory jurisdiction of DEQ the authority to require permits and regulate the operation of wells employed for the underground injection and disposal of water, gas or other materials derived in association with oil or gas production. This authority, says Rocky Mountain, lies exclusively with the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. This statute provides:
“(i) ‘Pollution’ means contamination or other alteration of the physical, chemical or biological properties of any waters of the state, including change in temperature, taste, color, turbidity or odor of the waters or any discharge of any acid or toxic materials, chemical or chemical compound, whether it be liquid,..gaseous, solid, radioactive or other substance, including wastes, into any waters of the state which creates a nuisance or renders any waters harmful, detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare, to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational or other legitimate beneficial uses, or to livestock, wildlife or aquatic life, or which degrades the water for its intended use, or adversely affects the environment. This term does not mean water, gas or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate production of oil, or gas or water, derived in association with oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the well used either to facilitate production or for disposal purposes is approved by authority of the state, and if the state determines that such injection or disposal well will not result in the degradation of ground or surface or water resources;” (Emphasis added.)
Section 9 — 4-114(a), W.S.1977, points the way for a “person” affected by a rule promulgated by an agency to appeal to a district court for review. That statute provides:
“(a) Subject to the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted and in the absence of any statutory or common-law provision precluding or limiting judicial review, any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency in a contested case, or by other agency action or inaction, or any person affected in fact by a rule adopted by an agency, is entitled to judicial review in the district court for the county in which such administrative action or inaction was taken, or in which any real property affected by such administrative action or inaction is located, or in the event no real property is involved, in the district court for the county in which the party aggrieved or adversely affected by the administrative action or inaction resides or has its principal place of business. The procedure to be followed in such proceeding before the district court shall be in accordance with rules heretofore or hereinafter adopted by the Wyoming supreme court.” (Emphasis added.)
*1171And section (c) of § 9-4-114, W.S.1977, 1981 Cumm.Supp. provides:
“(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:
“(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
“(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or lacking statutory right;
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; or
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.”
As indicated in subsection (a) above, the procedures to be followed in pursuing a petition for review to the district court are prescribed by the rules of the Wyoming Supreme Court. The rule for reviewing an agency ruling through the petition-for-review procedure is contemplated by Rule 12, W.R.A.P. In a noncontested case (which this is), appellees urge the applicability of Rule 12.04, W.R.A.P., which provides:
“In a contested case, or in a noncon-tested case where a statute places a time limit on appeal, the petition for review shall be filed within thirty (30) days after written, certified notice to all parties of the final decision of the agency or denial of the petition for a rehearing, * * *.” (Emphasis added.)
The appellees point out that Wyoming has a statute which sets the time for appeal— namely, § 35-11-1001, W.S.1977. This statute provides:
“Judicial review.
“(a) Any aggrieved party under this act, any person who filed a complaint on which a hearing was denied, and any person who has been denied a variance or permit under this act, may obtain judicial review by filing a petition for review within thirty (30) days after entry of the order or other final action complained of pursuant to the provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act [§§ 9-4-101 to 9-4-115].” (Emphasis added.)
Appellees argue that, under this statute, if the appellants were aggrieved by rules promulgated by authority of the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act they were compelled to bring their petition for review or their declaratory-judgment action within the 30-day period contemplated by the statute — which they failed to do. The árgument is that, in consequence of this failure, the court did not longer possess jurisdiction — either to entertain a petition for review or for any other action, including a declaratory-judgment action.
In response, appellants urge that Rule 12, W.R.A.P. and its subdivisions are applicable only to petitions for review, that theirs is not a petition for review but an action for declaratory judgment, and that Rule 12.12, W.R.A.P. contemplates this kind of independent relief in the circumstances of this case. Rule 12.12 provides:
“The relief, review, or redress available in suits for injunction against agency action or enforcement thereof, in actions for recovery of money, in actions for a declaratory judgment of rights, status, or legal relations based on administrative action or inaction, in actions for mandamus to compel administrative action, and in applications for writs of certiorari and prohibition to review or prevent administrative action shall be available by independent action notwithstanding any petition for review filed.” (Emphasis added.)
*1172Appellants further contend that § 35-11-1001, W.S.1977 is inapplicable to the matter at hand because it also is concerned only with an appeal by way of judicial review.
Keeping in mind that the petition-for-review jurisdictional time limits have not been complied with, I perceive the central question to be this:
Does Rule 12.12 give the appellants an independent right of action for declaratory judgment even in those circumstances where the court no longer retains jurisdiction to entertain a petition for review?
In answering appellants’ claims, the State urges that, although Rule 12.12 allows for declaratory relief, the provisions must be read together with all of the Rule 12 provisions which implement the procedures for reviewing-agency action provided by § 9-4-114, supra. When this is done, the State argues, the 30-day time limitation noted previously in § 35-11-1001 applies under Rule 12.04, and the appellants’ action was, therefore, untimely — which is to say that the trial court did not have jurisdiction when the declaratory-judgment action was filed.
As noted above, the legislature, in § 9-4-114, granted individuals access to the courts in order to review either agency rules or adjudication which affected them. The statutory requirement for obtaining judicial review of agency action is that the party challenging the agency action or inaction be aggrieved by the adjudication or injured in fact by a rule. Pursuant to the provisions of § 9-4-114(a), this court promulgated the rules of procedure for obtaining judicial review of agency action, which procedure is now compiled in Rule 12 W.R.A.P.2 Rule 12.01, W.R.A.P. provides the general standard applicable for obtaining judicial review:
“To the extent that judicial review of administrative action by a district court is available, any person who is aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by any other agency action or inaction, or who is adversely affected in fact by a rule adopted by agency, may obtain such review as provided in this rule.”
Thus, under the appropriate procedures, the challenging party must not only show that he is aggrieved but also that his filing of an action seeking review is timely under the provisions of Rule 12.04 W.R.A.P.
The provision for declaratory relief in Rule 12.12 cannot and does not have the effect of conferring jurisdiction which is in addition to that provided in the rules and statutes pertaining to petitions for review. We said as much in Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of Wyoming, Wyo., 531 P.2d 884 (1975), when, in discussing the consent-to-suit aspect of the immunity issue, we said:
“The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act has been held not to constitute consent to suit against the United States but only that it gives an additional remedy when such jurisdiction already exists, 22 Am. Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments, § 85, p. 948. This is also true of the states where the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act has been adopted, American Federation of Labor v. Mann, Tex.Civ.App., 188 S.W.2d 276, 279, with much authority therein cited. Also see Empire Trust Co. v. Board of Commerce and Navigation, 124 N.J.L. 406, 11 A.2d 752, 754; Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A.2d 880, 885; Purity Oats Co. v. State, 125 Kan. 558, 264 P. 740; Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, p. 374 (2d Ed.); 1 Anderson, Actions for Declaratory Judgments, § 179, p. 346 (2d Ed.).” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 886.
In Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of Wyoming, supra, the jurisdictional issue was consent. The question was: Where the court was otherwise without jurisdiction (consent), could jurisdiction (consent) be invoked by authority of a statute which authorizes declaratory-relief judgment? We said no. We said, in essence, that if there had been jurisdiction to sue the State in the *1173first instance (consent), declaratory judgment could be utilized for whatever advantage the declaratory-judgment statute might serve — but, it could not confer jurisdiction — i.e., grant consent to sue the State — where otherwise it did not exist.
It is said in 22 Am.Jur.2d, p. 936, Declaratory Judgments § 75 “Jurisdiction — of state courts.”:
“Declaratory judgment statutes are not jurisdictional and do not create or grant jurisdiction where it does not otherwise exist, * * *.” Citing Conley v. Union County People’s Utility Dist., 182 Or. 568, 187 P.2d 150; Knodell v. Nelson, 76 S.D. 43, 71 N.W.2d 737; Malone v. Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 278 S.W.2d 204, error ref. n. r. e.; Borden Co. v. McDowell, 8 Wis.2d 246, 99 N.W.2d 146.
In actions for declaratory judgments, Anderson, Vol. 1, Jurisdiction, § 106, p. 173, the author says:
“The declaratory judgment statute did not in any way alter the regular jurisdiction of the courts by conferring upon the courts the procedural power enumerated therein, to render declaratory judgments.”
There can be no doubt but that the timely filing of a suit seeking review of administrative action is jurisdictional. Department of Revenue & Taxation v. Irvine, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1295 (1979); Snell v. Ruppert, Wyo., 541 P.2d 1042 (1975). Here, the appellants are requesting that we construe Rule 12.12 to allow them to bring a declaratory-judgment action at any time for purposes of reviewing the challenged regulation, even though the jurisdictional requirement created by Rule 12.04 and § 35-11-1001 has not been satisfied. This is in effect what the majority opinion allows — but I take issue with this resolution of the question. The only possible construction which I can give to Rule 12.12 is to say that the availability of declaratory relief to review administrative action is dependent on the timely filing of the action. All Rule 12.12 provides is that a litigant will be permitted to substitute the filing of a petition for review with an independent action of the sort listed in the rule. This conclusion is further supported by the first sentence of § 1-37-102 W.S.1977 where it is stated:
“Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions * * (Emphasis added.)
For me, this language contemplates that a party must comply with jurisdictional requirements before any question concerning the propriety of granting declaratory relief can be considered.
We have held before that our rules of procedure, enacted under the authority conferred by § 9-4-114, cannot enlarge our jurisdiction, nor can such authority modify or repeal the scope of review provided by the legislature. Tri-County Electric Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Gillette, Wyo., 525 P.2d 3 (1974); Johnson v. Schrader, Wyo., 507 P.2d 814 (1973). Since the jurisdiction of the district court, in this case, was dependent on the timely filing of the appeal, and since § 1-37-103 does not confer jurisdiction on the court by itself, the appellants’ failure to seek relief within 30 days of the final agency action required dismissal of their complaint which was filed some 40 days late. It is interesting to note that the majority recognize that it is important to consider the fact that here the district court was acting as an appellate court, yet the opinion ignores the scope of the district court’s appellate jurisdiction as it relates to review of DEQ action or inaction. This, for me, is an essential flaw in the majority’s approach.
I am aware of various holdings in other jurisdictions which seem to allow the use of declaratory-judgment actions to review administrative rules and regulations not yet applied by the promulgating agency. See: Homestake Mining v. Board of Environmental Protection, S.D., 289 N.W.2d 561 (1980); Consolidated Cigar v. Department of Public Health, 372 Mass. 844, 364 N.E.2d 1202 (1977); Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 74 Ill.2d 541, 25 Ill.Dec. 602, 387 N.E.2d 258 (1978); Rankin-Thoman, Inc. v. Caldwell, 42 Ohio St.2d 436, 329 N.E.2d 686 *1174(1975).3 However, in most instances where declaratory relief was held to be available, the applicable statutory-review provisions specifically directed the use of declaratory judgments as a means for reviewing-agency regulations.4 In some of the other cases listed above, the courts were concerned that failure to allow the requested relief would have precluded review altogether. In CF&I Steel v. Colorado Air Pollution Control Commission, Colo., 610 P.2d 85 (1980), the Colorado Supreme Court held that declaratory relief was available to challenge an agency regulation yet to be applied, since the threat of application was sufficient to give the parties standing under the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act.5
I would emphasize that I do not suggest that declaratory relief is never available to challenge an agency regulation, since Rule 12.12 specifically permits it. Instead, I would hold that, as a matter of law, the challenging party must timely file his action below if declaratory-judgment relief is to be sought in lieu of a petition for review.
Additionally, I do not conclude that declaratory relief is even now denied to the appellants. I am simply saying that, in these circumstances, under § 9-4-114, review cannot now become available until the challenged regulation is applied to the appellants, at which time the appellants may utilize whatever defenses are available under the law. Once again I reiterate that my conclusions on this issue are addressed to the failure of appellants to institute a timely review proceeding.
Justiciable Issue?
In addition to my conclusion that the district court was correct in dismissing this action for lack of jurisdiction, I would also observe that I question whether the circumstances of this case structure such a justiciable controversy as is necessary for the granting of declaratory relief. I say this because, even though declaratory relief is available as an alternative remedy for review of administrative action where the court has jurisdiction in the first instance, I doubt that the simple existence of an agency rule is, in and of itself, such a circumstance as will warrant the granting of the declaratory-judgment remedy. It seems to me that a challenging party must at least be able to point to an actual threatened application of a rule together with a probable adverse effect before a justiciable controversy will be said to have been fashioned. Thus, not only did the appellants fail to exhaust an available administrative remedy (as per the Thomas dissent) — fail to establish jurisdiction in the trial court, but I also conclude that the circumstances of this case were not at that stage where declaratory relief could have been granted, because the record does not disclose a threatened application of the rule in a manner which would adversely affect the appellants. Anderson v. Wyoming Development Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318 (1944); Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Hallmark Insurance, Wyo., 561 P.2d 706 (1977); Brimmer v. Thomson, Wyo., 521 P.2d 574 (1974). For all we know, DEQ might never invoke the rule against the appellants, or, if it did, the appellants might find it impossible to show that they were harmed in such a degree as a court would find sufficient to call for declaratory relief.
In conclusion, I would have held that the appellants’ failure to file their action within the 30-day requirement of § 35-11-1001, precluded review of the questioned regulation under any method suggested in Rule 12.12, W.R.A.P., that they did not exhaust their administrative remedy, and that the *1175facts of the case do not present a justiciable controversy. In my opinion the trial judge acted properly in dismissing this action.
I would have affirmed.
. I will sometimes refer to the appellants as “Rocky Mountain” in this dissenting opinion.
. The procedures were formerly found in Rule 72.1 W.R.C.P. See: Bruegman v. Johnson Ranches, Inc., Wyo., 520 P.2d 489 (1974).
. For a contra holding precluding the use of declaratory relief to review an agency regulation see: Appeal of Buckeye Power, Inc., et al., 42 Ohio St.2d 508, 330 N.E.2d 430 (1975).
. The Model Administrative Procedure Act, § 6, contains such a provision. For a discussion of this see: Davis, An Administrative Procedure Act for Arizona, 2 Ariz.L.Rev. 17, 26 (Summ.1960); Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33 Iowa L.Rev. 196 (1948). Wyoming did not choose to take such a course in enacting our version of the Administrative Procedure Act.
.The Colorado Supreme Court was not concerned with the question of timely filing, where here that is the principal point at issue.