concurring in part and concurring in the result in part.
I cannot agree with the majority opinion’s determination that defendant waived any claim of cruel and unusual punishment. Nonetheless, because I would hold that defendant’s sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment, I concur in the result with respect to that assignment of error. I concur fully with the remainder of the majority opinion.
I recognize that I previously authored an opinion reaching the same conclusion as the majority in this case. See State v. McGee, 175 N.C. App. 586, 590, 623 S.E.2d 782, 785, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 542, 634 S.E.2d 891 (2006). On the other hand, I have also authored opinions reaching the merits of such an argument without considering whether the contention had been raised below. See State v. Legrand, 181 N.C. App. 760, 640 S.E.2d 869, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 380, *12-15, 2007 WL 509322, *5 (2007) (unpublished); State v. McCleave, 161 N.C. App. 349, 588 S.E.2d 585, 2003 N.C. App. LEXIS 2064, *5-6, 2003 WL 22705376, *2-3 (2003) (unpublished).
Upon further reflection and in light of the flurry of decisions under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), in which Sixth Amendment issues relating to sentencing were addressed regardless whether raised below, I believe this issue is controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Canady, 330 N.C. 398, 410 S.E.2d 875 (1991). In Canady, the Supreme Court held that Rule 10(b)(1) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure did not preclude a defendant from challenging on appeal a trial court’s finding of an aggravating factor despite a failure to object to the finding before the trial court. The Court'explained:
[Rule 10(b)(1)] does not have any application to this case. It is directed to matters which occur at trial and upon which the trial court must be given an opportunity to rule in order to preserve the question for appeal. The purpose of the rule is to require a party to call the court’s attention to a matter upon which he or she wants a ruling before he or she can assign error to the matter on appeal.
Id. at 401, 410 S.E.2d at 878.
*421In short, in Canady, the Supreme Court distinguished between matters occurring “at trial” and matters occurring during “sentencing.” This Court has since repeatedly applied Canady to reject contentions that a challenge to a sentence on appeal is precluded by a failure to object below. See, e.g, State v. Chivers, 180 N.C. App. 275, 278, 636 S.E.2d 590, 593 (2006) (“Our Supreme Court has held that an error at sentencing is not considered an error at trial for the purpose of Appellate Rule 10(b)(1).”), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 222, 642 S.E.2d 709 (2007); State v. Curmon, 171 N.C. App. 697, 704, 615 S.E.2d 417, 422-23 (2005) (“[D]efendant was not required to object at sentencing to preserve this issue for appellate review.”); State v. Hargett, 157 N.C. App. 90, 92, 577 S.E.2d 703, 705 (2003) (“Our Supreme Court has held that an error at sentencing is not considered an error at trial for the purpose of N.C. Rule 10(b)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.”).
This principle has further been applied to permit review of constitutional issues arising out of sentencing such as those governed by Blakely. See, e.g., State v. McQueen, 181 N.C. App. 417, 420-21, 639 S.E.2d 131, 133, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 365,-S.E.2d-(2007); State v. Harris, 175 N.C. App. 360, 362-63, 623 S.E.2d 588, 590, vacated in part on other grounds, 361 N.C. 154, -S.E.2d-, disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 174, 641 S.E.2d 308 (2006). I see no meaningful basis for distinguishing Canady or the host of cases arising out of Blakely.
As recognized in Canady, the requirement of an objection to a sentence is not consistent with “the way our judicial system works.” Canady, 330 N.C. at 402, 410 S.E.2d at 878. Whether a defendant were to challenge a finding of fact encompassed in the sentence, as in Canady, or the sentence as a whole, as here, it would be an odd requirement — “a near impossibility” according to Canady, id. — to insist upon an objection “after a trial is completed and a judge is preparing a judgment,” id. Indeed, an Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence could not in fact be asserted until the sentence was imposed and judgment already entered.
Moreover, such a rule would require counsel effectively to stand up and say “I object” in response to the ruling of the trial court. Our Supreme Court long ago eliminated the requirement that counsel “except” to a trial court’s ruling. I see no reason to revive “exceptions,” especially since the appropriate forum for objecting to a trial court’s ruling is the appeal.
*422Although I believe that the Eighth Amendment issue is properly before this Court, I would hold that defendant has failed to demonstrate any constitutional violation. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence under the habitual felon statute because the resulting sentence was disproportionate to the crime of possessing .2 grams of cocaine.
Contrary to defendant’s argument, he was not sentenced to a term of 135 to 171 months for possessing a small amount of cocaine. He received the lengthy sentence because he had attained the status of a habitual felon. “Habitual felon laws have withstood scrutiny under the Eighth. Amendment to the United States Constitution in our Supreme Court and in the United States Supreme Court.” State v. Cates, 154 N.C. App. 737, 741, 573 S.E.2d 208, 210 (2002) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382, 100 S. Ct. 1133 (1980), and State v. Todd, 313 N.C. 110, 326 S.E.2d 249 (1985)), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 682, 577 S.E.2d 897, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 846, 157 L. Ed. 2d 84, 124 S. Ct. 121 (2003); see also State v. Quick, 170 N.C. App. 166, 170, 611 S.E.2d 864, 867 (2005) (“[NJothing in the Eighth Amendment prohibits our legislature from enhancing punishment for habitual offenders.”). Indeed, “[o]nly in exceedingly unusual non-capital cases will the sentences imposed be so grossly disproportionate as to violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishment.” State v. Ysaguire, 309 N.C. 780, 786, 309 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1983).
Defendant here fails to show that his sentence of 135 to 171 months is either “exceedingly unusual” or “grossly disproportionate” in light of his status as a habitual felon. Indeed, this Court has previously upheld a 14-year sentence for possession of a “small amount” of cocaine when the defendant was a habitual felon. See State v. Hodge, 112 N.C. App. 462, 468, 436 S.E.2d 251, 255 (1993). See also State v. Hensley, 156 N.C. App. 634, 639, 577 S.E.2d 417, 421 (holding that sentence, under habitual felon statute, of 90 to 117 months did not offend Eighth Amendment even though triggering felony involved pawning a tool for twenty dollars), disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 167, 581 S.E.2d 64 (2003).
Defendant directs our attention to State v. Starkey, 177 N.C. App. 264, 628 S.E.2d 424, cert. denied,-N.C.-, 636 S.E.2d 196 (2006). In Starkey, the State attempted to appeal a superior court’s decision sua sponte granting its own motion for appropriate relief and vacating, pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, a defendant’s sentence as a habitual felon for possession of .004 ounces of cocaine. Because this *423Court held that the State had no right to appeal the superior court’s decision and additionally refused to grant the State’s petition for writ of certiorari, the Court never addressed the merits of the Eighth Amendment issue. Starkey, therefore, provides no authority for disturbing defendant’s sentence as a habitual felon. Accordingly, given Hodge, I would decline to find that defendant’s sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.