(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the reasoning or result reached in Division I of the majority opinion, therefore respectfully dissent.
Significantly, the court declared in Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968):
“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate? [Citations]. Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction. [Citations]. And simple “'good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.” * * * If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be “secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects”, only in the discretion of the police.’ [Citation].” (emphasis supplied).
See also State v. Cooley, 229 N.W.2d 755, 756 (Iowa 1975).
Unquestionably, Officer Nuehring’s stop of the instantly involved red van constituted a seizure of the person within the context of the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Cooley, 229 N.W.2d at 759.
I submit Officer Nuehring, acting alone in making the initial and determinative stop and seizure of the person, did so absent articulated cause to reasonably believe criminal activity on the part of the .van occupants was then afoot. More precisely, as disclosed, infra, the officer acted upon nothing more than totally inadequate suspicion and conjecture. See State v. Cooley, 229 N.W.2d at 760-761.
It is to me evident the court below imper-missibly buttressed, and now the majority likewise attempts to bolster Officer Nuehr-ing’s inadequate articulated cause for stopping the vehicle by reference to facts not shown to have been known to him when he stopped the van. Such a “drag-net” rationale will only serve to create a sea of uncertainty in futuro for courts, attorneys and peace officers.
In support of the foregoing I refer first to these relevant portions of the record before us regarding Officer Nuehring’s testimony in course of the hearing on defendant’s pretrial suppression mqtion:
“The sole reason Officer Nuehring stopped the vehicle was because it was traveling slowly in the Mars Hill Drive Residential Area. After he stopped the vehicle, he was going to try to find from the driver why they were cruising the residential areas. He asked the driver of the vehicle basically just what he was doing, cruising the residential areas that hour of the night. He asked the driver to produce his driver’s license only. That there was nothing wrong with the driver’s license and he returned it. That he discovered no contraband in the vehicle nor did he ever observe any contraband in the vehicle.
*581“The Court directed the counsel for the Defendant to find out why the Officers stopped the vehicle on grounds that there had been no showing to the Court that there was any probable cause to stop the vehicle. The Court stated that the fact that the vehicle was driving slowly was not a crime and that the driver could cruise around in the residential district all he wanted to.
“In response to the inquiry made by the Court, Officer Nuehring testified that he had no prior information from the radio dispatcher that this vehicle had been suspected of use in any criminal activity. He had no prior information from any source that this vehicle was used in any criminal activity. From his observation of the vehicle that he thought that possibly a burglary element was involved on the basis that the vehicle was just cruising residential areas in a late hour.
“ * * * Officer Nuehring testified further than the vehicle in which the defendant was riding was not the particular red van operated by some known law violators at the lake.
“On re-direct examination, Officer Nuehring testified that he stopped the vehicle in the Mars Hill Drive area, which is a street that goes by the Dairy Queen and the Sunset Elementary School, a very curvy street which allows parking, so that it would be difficult to travel very fast on that street under any circumstances. Officer Nuehring testified that his purpose in stopping the vehicle was to find out what was going on, what they were doing, and incidental to that purpose he asked the driver to produce his license by way of identification.” (emphasis supplied).
Further in the same vein Judge Sullivan, in ruling on the aforesaid motion, specifically found:
“In this particular case, Officer Nuehr-ing first saw the vehicle on North Ninth Street, then he again saw the vehicle on the dead-end street in the Mars Hill area and he asked the driver of the van to produce his driver’s license, and at that time did not see any contraband in the vehicle. He had not received any dispatch of any criminal activities in the area; he had not received any warning by other peace officers to be on the lookout for such a vehicle, but because there had been many break-ins in the area, he thought perhaps a burglary might be involved. He found the vehicle in good operating order and he had known of other violators operating in the resort area in a red van; however, on direct examination, his purpose in stopping the vehicle was to find out what was going on. He did not stop the vehicle to obtain a view of the Defendant’s driver’s license, and appeared to be only incidental. He did not stop the vehicle for a driver’s license check. The Court finds that none of the provisions of 321:492 were applicable. There was no notice from other authorities, and he was suspicious because the vehicle was driving slow and there had been burglaries in the area with a van, although this Defendant was not the operator of the van.” (emphasis supplied).
I submit the showing made upon which this court must act falls far short of a moment-of-action reasonable cause for stopping a vehicle on one of our public highways. This wrongful intrusion, if here sanctioned, will surely open the door to indiscriminate and capricious stopping of any and every automobile engaged in legitimate affairs by peace officers acting upon nothing more than whim, fancy, caprice or suspicion. This I cannot sanction. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-154, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). See also Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97, 85 S.Ct. 223, 229, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1946).
Mindful of the foregoing, I would hold Nuehring and the latér arriving Officer Garlock were not in a place where they had a right to be after the van had been stopped. Consequently, nothing seen by *582them in the vehicle or obtained by a search of same or of the person of the occupants can withstand applicable constitutional mandates.
By the same token any subsequent searches were fatally tainted by the triggering “poisoned” vehicle stop.
I would reverse.
McCORMICK, J., joins this Dissent.