concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with that portion of the majority’s opinion that finds that the Full Commission’s second Opinion and Award in this case is not moot, and that this appeal is therefore proper. However, because I find that the Full Commission erred as a matter of law in its application of premises liability to the facts at hand, I would reverse and *213remand the Opinion and Award for further consideration. I therefore respectfully dissent.
The majority points to the Full Commission’s finding that “[t]he greater weight of the evidence indicates that neither Ms. Wall nor her staff knew or should have known that the ficus tree was likely to fall[,]” and the conclusion that the North Carolina Zoo staff met or exceeded the standards of the field in monitoring and tending to the ficus tree, to conclude that the Full Commission properly applied the standard for premises liability. I disagree.
As recognized by the majority, the Tort Claims Act waives governmental immunity for certain acts of negligence by state employees, with “such negligence . . . determined by the same rules as those applicable to private parties.” Bolkhir v. North Carolina State Univ., 321 N.C. 706, 709, 365 S.E.2d 898, 900 (1988); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-291 (2005). Negligence must be shown by proving that a defendant state employee or agency “failed to exercise due care in the performance of some legal duty owed to plaintiff under the circumstances,” as well as that the breach of duty was the proximate cause of the injury. Bolkhir, 321 N.C. at 709, 365 S.E.2d at 900.
In a premises liability case, the duty to exercise reasonable care “requires that the landowner not necessarily expose a lawful visitor to danger and give warning of hidden hazards of which the landowner has express or implied knowledge.” Bolick v. Bon Worth, Inc., 150 N.C. App. 428, 430, 562 S.E.2d 602, 604, disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 297, 570 S.E.2d 498 (2002). Thus, where in a negligence action a plaintiff must show that the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff and that the defendant breached that duty, thereby causing the plaintiff’s injuries, see Lavelle v. Schultz, 120 N.C. App. 857, 859-60, 463 S.E.2d 567, 569 (1995) (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 656, 467 S.E.2d 715 (1996), a plaintiff in a premises liability action must show that the defendant owed her a duty, and that the defendant breached that duty by unnecessarily exposing her to danger and failing to warn her of “hidden hazards of which the landowner has express or implied knowledge!,]” thereby causing her injuries. Bolick, 150 N.C. App. at 430, 562 S.E.2d at 604; see also Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615, 632, 507 S.E.2d 882, 892 (1998), reh’g denied, 350 N.C. 108, 533 S.E.2d 467 (1999); Grayson v. High Point Development Ltd. Partnership, 175 N.C. App. 786, 788-89, 625 S.E.2d 591, 593, disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 533, 633 S.E.2d 681 (2006). The reasonableness of a defendant’s exercise of care “must be judged against the *214conduct of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances.” Lorinovich v. K-Mart Corp., 134 N.C. App. 158, 161, 516 S.E.2d 643, 646, cert. denied, 351 N.C. 107, 541 S.E.2d 148 (1999).
Here, there is no dispute that the North Carolina Zoo owed Ms. Cherney a duty of reasonable care, see Nelson, 349 N.C. at 631, 507 S.E.2d at 892 (“[W]e impose upon [owners and occupiers of land] only the duty to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of their premises for the protection of lawful visitors.”), nor that the falling of a ficus tree in the exclusive control of the Zoo caused her injuries. The question of liability in this case instead turns on whether the Zoo breached its duty of reasonable care to Ms. Cherney by exposing her to danger unnecessarily and failing to warn of the hidden hazard of the ficus tree — provided that the Zoo and its employees had either express or implied knowledge that the tree was, in fact, in danger of falling. See Bolick, 150 N.C. App. at 430, 562 S.E.2d at 604.
Although the Full Commission found that “[t]he greater weight of the evidence indicates that neither Ms. Wall nor her staff knew or should have known that the ficus tree was likely to fall[,]” the record contains evidence not only to the contrary, but indeed, I believe such a finding is completely inconsistent with the evidence presented to the Full Commission. See Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (“[T]he findings of fact of the Industrial Commission are conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence, even though there be evidence that would support findings to the contrary.” (citation and quotation omitted)), reh’g denied, 350 N.C. 108, 532 S.E.2d 522 (1999); Rhodes v. Price Bros., Inc., 175 N.C. App. 219, 221, 622 S.E.2d 710, 712 (2005) (findings of fact may be set aside on appeal only “when there is a complete lack of competent evidence to support them” (quotation omitted)).
At the time the ficus tree fell the first time, in 1988, it was between eighteen and twenty feet tall, with a more compact root ball; when it fell on Ms. Cherney, it was approximately thirty-four feet tall. As found by the Full Commission, after it fell the first time, the tree was “replanted, and six, seven-strand 3/8" cables going in four directions were looped around the tree and attached to the planter walls.” The purpose of the cables was “to aid the tree in keeping it upright and to assist in monitoring the tree.” Additionally, the Full Commission found as fact that the “cables on the tree were thereafter checked monthly for slack, tension and deterioration” by the Zoo staff, as well as “given a daily visual inspection for general health, *215appearance, and special problems[.]” Two of the four cables had snapped when the tree fell on Ms. Chemey.
The very fact that the tree was cabled to the planter walls illustrates that the Zoo and its employees had “express or implied knowledge” that the tree might fall; if there had been no danger, then the tree would not have needed to be cabled in such a fashion, nor would the Zoo employees have needed to monitor it so closely. Moreover, the Full Commission itself stated that the cables were “used to aid the tree in keeping it upright,” suggesting that there was an implied recognition that the tree might again fall. In light of these actions, as well as the fact that the tree was in a shallow concrete planter, growing bigger by the year, and had previously fallen, the testimony by the Zoo employees that they had no knowledge that the tree might fall is simply not competent evidence. The question is not whether the tree was likely to fall, as addressed by the Full Commission in the finding of fact quoted by the majority opinion. Rather, the issue is whether a Zoo visitor such as Ms. Cherney — or one of the tens of thousands of schoolchildren who pass through the African Pavilion each year — was unnecessarily exposed to danger and was not warned of a hidden hazard.
Given that the Zoo staff was aware of the danger of the tree falling, both through the previous incident and its ongoing monitoring and cabling of the tree, I would conclude that the Zoo had a duty to warn Ms. Chemey and other Zoo visitors of the possibility that the tree might fall. The Full Commission made no finding as to any warning sign posted by the Zoo or other indication that the tree was a hidden hazard, and the record contains no reference to such a warning. The Zoo staff could also have moved the tree to a different location, where it would not have injured visitors even if it fell, or could have pruned it back even further to ensure that it was not outgrowing its planter.
Hundreds of thousands of people visit the North Carolina Zoo each year; it is one of our State’s most popular and well-maintained attractions. However, in light of the knowledge of Zoo staff as to the possible danger posed to the public of the ficus tree in question, I believe the Zoo employees failed to exercise the care of a reasonably pmdent person under the circumstances by failing to warn of the hidden hazard here.
Because the Full Commission made findings contrary to logic and unsupported by competent evidence, I believe the Full Commis*216sion erred as a matter of law in its application of the premises liability negligence standard. I would therefore reverse and remand for additional consideration.