(dissenting). The majority opinion reads very well in the abstract, for no one can quarrel with the statement that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires”. I feel, however, that the factual setting of this case justified the trial judge’s denial of the school board’s motion to amend its complaint.
This case is typical of recent employer-union disputes in the public sector. On September 18, 1973, the board of education filed a complaint in circuit court alleging that the teachers’ union had been on strike since September 4, 1973, in violation of the public employment relations act, MCLA 423.201, et seq.; MSA 17.455(1), et seq. Although the board clearly claimed it was "damaged” by the actions of the union, money darhages were never being claimed. The board requested injunctive relief and the usual miscellaneous "other and further relief as the Court shall deem proper”, alleging that it had "been left without an adequate remedy in law” and had "suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable injury and damages”. The suit was purely one for injunctive relief, and all parties treated it as such.
A temporary injunction was issued on September 26, 1973, and the trial judge ordered continual negotiation on all issues. For several days, the circuit court guided bargaining sessions, and a new contract was hammered out. That agreement was signed on September 28, 1973. Nothing more oc*700curred for the next six months, and the lawsuit appeared to all objective observers to be over.
On April 1, 1974, defendant’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case for "mootness”. However, at an April 26, 1974 hearing on that motion, plaintiff sought leave to amend its complaint to include a request for money damages. The circuit court judge refused to allow plaintiff to amend its complaint, and, treating defendant’s motion as one for summary judgment, granted the same. Plaintiff’s motion for rehearing was denied on May 24, 1974.
The trial judge based his decision on the fact that plaintiff’s proposed amendment came as a complete surprise, and changed the whole tenor of the proceedings, which had seemed to be finished. He stated at the rehearing proceedings:
"And I am not going to grant you a rehearing, Mr. DeBiasi, because I believe it is a moot question at this time as far as the injunction which you prayed for in your original complaint. The teachers are back working. It is about nine months since the Board of Education and the Taylor Union reached an agreement with the help of the State Labor Mediation Board with much prodding and threatening by myself. And if everything is copacetic at this time — and I believe it is — I don’t see why I should wake it up from a sort of lethargic state. And that is where I would like it to be.”
I agree with the trial judge’s view of the school board’s actions. If they want to start a new lawsuit which changes the whole thrust of the proceedings, a new complaint should be filed. The trial judge correctly exercised his discretion by disallowing this amendment of the original complaint, and I vote to affirm.