(dissenting).
I would reverse and remand for a new trial. I believe that the trial court’s limitation of the defendant’s cross-examination of the alleged victim constituted a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and that violation was prejudicial error.
The defendant’s theory of defense was that the victim’s allegations were confabulations against him. To prove that the victim had confabulated, defense counsel sought to cross-examine the victim on what defense counsel called the victim’s “fetish” for sexual things. The defendant asserted that because the alleged victim was preoccupied with sexual matters, she was more likely to have either fabricated or confabulated the charges. The trial judge excluded all questions about the victim’s sexual knowledge and past sexual experiences, except as to specific instances that bore directly upon the credibility of her testimony, such as evidence showing she had lied or had contradicted herself. That limitation was far too narrow.
Evidence frequently relied on to support a child’s veracity in sexual abuse cases is the child’s use of sex-related words whose use is atypical of children that age and the child’s descriptions of adult-type sexual acts, especially when they are thought to be deviant or unusual and hence foreign to the experience of an ordinary, normal youngster. If, however, a child has learned sexual words from someone other than the defendant, or experienced sexual acts with someone other than the accused, that information is clearly relevant. It is especially probative when there is some possibility that the victim may be confabulating by blending fact and fantasy because of an obsession or feelings of guilt arising from some other conduct, or because an adult has coached the child into a “memory” of “nonfacts,” or simply because of the cognitive functioning of the particular child.
I recognize that inquiry into such matters may well be embarrassing for the victim, but temporary embarrassment must surely yield to the integrity of the fact-finding process when an innocent person’s liberty is at stake. Certainly a fundamental constitutional right cannot be disposed of on a ground so unsubstantial.
The questions to which the defendant was denied an answer included the following:
Q: Do you remember when you were living with your mom that she would have boyfriends come over to her house?
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Q: Did your brother or his friends ever make you do sexual things to them?
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Q: You saw your mom’s boyfriends do sexual things, didn’t you?
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Q: You have seen all those things [male genitals and fellatio] before, haven’t you?
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Q: ... [H]ave you ever grabbed at other children’s private parts?
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Q: Have you ever tried to rub up against them [other children]?
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Q: Have you ever had trouble at school with wanting to show the kids your bra?
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Q: Have you ever asked [your male cousin] to take off all your clothes?
In my view, it was reversible error for the trial court to sustain objections to those questions. The evidence adduced suggests that the questions might have elicited evidence favorable to the defendant’s case. The trial judge did allow some evidence that was relevant to the victim’s credibility, but it fell far short of the probative value that the answers to the excluded questions might have had, and it clearly indicated that further questioning might have proved productive. The victim testified:
*646Q: Do you remember a time when you went over to [your aunt’s] house?
A: Yes.
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Q: Were you with [a male friend of yours] at the time?
A: Yes.
Q: Was [your male friend] selling some doughnuts to [your aunt]?
A: No, he was selling them with me.
Q: And do you remember telling [your aunt] that you had had sex with [your male friend] underneath the trailer at the school? Do you remember telling her that?
A: No.
Q: You didn’t tell her that?
A: I don’t remember.
Q: Did you ever say anything about you and [your male friend] doing nasty things?
A: I don’t remember.
The testimony concerning the experience with the male friend was later contradicted by the victim’s aunt.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to an accused the right “to be confronted with witnesses against him.” A primary right secured by the confrontation clause is the right of cross-examination. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). The right of cross-examination is especially important in cases involving sex crimes when the only direct testimony condemning the accused comes from the alleged victim. It is easy to accuse a person of a sex crime, and it may be extremely difficult for an unjustly accused person to disprove the allegations. Unfortunately, courts have no better means of testing the credibility of a child’s allegations than by cross-examination. This Court and a host of other courts in the United States have recognized the basic principle that wide latitude must be allowed on cross-examination if it is to serve its truth-finding function. E.g., State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 488-89, 62 P.2d 1110, 1114 (1936); State v. Warner, 79 Utah 510, 514-15, 13 P.2d 317, 319 (1932). See also People v. Hurlburt, 166 Cal.App.2d 334, 338, 333 P.2d 82, 85 (1958); People v. Simbolo, 188 Colo. 49, 52, 532 P.2d 962, 963 (1975); People v. Sheperd, 37 Colo.App. 336, 338, 551 P.2d 210, 212 (1976); People v. Wilson, 170 Mich. 669, 137 N.W. 92 (1912); People v. Evans, 72 Mich. 367, 40 N.W. 473 (1888); Woods v. State, 657 P.2d 180 (Okla.Crim.App.1983); 2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 425 (C. Torcia 13th ed., 1972).
Many of the questions disallowed by the trial court were directed to establishing a possible foundation for either confabulation or fabrication of the charges. The witness’s responses to the defendant’s questions might have shown that the complaining witness had unusual sexual knowledge for her age and had had prior sexual experiences which would render the possibility of confabulation or fabrication much more probable than if such knowledge or experience did not exist. People v. Clark, 63 Cal.2d 503, 504-506, 47 Cal.Rptr. 382, 383, 407 P.2d 294, 295 (1965). See also People v. Francis, 5 Cal.App.3d 414, 416, 85 Cal.Rptr. 61, 62 (1970); People v. Blagg, 267 Cal.App.2d 598, 605, 73 Cal.Rptr. 93, 100 (1968). For a general discussion of the subject, see 3A Wigmore on Evidence §§ 924a, 934a (Chadboum rev. 1970); Annotation, Cross-examination of Witness as to his Mental State or Condition, to Impeach Competency or Credibility, 44 A.L.R.3d 1203, 1210 (1973). Broad cross-examination has typically been allowed on the issue of credibility, especially when it deals with a person’s state of mind. Sturdevant v. State, 49 Wis.2d 142, 181 N.W.2d 523 (1970). See also Hurlburt, 166 Cal.App.2d at 335, 333 P.2d at 83; Sheperd, 37 Colo.App. at 338, 551 P.2d at 212-13; Evans, 72 Mich. 367, 40 N.W. 473; Woods, 657 P.2d at 182; 3A Wigmore on Evidence § 963 (Chadbourn rev.1970); Annotation, Impeachment or Cross-examination of Prosecuting Witness in Sexual Offense Trial by Showing that Similar Charges Were Made Against Other Persons, 75 A.L.R.2d 508 (1961).
Concern for embarrassment caused the victim in a sex case, though legitimate and appropriate, should not be allowed to cur*647tail the constitutional rights of a defendant. A trial judge can do much to protect and assist a child witness without infringing on a defendant’s right to cross-examine. In this case, the defendant was denied his right to cross-examine effectively the only source of the accusations against him. I believe that a new trial should be ordered.