(dissenting).
¶ 63. I dissent from Parts III and IV of the majority opinion, regarding whether service was proper and whether the circuit court erred in refusing to vacate the judgment against Richter Industries. I conclude that the applicable statute regarding service of a motion for judgment in a garnishment proceeding is Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2) (2001-02)1 not Wis. Stat. § 801.11(5). As such, I would conclude that service was properly effectuated in this case and remand is unnecessary.
¶ 64. In this case, Kenosha Hospital attempted to serve Erik Richter of Richter Industries with a notice of motion and motion for judgment pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 812.41(1). Section 812.41(1) provides, in pertinent part:
If the garnishee fails to pay over funds to which the creditor is entitled under this subchapter within the time required under s. 812.39, the creditor may, upon *371notice to all of the parties, move the court for judgment against the garnishee in the amount of the unsatisfied judgment plus interest and costs.
(Emphasis added.) The parties do not contest the merits of Kenosha Hospital's § 812.41(1) motion; rather, they contest whether Kenosha Hospital properly served its motion for judgment on Richter Industries.
¶ 65. Section 812.41(1) simply provides that notice to all parties is required when serving a motion for judgment against a garnishee. The statute does not specify what type of notice is appropriate, nor does it specify with which statute notice must comply. Thus, I turn to Wis. Stat. § 812.31(1), which provides: "The procedures in this subchapter govern the garnishment of earnings, regardless of the amount of the judgment debt. Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, the general rules of practice and procedure in chs. 750 to 758 and 801 to 847 shall apply to actions under this subchapter."
¶ 66. As there is no dispute that the earnings garnishment action was properly commenced, majority op., ¶¶ 21, 38,1 turn to § 801.14(2), which governs the filing of pleadings and other papers in civil actions. This section provides, in pertinent part:
Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing it to the last-known address, or, if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. Delivery of a copy within this section means: handing it to the attorney or to the party; transmitting a copy of the paper by facsimile machine to his or her office; or leaving it at his or her office with a clerk or other person in charge thereof; or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at his or *372her dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein.
Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2) (emphasis added). The majority agrees that Kenosha Hospital properly effectuated service under § 801.14(2). Majority op., ¶ 35.2
¶ 67. However, after conceding that the garnishment action was properly commenced and Kenosha Hospital's motion for judgment complied with § 801.14(2), the majority nevertheless holds that Kenosha Hospital's motion for judgment was improperly served. The majority holds that Kenosha Hospital's motion for judgment was improperly served because the majority concludes that § 801.11(5) (governing the service of a summons on a domestic or foreign corporation) rather than § 801.14(2) (governing the service and filing of pleadings and other papers) is the applicable statute for purposes of serving a motion for judgment against a garnishee in a garnishment action. Majority op., ¶ 39. The majority makes this holding despite the fact that Kenosha Hospital's civil garnishment action was properly commenced, and despite the fact that Kenosha Hospital served a motion for judgment and not a summons on Richter Industries.
¶ 68. As I discussed above, because Kenosha Hospital properly commenced the garnishment action in this case and served Richter Industries with a motion for judgment, § 801.14(2) is the appropriate statute governing service of a motion for judgment in a garnishment action. As will be demonstrated below, there *373is simply no legal authority supporting the majority's conclusion that "the notice of motion for judgment in an earnings garnishment procedure [should be] served like a summons . . . rather than as a paper in a pending action . . . Majority op., ¶ 39.
¶ 69. Because the majority concludes that § 801.11(5) is the proper statute governing service of a motion for judgment in a garnishment action, I begin by examining the text of Wis. Stat. § 801.11 to determine the scope of this statute. The explicit language of §801.11 provides that its provisions govern when a court in this state may exercise "personal jurisdiction over a defendant by service of a summons .. .." Wis. Stat. § 801.11. Here, Kenosha Hospital did not seek to serve a summons upon Richter Industries in order to obtain personal jurisdiction over Richter Industries; rather, it served a motion for judgment against Richter Industries pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 812.41 because Richter Industries allegedly failed to turn over the appropriate amount of Jesus Garcia's wages. Section §801.11(5) simply does not apply to this case because §801.11 governs when a summons has been properly served and Kenosha Hospital did not attempt to serve a summons on Richter Industries.
¶ 70. The majority provides no legal authority for the proposition that a motion for judgment against a garnishee in a properly commenced, pending garnishment proceeding must be served as if it were a summons in a completely new action. Under Wis. Stat. § 801.14(1), the only time a paper need be filed in a proceeding that has been properly commenced as if it were a summons is when a party files a "pleadingO asserting new or additional claims for relief' against a defendant who is in default for failure to appear. However, at the time Kenosha Hospital served its *374motion for judgment on Richter Industries, Richter Industries was not in default for failure to appear. Rather, Kenosha Hospital filed its motion for judgment because Richter Industries allegedly failed to pay the required sums to Kenosha Hospital in the garnishment proceeding.
¶ 71. What troubles me about the majority opinion is that in addition to simply ignoring the explicit language of the relevant statutes in this case, the majority provides little reasoning and no authority to support its conclusion that § 801.11(5) is the applicable statute in this case. After devoting a lengthy 21 paragraphs to a discussion of various statutes governing service that may or may not apply in this case and unnecessarily opining as to whether service in the present case satisfied one or more of those statutes, the majority allocates a mere one paragraph of discussion regarding which statute actually applies in this case. Compare majority op., ¶¶ 16-37 with majority op., ¶ 38.
¶ 72. The majority summarily concludes that § 801.11(5) rather than § 801.14(2) is the applicable statute for purposes of serving a motion for judgment against a garnishee in a garnishment action. The majority explains, without citing to a single source of legal authority, that "[t]he judgment sought against Richter Industries, although arising out of an earnings garnishment proceedings that was properly commenced, is to some extent separate and distinct from the earnings garnishment action." Majority op., ¶ 38. Again, without citing to any authority, and without explaining why, the majority states that it is important that the "heightened statutory protections" of § 801.11(5) apply in this case. Id.
*375¶ 73. Even if I were to agree with the majority's unfounded assertion that § 801.11(5) is applicable, despite the fact that § 801.11(5) governs the service of a summons, I would nonetheless conclude that service under § 801.11(5) was proper. Section 801.11(5) provides that service may be effectuated upon a foreign corporation:
(a) By personally serving the summons upon an officer, director or managing agent of the corporation or limited liability company either within or without this state. In lieu of delivering the copy of the summons to the officer specified, the copy may be left in the office of such officer, director or managing agent with the person who is apparently in charge of the office.
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(5)(a) (emphasis added). The majority concludes that Kenosha Hospital's service did not comply with this statute because the Kenosha plant where the motion was served was not the office of Erik Richter. Majority op., ¶¶ 28, 40. Instead, according to the majority, Kenosha Hospital should have served its motion at Richter Industries' principal office located in Illinois. Majority op., ¶¶ 29-31.
¶ 74. Case law establishes that when evaluating whether service properly complied with § 801.11(5)(a), courts must ask two questions:
(1) Objectively, was the location where the summons and complaint were presented "the office of such officer, director or managing agent"? (2) Subjectively, was it reasonable for the process server to conclude that the person presented with the summons and complaint was "the person who is apparently in charge of the office"?
Bar Code Res. v. Ameritech Info. Sys., Inc., 229 Wis. 2d 287, 292, 599 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1999). Addressing the first factor, Kenosha Hospital attempted to serve *376Erik Richter of Richter Industries by personally serving a copy of its motion for judgment at Richter Industries' plant in Kenosha with a secretary who stated she was in charge of the office. This is the same location to which Kenosha Hospital mailed the garnishment notice to commence the underlying garnishment action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 812.35(3). This is also the same location at which Erik Richter personally signed the return receipt on the original garnishment notice. Also, a record from the Department of Financial Institutions, while indicating that Richter Industries' certificate of authority to transact business in Wisconsin was revoked as of November 3, 1994, nevertheless indicates that Richter's "Registered Agent Office" is located at 4910 70th Ave., Kenosha Wisconsin — the location at which Kenosha Hospital served the original notice of garnishment and attempted to serve its motion for judgment.3 This address is listed separately from Richter Industries' "Principle Office address," which is located in Illinois. Under these facts, I conclude that objectively, Richter Industries' plant in Kenosha was "the office" of Erik Richter for purposes of § 801.11(5)(a).
¶ 75. The majority's contrary conclusion is interesting in light of the fact it also concludes that service would have been proper under § 801.14(2), were that statute applicable. As noted above, § 801.14(2) allows for service of papers in a civil action by "leaving it at [the party's] office with a clerk or other person in charge thereof!.]" Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2). The majority fails to explain why service would have satisfied *377§ 801.14(2) but does not satisfy § 801.11(5)(a), which allows for service by delivering a copy of a summons "in the office of [an] officer, director or managing agent with the person who is apparently in charge of the office." Wis. Stat. § 801.11(5)(a). Neither statute specifies that the "office" of an officer, director or managing agent of a foreign corporation for purposes of service is necessarily located at the principal corporate office in the business's state of incorporation. In short, the majority provides no authority for its conclusion that Kenosha Hospital was required to serve Erik Richter at Richter Industries' principal office in its state of incorporation.
¶ 76. As to the second factor, the majority concludes that service was proper under § 801.14(2), which requires service to be made by "leaving [the relevant document] at [the party's] office with a clerk or other person in charge thereof." Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2) (emphasis added). In contrast, section 801.11(5)(a) requires service to be made upon "the person who is apparently in charge of' the party's office. Wis. Stat. § 801.11(5)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, if the person accepting service would qualify as the person "in charge" of the party's office for purposes of § 801.14(2), then that person would certainly qualify as the person "apparently in charge of' the party's office for purposes of § 801.11(5)(a). In any event, "[w]hen a person appears in response to a request for someone who may be served with legal process, it will normally be reasonable for the process server to serve that person." Horrigan v. State Farm Ins. Co., 106 Wis. 2d 675, 684, 317 N.W.2d 474 (1982).
¶ 77. Finally, I cannot understand Part IV of the majority opinion. After determining that service on Richter Industries was improper under § 801.11(5), *378majority op., ¶ 40, the majority nonetheless orders a remand to the circuit court to reconsider Richter Industries' motion to vacate the default judgment. Majority op., ¶ 43. However, by concluding that service did not comply with § 801.11(5), the majority has in fact determined what the circuit court must do on remand, namely, vacate the order for default judgment against Richter Industries.
¶ 78. The majority's only rationale for concluding that service of a motion for judgment in a garnishment action must be served as a summons is that a motion for judgment is somehow a separate proceeding from the original garnishment action such that the "heightened statutory protections" of § 801.11(5) apply. Majority op., ¶ 38. As noted supra, § 801.11 governs under what circumstances a court may "exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant by service of a summons ... ." Wis. Stat. § 801.11 (emphasis added). By concluding that a motion for judgment in a garnishment proceeding must be served in accordance with § 801.11(5) and that service here did not comply with that section, the majority has essentially concluded that the circuit court failed to obtain personal jurisdiction over Richter Industries. If the circuit court failed to obtain personal jurisdiction over Richter Industries, then there is nothing left to consider on remand.
¶ 79. Because the applicable statute regarding service of a motion for judgment in a garnishment proceeding is § 801.14(2) not § 801.11(5), and in any event, service was properly effectuated under § 801.11(5)(a), I dissent.
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version.
Service upon an attorney would not have been necessary in this case as Richter Industries did not obtain counsel until after the circuit court entered the default judgment against it. See Pet'r Br. at 3.
See http://wvm.wdfi.org/corporations/crispix/details.asp? ID=R028857 (last visited June 25, 2004).