dissenting: The record in this proceeding is voluminous. Time does not permit me to do more than record -a few of the reasons why I icarn not concur in (the opinion. The fundamental error, I think, is the 'assumption that these proceedings authorize ia taking of property. If the beneficiaries of the gifts had brought this action to force the making of the gifts, the opinion would be sound. What the opinion/ /says, however, is that the owner, acting through her trustee and with the approval of the court /under legislative authority, cannot voluntarily make the gifts. The statutes discussed in the opinion ('Chapters 111, 112 and 113, Session Laws of 1963) do not require or compel the trustee to do anything. They are permissive only. Before ithe -trustee may exercise any of the powers conferred, the court must make critical findings of fact and 'tiren approve.
Until now this Count has not undertaken to say ¡the North Carolina General Assembly may not pass laws regulating the disposition of property by deed, by will, by inheritance, by distribution, even by escheat. Neither has its power been doubted to- provide for the appointment of -guandians, administrators, receivers, ¡and trustees, and prescribe their duties. Ford v. Bank, 249 N.C. 141, 105 S.E. 2d 421. This Court has no power to legislate. “It is our duty -to interpret and apply -the law a© it is written, but it is the function -and prerogative of the Legislature to- make the law.” State v. Scoggins, 236 N.C. 19, 72 S.E. 2d 54. “Whether a statute produces a just or an unjust result is a matter for the legislators and not for judges.” Deaton v. Deaton, 237 N.C. 487, 75 S.E. 2d 398. “Nor -are w-e the judges of the wisdom or im-policy of the law. It is enough that the General Assembly has spoken on the subject. Wells v. Wells, 156 N.C. 246, 72 S.E. 311. The defendant (complains both at the law -and at the insistence of the plaintiff®, but these are matters belonging not to the courts.” Cooper v. Cooper, 221 N.C. 124, 19 S.E. 2d 237. “Outside the power -granted to the Federal Government, the power ¡of the Legislature ¡of North Carolina to enact statutes is without limit, except ais restrained by the Constitution of North Carolina.” Milk Commission v. Galloway, 249 N.C. 658, 107 S.E. 2d 631.
In so .far as I have been able to. discover, not >a single case cited in support of the Court1-s decision involved legislative .authority comparable to Chapters 111, 112, 113, Session Laws of 1963. The enactments *16■are prelsumed to be valid until 'the contrary appears beyond a reasonable doubt. “. . . (T)ibe presumption.1 is in favor of constitutionality land .a statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless the condu-isioa is so clear that no- reasonable doubt can arise.” Strong’s North Carolina Index, Constitutional Law, § 10, Yol. 1, and supplement thereto', citing 25 cases.
In the hearing before the trial judge, all conceivable interests adverse to the petitioner’s request were represented. Near relatives who are sui juris joined with the petitioner 'in recommending .the court’s approval. After hearing, the trial court concluded with respect to the gifts from income:
“21. Considering .the situation nf Sarah Graham Kenan and her estate, it is -in no way detrimental to Sarah ‘Graham Kenan, ais a practical matter, but rather it is wise and provident for the petitioner to. make the gifts herein authorized and directed.”
With respect to the gifts from the corpus of the estate, the court concluded:
“16. Considering the situation of Sarah Graham Kenan and 'her estate, it is in no way detrimental to Sarah Graham Kenan, as a practical matter, but rather it is- -wise and provident for the petitioner to make the gift herein authorized and directed.”
With respect to the trust, the court concluded:
“9. This reduction in taxes will be greatly in excess of the amount of trust income remaining to. be transmitted to her legatees, heirs, .or next of kin in the absence of such declaration and gifts. It is, therefore, to the general, over-ail financial advantage of the legatees, heirs and next of kin of Sarah Graham Kenan that .the declaration and gifts be made, and in no way detrimental to the incompetent, as a practical matter.”
* #
“31. That the relief sought by the Petitioner herein is consistent with sound estate planning and is in keeping with the action which might be reasonably expected of a competent person .acting upon advice of qualified advisors experienced in such matters.”
Sarah Graham Kenan 'is 87 years of age. She has ho lineal descendants, no. dependents, no. debts. She has been- adjudged incompetent. The jury has found .that condition will continue. The corpus of her estate is worth more than eighty million dollars. The annual income exceeds three million dollars. Why may not the. Legislature áu-*17ifcbarize ’her .trustee, .with fihe approval of the ©aunt after full bearing, to dio that wihiclh a compatepfc owner similarly situated may, should, and usually does do; that is, plain .and prepare far the day when the waist estate shall pass to 'other bands? ■
The records of this and other courts are -replete with eases setting up trusts and making contributions to. foundations, educational .institutions, churches, .and other charities. The.trustee seeks to follow these sound 'business practices, but the Court say® this is taking private property. To my single-track mind the only thing taken is 'the right of the trustee, .acting for 'his beneficiary, to do with this vast estate what the General Assembly oif North Carolina -authorized him to do. The relatives in .this public .spirited family who are sui juris appear to have joined in. the trustee’s requests. The authority to follow the plan has been -authorized -by 170 of the people’s representatives in session on Halifax Street. It .is now set aside by a majority of the seven on Morgan.
This decision will haunt us. I vote to affirm.
PARKER and ShaRp, JJ., join in dissenting opinion.