(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. While the majority’s conclusion that an indigent criminal appellant represented by private counsel should be entitled to a trial transcript at public expense may ultimately be correct, the sparse record before us results in more questions than answers. Rather than announcing a broad rule based on appellant’s motion, I would deny appellant’s motion- and refer this case to the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides a superior forum for ensuring that checks and balances protect the justice system from abuses.
The majority’s decision is not based on the federal or state constitutions, any state statute, or any rule of criminal procedure. Instead, the majority relies on our supervisory powers to announce a rule that is tantamount to an unfunded mandate from this court.
Today’s decision will result in the public paying for the transcript costs of every indigent criminal appellant who is represented by private counsel without any mechanism for inquiry into whether the transcript is necessary or its cost reasonable. As Justice Wahl observed in State v. Seifert, a system that requires the public defender to pay for transcripts it does not use deprives the public defender of the ability to control costs: “Obviously, if the State Public Defender is no longer representing the defendant, that office is not in a position to ascertain what transcripts are necessary [to raise a particular claim].” 423 N.W.2d 368, 377 (Minn.1988) (Wahl, J., dissenting). Divorcing use of the transcript from payment for it removes the incentive to ensure that transcripts are *456necessary to the appeal and used responsibly.
The majority’s assertion that our decision in Seifert recognizes that “the right to public defender representation and the right to a transcript at public expense are two separate rights” ignores the significant differences between the appellant in Sei-fert and the appellant in the case before us. In Seifert, the first issue decided was whether an indigent criminal appellant must accept representation by the public defender. We held that appellants had the right to proceed pro se. See id. at 371. Having allowed pro se appeals, we then turned to the question of whether a pro se criminal appellant was entitled to a transcript paid for by the public defender. See id. at 371-72. We concluded that a pro se criminal appellant was entitled to a transcript paid for by the public defender. See id. Thus, Seifert, unlike the case before us, did not involve an inquiry into whether a criminal defendant capable of making payments to a private lawyer is “financially unable to pay counsel” as the language of Minn.Stat. § 611.18 requires, or whether the public defender should be able to review the circumstances of the private lawyer’s retention and the specifics of the fee arrangement. We are faced with a criminal appellant who, despite qualifying as indigent, has the resources or access to resources that make him financially able to pay counsel - yet the record contains no information regarding the amount of fees paid, who paid the fees, or whether the appellant has the ability to control the funds used to retain a private lawyer.
Before a broad new rule is announced, some means of examining the reasonableness of the requests and the fee arrangements between the criminal appellant and his or her private attorney should be considered. See Fullan v. Commissioner of Corrections, 891 F.2d 1007, 1011 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied 496 U.S. 942, 110 S.Ct. 3229, 110 L.Ed.2d 675 (1990) (recognizing that criminal defendant’s ability to control third-party funds could render defendant non-indigent); State v. Arenas, 126 N.J. 504, 600 A.2d 467, 470 (1991) (holding that public defender must pay for indigent’s transcript despite retention of private lawyer but allowing the public defender to consider fee arrangement with private lawyer when deciding whether to approve a transcript request, and cautioning defense lawyers, in cases involving indigent appellants represented by private lawyers, that the cost of transcripts or other ancillary services could be charged, in whole or in part, to defense counsel). Indeed, this court has never before required that the public defender fund transcript costs where the appellant has retained private counsel. See State v. Williams, No. C2-97-686 (order dated May 14, 1997) (order of the Minnesota Supreme Court denying criminal appellant’s motion seeking an order compelling the public defender to pay for a transcript in a case where appellant was represented by private counsel). Today’s decision requires the public defender to order transcripts and to “pay out of its budget the cost of the trial transcript necessary for an effective appellate review” but offers no guidance as to what criteria should be used to evaluate “effective appellate review” or what role the courts may play in resolving disputes between criminal appellants and the public defender’s office regarding transcript requests.
Despite, the public defender’s assertions that it exceeds its annual transcript budget serving criminal appellants who do not have private lawyers, the majority’s decision will require the public defender to pay more. The opinion provides no hint as to how the public defender should accommodate this new mandate, and the record provides no guidance as to how many new cases will become the fiscal responsibility of the public defender.
The solution is to refer the matter to the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, where testimony can be taken, case numbers can be analyzed, budgets can be reviewed, and a mechanism for reviewing requests for transcripts can be *457studied before a new rule is announced. Whatever the scope of our supervisory-powers over the criminal justice system, our exercise of those powers should, when possible, be based on a fully developed record, particularly when the expenditure of public funds is involved.