dissenting.
The majority holds that the trial court erred in allowing standby counsel to intervene by motion and, upon appointment for that lim*139ited purpose, to advocate over defendant’s objection that defendant lacked the mental capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. It is my view that standby counsel’s actions were proper and, indeed, precisely the type of actions contemplated by the statute authorizing the appointment of standby counsel for defendants electing to proceed pro se. I would therefore hold that the trial court did not err.
This defendant’s desire to represent himself has been troublesome from the outset. In his first trial, he repeatedly asserted that he wanted to represent himself but that he would need an “assistant.” Defendant’s lengthy and incoherent monologues on this subject were of sufficient concern to the trial court that it ordered defendant committed to Dorothea Dix Hospital for evaluation of his competency to stand trial and ultimately denied defendant’s motion to appear as co-counsel. In subsequent proceedings, a different superior court judge listened as defendant made another rambling statement in which he referred to his lawyers as “assistants” and to himself as “leading attorney.” The judge interpreted these statements as a request to proceed pro se, which he allowed. We held that this was error and ordered a new trial because defendant’s repeated assertion that he required a licensed attorney to serve as his “assistant” did not amount to a clear and unequivocal expression of a desire to proceed pro se. State v. Thomas, 331 N.C. 671, 417 S.E.2d 473 (1992).
In the proceedings now at issue, defendant asked to be permitted to proceed pro se and also requested the appointment of standby counsel. Judge Watts allowed both requests and entered orders accordingly. Over the course of the next few months, standby counsel observed that defendant appeared to be less focused and less able to process information than he had been in the past. They became concerned that defendant lacked the capacity to waive counsel and therefore filed the motion at issue.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1243 provides:
When a defendant has elected to proceed without the assistance of counsel, the trial judge in his discretion may appoint standby counsel to assist the defendant when called upon and to bring to the judge’s attention matters favorable to the defendant upon which the judge should rule upon his own motion.
By its plain language, this statute contemplates a dual role for standby counsel. First, standby counsel has a duty to serve the *140defendant by assisting him when called upon. Second, standby counsel has a duty to serve the trial court by “bringing] to the judge’s attention matters favorable to the defendant upon which the judge should rule upon his own motion.” That the legislature intended standby counsel to serve the court, as well as the defendant, is evidenced in two ways. First, the statute refers to matters the court should address upon its own motion, not the defendant’s motion. Second, the statute makes the appointment of standby counsel discretionary with the trial court. If the legislature intended standby counsel to serve the defendant only, presumably it would have required the court to appoint standby counsel only upon the defendant’s request.
By holding that the trial court erred in allowing standby counsel to intervene and advocate a position over defendant’s objection, the majority essentially nullifies standby counsel’s statutory duty to the court. It concludes that the trial court thereby interfered with defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right to represent himself. I disagree. I believe standby counsel’s motion was a proper attempt to bring to the judge’s attention the question of defendant’s mental capacity to waive counsel. This is a matter of importance to defendant’s right to knowingly and intelligently defend himself; it is precisely the type of “matter[] favorable to the defendant upon which the judge should rule” that the statute contemplates and one that may well not come to the judge’s attention otherwise. That the matter was brought to the judge’s attention by way of a motion to which defendant objected should be irrelevant. The statute does not specify the precise means by which the judge’s attention should be engaged.
The majority is correct that a criminal defendant has a state and federal constitutional right to represent himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 572 (1975); Thomas, 331 N.C. at 673, 417 S.E.2d at 475. Exercise of this right presupposes a mentally competent defendant, however. Thus, trial courts must make thorough inquiry to ensure that a defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel is knowingly and intelligently made. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 581; Thomas, 331 N.C. at 674, 417 S.E.2d at 476; see also N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242 (1988). In my view, when faced with a substantial question as to defendant’s mental capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se, standby counsel had not only the statutory authority, but also a professional duty, to call this matter to the judge’s attention. The effect of the majority opinion is to hold the statute unconstitutional, at least *141as applied. Because the right to self-representation presupposes a mentally competent defendant, it is inconceivable to me that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to these discrete facts.
The majority also holds that by allowing standby counsel to represent defendant for the limited purpose of determining defendant’s mental capacity, the trial court erroneously permitted hybrid representation. I disagree. In presenting evidence relevant to defendant’s mental capacity, standby counsel were fulfilling their duties as such and as officers of the court. It may have been a mistake to characterize their actions as “limited representation” of the defendant; if so, however, it was not prejudicial error requiring a new trial.
For these reasons, and perceiving no other error warranting a new trial, I would hold that defendant received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error. I therefore respectfully dissent.