concurring specially.
Although I agree with the decision reached by the majority, in an effort to avoid potential confusion in future cases, I write to point out the distinctions between the present case and Johnson v. Trust Co. Bank, 223 Ga. App. 650 (478 SE2d 629) (1996). In Johnson, Johnson had both informed the bankruptcy trustee about the existence of a potential tort claim and referenced the potential claim in a statement of financial affairs before his bankruptcy case was concluded. Id. at 651. Johnson also successfully moved the bankruptcy court, which was the court whose alleged manipulation was at issue, to reopen his bankruptcy.case to allow him to schedule his tort claim as a potential asset. Id. As a result, it could not be said as a matter of law that Johnson had intentionally deceived or manipulated the bankruptcy court or that he was taking a position in pursuing his tort action that was “inconsistent with one successfully and unequivocally asserted by him in a prior proceeding.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Id. at 652. Therefore, judicial estoppel was not warranted.
In the case at bar, however, none of the above circumstances exist, and there is no indication that plaintiff ever had any desire to have her bankruptcy case reopened to include her tort claim as a *509potential asset. And while plaintiff claims that she did not understand what was required to be listed in the bankruptcy schedule, this creates merely a potential issue between plaintiff and her attorney, who should have thoroughly explained any necessary paperwork to her and, as set forth by the majority, does not relieve plaintiff from the duties imposed upon her.
Decided March 17,1997. John C. McCaffery, Lowell C. Chatham, for appellant. Hawkins & Parnell, Alan F. Herman, Anita T Wallace, Moore, Ingram, Johnson & Steele, Eldon L. Basham, Jere C. Smith, Alexander T. Galloway III, for appellees.