(concurring) — I concur fully with the result reached by the majority. In my opinion the statute, RCW 70.77.285, is decisive. While I harbor some belief the Legislature may not have intended the result reached by the majority, legislative intent is irrelevant when the language of the statute is plain on its face.
I am not in agreement, however, with the analysis reached by the majority relative to the application of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977), which characterizes fireworks displays as "abnormally dangerous". Even *19if I agreed with the Restatement analysis, I believe it is an act of supererogation and need not and should not be contained in the opinion. Where there is one good reason — and it is surely present here — there is no necessity for multiple reasons.
I first note that no other jurisdiction has adopted a common law rule of strict liability for fireworks displays. While this state regularly does things differently from its companion jurisdictions and, indeed, its uniqueness is many times a source of justifiable pride, extreme care should be exercised before embarking on a new doctrine foreign to this state as well as to all others.
A party engaging in an abnormally dangerous activity is strictly hable for any damages which might ensue. See New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 102 Wn.2d 495, 687 P.2d 212 (1984); Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wn.2d 855, 567 P.2d 218 (1977); Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wn.2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973). The majority points to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977) with its six factors to be considered in determining whether an activity is "abnormally dangerous".
The six factors in section 520 are:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
The majority claims factors (a), (b), (c), and (d) are present while factors (e) and (f) are not present. I agree factors (e) and (f) do not apply for the reasons given by the majority. I also agree factors (a) and (b) are present. Where *20I disagree with the majority is in whether factors (c) and (d) are present. The majority says yes, I say no.
Fireworks, no less than motor vehicles, for example, are high risk instrumentalities. In reality, all instrumentalities inevitably involve some degree of risk. Nothing in human life is risk free. The real issue is whether the hazard can be reduced to acceptable limits. This analysis is particularly apt where, as here, the likelihood of injury to significant numbers of persons is great unless the risk is significantly reduced. Blasting at some remove from civilization is one thing; public, urban fireworks displays are another matter.
It is apparent the Legislature, recognizing the dangers of public fireworks displays, attempted to regulate comprehensively fireworks displays. RCW 70.77 (State Fireworks Law). There are strict and specific safety and licensing provisions. Before a license can be issued by the State, there must be a finding "that the granting of such license would not be contrary to public safety or welfare". (Italics mine.) RCW 70.77.330. See also RCW 70.77.285, ,355-.375, .410, .415. Section 520(c) only requires the elimination of "a high degree of risk" not the elimination of all risk. The Legislature has made the determination, through the legislative process, that in fact the "high degree of risk" inherent in public fireworks displays can adequately be reduced by the "reasonable care" required by the statute. This being so, I do not believe this court should use a random case, as here, to tamper with this legislative judgment. Factor (c) has not been met.
In discussing factor (d), the majority states that since "few persons set off special fireworks displays" they are not a matter of common usage. Majority, at 9. I believe the majority misconstrues factor (d). The Restatement comment on clause (d) discusses activities carried on by only a few persons, e.g., blasting, the transportation of high explosives, the drilling of oil wells. What is significant is that each of the activities used for illustrative purposes is not only an activity which is not a matter of common usage, but it is *21also a solitary activity. In contrast to the large crowds which attend public fireworks displays, the examples listed in comment d are not for spectators and are done away from the public. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520, comment d, at 40 (1977). The viewing of a public fireworks display is in fact, in the words of the comment on clause (d), "customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind or by many people in the community." Comment i, at 39. None of the examples in the comment are in any way similar to public fireworks displays. While it is true the setting up and setting off of the fireworks in public displays are done by very few people, the more important "activity" is viewing the fireworks display. I would find factor (d) is not met.
I also disagree with the majority's treatment of the six factors as acting only in favor of strict liability. Properly construed, each of the factors may also mitigate against strict liability. In New Meadows, we expressly stated, "Factors (d), (e), and (f) clearly weigh against imposition of strict liability." New Meadows, 102 Wn.2d at 502. The majority concedes "the value of fireworks to the community outweighs its dangerous attributes." Majority, at 10. Properly construed, therefore, factor (f) is not merely a nullity in the strict liability analysis, but should actually mitigate against the imposition of strict liability.
Thus, by my analysis, only two of the six factors in section 520 are met and one factor weighs against strict liability. The penultimate paragraph in the comment on clause (c) states:
A combination of the factors stated in Clauses (a), (b) and (c), or sometimes any one of them alone, is commonly expressed by saying that the activity is "ultrahazardous," or "extra-hazardous." Liability for abnormally dangerous activities is not; however, a matter of these three factors alone, and those stated in Clauses (d), (e), and (f) must still be taken into account.
(Italics mine.) Comment h, at 39. See also New Meadows, 102 Wn.2d at 503-04 (Pearson, J., concurring) ("Strict liability may not be imposed under the Restatement (Second) of *22Torts § 520 (1977) on the basis of factors (a) and (b) alone."). I would hold pyrotechnicians licensed under RCW 70.77 are not strictly liable for damages caused by fireworks displays.
Finally, it is my belief that the Legislature has abrogated the common law in the area of the control of fireworks displays and thus section 520 would not apply. Numerous courts have adopted the principle that a statute covering the entire subject area necessarily abrogates the common law in the area. The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated:
Inasmuch as our statutes deal with the subject extensively and provide a remedy which the legislature apparently considered sufficient, it is difficult to argue from a commonsense point of view, that statutes have not superseded and abrogated the common law. As stated in In re Roberts' Estate, 4[58] Wyo. 438, 133 P.2d 492, 500 [(1943)], if a statute covers the whole subject matter, the abrogation of the common law on the same subject will necessarily be implied.
(Italics mine.) Schlattman v. Stone, 511 P.2d 959, 961 (Wyo. 1973); see also Casey v. Massachusetts Elec. Co., 392 Mass. 876, 883 n.12, 467 N.E.2d 1358 (1984); State v. Salafia, 29 Conn. Supp. 305, 313, 284 A.2d 576 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
Although Washington courts have never explicitly stated the abrogation rule, at least two cases have impliedly followed it. In Washington Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 112 Wn.2d 847, 774 P.2d 1199 (1989), we interpreted RCW 7.72, the Washington products liability act (WPIA), to preempt common law liability remedies. We based our conclusion on WPLA's broad, all-inclusive definition of a product liability claim. Washington Water Power Co., 112 Wn.2d at 853-54. Earlier in Baum v. Murray, 23 Wn.2d 890, 896, 162 P.2d 801 (1945) this court also stated:
We think, however, that when a statute is enacted by the legislature covering generally a certain subject of substantive law it should be followed and applied by the courts wherever applicable, irrespective of what the common law or rule of decision may have been theretofore ....
Although this statement does not expressly provide for abrogation, it supports the principle.
*23The case law also supports the viewpoint that it is unnecessary and even dangerous to refer to the common law where statutory provisions cover the subject matter. The Oregon Supreme Court has stated:
When a statute specifically defines the employment relationship, it is unnecessary and potentially misleading to turn to formulations found in other statutory or common law decisions. Despite deeply ingrained professional habits to the contrary, the formulas stated by courts are not more authoritative than those enacted by the legislature.
Realty Group, Inc. v. Department of Rev., 299 Or. 377, 383-84, 702 P.2d 1075 (1985). See also Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 237 Mass. 241, 243-44, 129 N.E. 391 (1921).
Given the comprehensive nature of RCW 70.77, it seems to me to be uncontestable that the Legislature has chosen to preempt the field of regulation of fireworks displays and has abrogated the application of the common law. Not only is the comprehensive nature of the statute important, the statutory liability imposed by RCW 70.77.285 also seems to me to be decisive in determining the Legislature has in all respects abrogated the common law in dealing with fireworks displays.
Thus, while I agree with the result reached by the majority, I would confine the opinion to that which is contained in part II in its opinion.
Smith, J., and Callow, J. Pro Tern., concur with DolLIVER, J.