(dissenting) :
I dissent, concluding the trial court erred in ordering the Greenville County zoning authorities to issue a building permit to respondent.
On March 20, 1978, the Greenville County Council commenced proceedings to rezone the subject property so as to prohibit multifamily dwellings. The following day, respondent Scott, with notice of the proposed rezoning, applied for a permit to construct a rent subsidized apartment complex on the property. At the time of application, respondent was not the owner of the property but had a contract to purchase it with a number of “out clauses.” One of the clauses provided he was not obligated to purchase until he obtained a firm commitment from the Department of Housing and Urban Development for project mortgage insurance. When respondent applied for the building permit, he had not yet acted to obtain a firm commitment from HUD.
On March 24, 1978, the Greenville County Administrator, acting at the request of county council, directed that no permit be issued pending the outcome of the rezoning study. The testimony reveals that due to the complexity of the project, review of respondent’s application had not been completed in several particulars by the time respondent instituted this action.
Respondent had failed to present to the county authorities sufficient proof that the sewer authority would permit a road to be built across its right of way, as shown by the plans. The Greenville County Planning Commission had requested the County engineer to evaluate the respondent’s proposed *518drainage plan, and the engineer’s study was incomplete. Finally, a traffic study requested by the Planning Commission had not been reviewed by the zoning administrator.
At the conclusion of all the testimony, respondent’s attorney requested the court to order the county officials to rule on the permit within a reasonable time. The trial court, however, disregarded that request and ordered the immediate issuance o.f the permit, without granting the officials time to complete their review of the proposed complex.
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred in ordering the immediate issuance of the permit prior to the county authorities completing their study. The majority, relying on the fact that the administrative officials have not appealed, violently assume that compliance is forthcoming and disregard the exceptions raised by appellants, property owners in the vicinity of the proposed apartment project.
Section 6:14 of the Zoning Ordinance for Greenville County permits the construction of apartment houses provided they meet the following requirements:
Plans for an apartment development shall be submitted to the Greenville County Planning Commission staff for approval. The plans should include the following data and any other reasonable information the Planning Commission staff may require in its investigation of the plans.
(A) The location and size of the site.
(B) Density of land use proposed for various parts of the site.
(C) The location and size of any road within the apartment complex.
(D) The location of all parking.
(E) The location of all street lights within the complex.
(F) The location, size, and type of recreation provided.
(G) The height of each structure in the development.
(H) Plan showing complete drainage of the entire site.
*519In addition to the above information, the following will be required.
(A) A copy of covenants, grants, easements, or other restrictions proposed to be imposed upon the use of land, buildings, and structures including proposed easements or grants for public utilities.
(B) A schedule showing the proposed times for constructing the development.
Subsection (H) clearly requires that the proposed drainage plan be submitted to the Planning Commission “for approval.” At the time of the hearing before the trial court, the drainage plan had not been approved, the traffic impact study was incomplete, and permission to construct a proposed road had not been obtained from the sewer authority. As approval of the drainage plan is specifically required by ordinance, I believe the commission was correct in refusing to issue a permit pending review of -these items. In Rogers v. Mayor & Aldermen of Atlanta, 110 Ga. App. 114, 137 S. E. (2d) 668 (1964), the Court noted the importance of a traffic impact study to the issuance of a permit to construct an apartment complex in a residential area. “The fact that a traffic hazard or congestion might result from the location of— (the project) has been held a valid ground for denying a permit.” 137 S. E. (2d) at 672. Also see Galfas v. Ailor, 81 Ga. App. 13, 57 S. E. (2d) 834 (1950).
The trial court’s reliance on the fact that respondent has incurred substantial expense in preparing this project is misplaced. Such action by a property owner does not create vested rights superior to the interest of the public in the valid exercise of the police power. Douglass v. City Council of Greenville, 92 S. C. 374, 383, 75 S. E. 687 (1912); Willis v. Town of Woodruff et al., 200 S. C. 266, 20 S. E. (2d) 699 (1940).
Moreover, this Court held in Whitfield v. Seabrook, 259 S. C. 66, 190 S. E. (2d) 743 (1972), that vested rights result only from good faith actions. In Whitfield, the Charles*520ton County Council on August 3, 1971, approved a zoning ordinance to be effective August 15, 1971. On August 4, 1971, the plaintiff applied for a permit to construct an apartment building .in the area. Although a permit was granted, the plaintiff was informed that construction must commence prior to August 15th. The county revoked the permit when the plaintiff failed to commence construction by that date. In the ensuing lawsuit, the plaintiff claimed he had vested rights in the permit because he had commenced negotiations for the purchase of the property, had prepared detailed plans and specifications, and had expended monies for the purchase of materials, all prior to the adoption of the new zoning ordinance.
This Court concluded the expenditures for plans and materials could not have been made in reliance upon the building permit as they were made prior to its issuance on August 4, 1971, and that any expenditures after the permit was issued were made with knowledge of the impending zoning change and therefore could not create a vested right. We held that where the plaintiff had knowledge of the proposed zoning ordinance, he did not act in good faith in expending money in connection with the project. Similarly, here, vested rights could not have accrued in the respondent when he had notice of the proposed zoning change at the time he applied for a building permit.
As this equitable matter was heard before the trial judge alone, sitting without a jury, his factual findings are not binding upon this Court. We have jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with our views of the preponderance of the evidence. Townes Associates, Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S. C. 81, 221 S. E. (2d) 773 (1976). In my opinion, the evidence in this case is insufficient to show any wilful delay by the responsible county authorities. The respondent, upon whom the burden of proof rested in the trial court, simply failed to prove that the Planning Commission or the zoning administrator unreasonably failed or refused to act on the *521application. There is absolutely no evidence that the county engineer and the traffic engineer had even been informed of the proposed rezoning study. For this reason, the factual finding of the lower court to the effect that the delay was occasioned by the .instruction of the county council is without evidentiary support.
Additionally, respondent argues that he did “introduce into evidence a letter from the Western Carolina Regional Sewer Authority which indicated — that a right of way would be granted — .” (Respondent’s Brief, p. 17). This letter, at page 129 of the transcript deals primarily with the acceptance of waste water from the units. The question of constructing a road over a sewer line is discussed, but the discussion is only to the effect that the architect or engineer involved with the project should consider the problem and make plans for the protection of the pipe if the road was developed. The letter in no way constitutes an unconditional grant of a right to construct a road over the right of way.
I would hold that the lower court erred in finding that the consideration of the respondent’s application for a building permit was delayed by the action of the county council. Rather, the evidence reveals that the respondent had not met the requirements of the Greenville County Zoning Ordinance and was not entitled to a building permit.
I would reverse since there was pending at the time of the application an ordinance of which the respondent had notice which would alter the zoning so as to prohibit apartment complexes. The respondent clearly has not acquired any vested right sufficient to defeat the police power of the county in protecting the public welfare of its citizens.
Gregory, Justice(dismissing) :
In my view the issue presented by this appeal has been rendered moot by events occurring subsequent to the filing of the order of the lower court.
*522This matter came before the lower court on a rule to show cause issued March 31, 1978 pursuant to the verified petition of respondent Scott. In his petition Scott alleged that the Greenville County zoning authorities refused without justification to issue him a zoning certificate and a building permit. The zoning authorities filed a return to the rule to show cause in which they alleged that they had not had sufficient time to complete their review of Scott’s applications.
The lower court permitted a group of private citizens to intervene answer Scott’s petition and file a cross-petition against the zoning authorities.
The rule to show cause was heard on April 10, 1978 and the subject order of the lower court was filed on April 13, 1978. The intervening defendants served and filed a notice of intention to appeal on April 14, 1978. An Order of Supersedeas was issued by a member of this Court on April 17, 1978, and was continued by Order of the full Court dated May 15, 1978.
The zoning authorities did not appeal from the order of the lower court. On May 4, 1978, however, the zoning authorities filed an answer to the cross-petition of the intervening defendants, stating:
. . . [T]he Plaintiff-Respondent (Scott) has . . . complied with all requirements of the Greenville County Zoning Ordinance and applicable building codes, and that these Defendants (zoning authorities) would therefore have issued such certificate and permit in this case except for the order of Supersedeas which was issued by this Honorable Court on April 17, 1978.
The majority opinion would affirm the order of the lower court finding that further delay was unjustified and requiring the zoning authorities to issue the necessary documents to Scott immediately.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Ness would reverse the order of the lower court and, in effect, remand the case to *523the zoning authorities to complete their review of the proposed complex. As noted above, however, the zoning authorities have already completed their review and have determined that Scott is in full compliance with all requirements of the Greenville County Zoning Ordinance and applicable building codes.
Thus, whether we affirm or reverse the order of the lower court the same result will follow — the Greenville County zoning authorities will issue the necessary documents to Scott.
Since a review of this case on its merits will not affect the outcome, I would dismiss the appeal on the ground the issue is moot.