(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because, in reaching the question of the compensability of suicide, the majority provides a solution for a legal issue not properly before our court. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals essentially placed the cart before the horse by ruling that “employerfs] and insurerfs] do not have primary liability for [an] employee’s major depressive disorder and suicide” before addressing the factual issue of whether James Middelton’s suicide stemmed from a work-related injury. The majority, in its zeal to correct the WCCA’s legal conclusion, exacerbates the WCCA’s error by emulating it.
It is clear from the record that petitioner failed to demonstrate that Middleton suffered a work-related injury. In order to show that there has been a work-related injury, the petitioner must prove that Middleton experienced extreme work-related stress that was “beyond the ordinary day-to-day stress to which all employees are exposed.” Egeland v. City of Minneapolis, 344 N.W.2d 597, 603 (Minn.1984). But the compensation judge found exactly the opposite. Specifically, at finding No. 38, the judge stated: “(B)ased upon a preponderance of the evidence, the employee was not subjected to stress at work beyond the day to day stress to which all employees are subjected.”
This factual finding was challenged by the petitioner before the WCCA, which declined to address this dispositive issue after prematurely ruling on the compensa-bility of suicide. The majority now commits the same error in its attempt to correct what it perceives to be an erroneous legal conclusion by the WCCA. In doing so, the majority ignores the fundamental flaw in its approach: on the facts presented in this case, the legal issue of the compensability of suicide resulting from a compensable mental injury simply is not before the court. The only way the majority can legitimately reach this issue is to first reverse the finding of the compensation judge. I do not believe that on this record they can do so.
Neither our court nor the WCCA can disregard a compensation judge’s findings and substitute our own unless we conclude the findings of the compensation judge are clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. See generally Minn.Stat. § 176 176.421 (1998). The findings of the judge are to be affirmed “if, in the context of the record as a whole [the findings] are supported by evidence that a *712reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59 (Minn.1984). In evaluating the record, a reviewing court must give due weight to the opportunity of the compensation judge to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. See id. Conflicts in medical testimony are to be resolved by the compensation judge as trier of fact. Krotzer v. Browning-Ferris/Woodlake Sanitation Service, 459 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn.1990). Although there was conflicting evidence on the factual issue of whether Middleton’s injury was work-related, the compensation judge found that Middleton was not subjected to work-related stress beyond the day-to-day stress to which all employees are subjected. The judge’s finding is adequately supported by the evidence in the record. As such, I am perplexed by the majority’s patchwork remand of the factual issue after reversing the WCCA’s legal conclusion. The only purpose I perceive in such a remand would be to hand off to the WCCA the distasteful job of denying workers’ compensation benefits to Middleton’s widow.
This court, indeed any appellate court, should address only those legal questions that are properly presented by the facts in a particular matter. See Lipka v. Minnesota School Employees Ass’n, Local 1980, 550 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Minn.1996) (noting that for the court to issue opinions on issues not presented by the facts is to issue impermissible “advisory” opinions). To do otherwise strays from our proper role in the judicial process and exceeds our legitimate authority. Id. This is especially important when dealing with an area of law that is wholly created by statute. See Stabs v. City of Tower, 229 Minn. 552, 565-66, 40 N.W.2d 362, 371 (Minn.1949) (stating that the court should not impose rules on a well-regulated area of law that the legislature did not impose when it considered the matter).
Notwithstanding my strong objection to the majority’s decision to address the issue of compensability of a suicide caused by a compensable work-related injury, I do share some of the majority’s concern at leaving the WCCA’s decision undisturbed. Accordingly, I would affirm the factual finding of the compensation judge that Middleton’s injury was not a work-related injury, but would reverse without comment the holding of the WCCA on the compens-ability of a suicide resulting from a work-related mental injury. I would leave the latter question for another day when the facts presented allow us to make a considered and appropriate ruling on such a far-reaching policy decision.