concurring in result.
I disagree with the conclusion that a corporation has standing to challenge a zoning action only if “all of the members/shareholders of the corporation” would have individual standing to bring the action (emphasis added). Further, I believe that pertinent authority, including that cited in the majority opinion, compel a different conclusion on this issue. However, for reasons discussed below, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
In support of its holding, the majority cites Piney Mt. Neighborhood Assoc. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 63 N.C. App. 244, 247, 304 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1983). In Piney Mountain, this Court held that a corporate petitioner which “has no property interest, but represents individuals who live in the affected area and who potentially will suffer injury” from a zoning action, has standing to challenge that action on behalf of its members. Id. The decision does not specify that all of the individual members of the neighborhood association were required to have individual standing in order for the association to have standing. Rather, it notes “the trend in other jurisdictions toward relaxing strict procedural requirements involving standing” and then proceeds to follow this trend by holding that the association involved did have standing. Id.
In River Birch Associates v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 388 S.E.2d 538 (1990), the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the standing of a homeowner’s association to bring an unfair and deceptive trade practices suit on behalf of its members. The Court found: “To have standing the complaining association or one of its members must suffer some immediate or threatened injury.” Id. at 129, 388 S.E.2d at 555 (emphasis added). As such, the Court adopted the federal rule for associational standing set forth in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 342-43, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383, 393-94 (1977). River Birch sets forth the following test:
*279[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members of the lawsuit.
326 N.C. at 130, 388 S.E.2d at 555 (quoting Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 394). Thus, even though River Birch holds that an association’s “members” must have standing in their own right in order for the association to have standing, it explains that not all of the members must have individual standing. For the same reason, I believe that Piney Mountain’s language to the effect that a corporate petitioner has standing to challenge a zoning action if it “represents individuals” who have standing, does not mean that all of the members of the association are required to have individual standing.
I agree with the majority that North Carolina has developed by statute and case law certain tests for determining standing in zoning actions. See Taylor v. City of Raleigh, 290 N.C. 608, 620, 227 S.E.2d 576, 583 (1976); N.C.G.S. § 160A-388(e) (1999). However, Taylor delineates the basis for an individual to have standing to bring a zoning challenge; it does not address associational standing. While River Birch does not involve a zoning action, it is instructive as to how many of an association’s members must have individual standing (under tests such as Taylor and N.C.G.S. § 160A-388(e)) in order to give the association standing to participate in litigation. In fact, River Birch cites Piney Mountain, a zoning case similar to the one before us, as an example of an association having standing to seek relief on behalf of its members. 326 N.C. at 130, 388 S.E.2d at 555.
This judge has been able to find no case in any jurisdiction which mandates that every single one of the individual members of an association must have standing on their own before an association itself may have standing to bring a zoning action. Rather, there are many cases which have found associational standing in zoning cases based upon the individual standing of one or several members. See, e.g., Simons v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. Rptr. 67, 69 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Distr. 1979) (standing found when “many” of association’s members owned property in close proximity to site proposed to be rezoned); Life of the Land v. Land Use Gom’n, 594 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Haw. 1979) (three of organization’s members lived in immediate vicinity of land proposed to be rezoned; other members used land for recreation); Ecology Action v. Van Cort, 417 N.Y.S.2d 165, 169 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) *280(association given standing had over 40 active members, several of whom lived near the proposed development); 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Multnomah County, Etc., 593 P.2d 1171, 1175 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (organization had standing where one of its members had individual standing); Save a Valuable Environment v. Bothell, 576 P.2d 401, 404 (Wash. 1978) (a non-profit association has standing if “one or more of its members are specifically injured”).
A seminal state court decision examining associational standing in zoning cases is Douglaston Civic Association v. Galvin, 324 N.E.2d 317, 321 (N.Y. 1974), which sets forth the following factors in determining whether an organization has standing:
(1) the capacity of the organization to assume an adversary position, (2) the size and composition of the organization as reflecting a position fairly representative of the community or interests which it seeks to protect[,] (3) the adverse effect of the decision sought to be reviewed on the group represented by the organization as within the zone of interests sought to be protected[, and (4) whether] full participating membership in the representative organization [is] open to all residents and property owners in the relevant neighborhood.
Douglaston discusses the policy implications behind its holding:
It should be readily apparent that a person desiring relaxation of zoning restrictions — such as a change from residential to business — has little to lose and much to gain if he can prevail. He is not reluctant to spend money in retaining special counsel and real estate appraisers if it will bring him the desired result. The individual owner of developed land in the neighborhood, on the other hand, may not, at the time, realize the impact the proposed change of zoning will have on his property, or, realizing the effect, may not have the financial resources to effectively oppose the proposed change. ... By granting neighborhood and civic associations standing in such situations, the expense can be spread out over a number of property owners putting them on an economic parity with the developer.
Id. at 320.
One practical effect of the majority’s opinion may be to drastically curtail North Carolina citizens’ ability to challenge zoning changes in the areas where they live. As Douglaston recognized, few people can afford to bring such a lawsuit as individuals. However, *281under the majority’s decision, if citizens create a neighborhood association, they will have to carefully scrutinize each and every person who joins out of concern that if one person who does not have individual standing becomes a member, the entire group will lose standing to carry out one of its most important purposes. Such need for scrutiny might not be so harsh if a bright-line rule for determining when an individual has standing existed. In reality, whether a person has individual standing to challenge a zoning action is a subjective inquiry and can be a difficult determination for attorneys and judges, let alone lay people, to make. In this same vein, I also do not favor requiring our trial courts to engage in a full-scale inquiry regarding the individual standing of every member of an association seeking to challenge a zoning decision.
In conclusion, I believe our Supreme Court has already spoken to the requirements for associational standing in this state in River Birch and would require the trial court to apply the test set forth in River Birch to determine whether the association in this case has standing.
I must concur in the result reached by the majority, however, in that I do not believe plaintiff can prevail on the merits of its case. Plaintiff essentially makes two arguments before this Court: first, that Hickory’s ordinance regarding the approval of Planned Development Districts is unduly vague; second, that certain members of the City Council were biased in favor of the rezoning before they heard and voted on the matter. Plaintiffs did not assert the vagueness of the ordinance in the trial court, and they may not present this issue for the first time on appeal. N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1); River Birch Associates, 326 N.C. at 131, 388 S.E.2d at 556.
Furthermore, the City Council, in voting to rezone the subject property as a Planned Development District, was acting in a legislative capacity. See Brown v. Town of Davidson, 113 N.C. App. 553, 556, 439 S.E.2d 206, 208 (1994) (zoning decisions are legislative acts). A predisposition to vote a certain way on a legislative matter does not amount to a due process violation. Id. I do not believe plaintiffs have demonstrated the City Council acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in approving the subject rezoning.