ON REHEARING
*610Leo Levenson, Portland, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Wm. C. Ralston and Phillips, Ralston & Poole, Portland. Burl L. Green, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Creen, Richardson, Creen & Criswold. Before McAllister, Chief Justice, and Rossman, Warner, Perry, Sloan, O’Connell and Goodwin, Justices. O’CONNELL, J.Upon reconsideration of this cause we have concluded that our former opinion must be withdrawn.
The facts are set out in our former opinion. Upon reargument, plaintiff has placed particular emphasis upon the defendant’s conduct as he approached the intersection of Linn Street and 13th Avenue, the scene of the accident. It was shown that defendant passed through four intersections immediately pre*611ceding the intersection at which the accident occurred; that he was travelling at a speed of 25 to 35 miles per hour; that he took his foot off the accelerator pedal as he approached each intersection but did not put his foot on the brake; that he was looking for a car containing his friends but was not looking for traffic as he approached the intersection. Plaintiff points to these facts as evidence of defendant’s continuing course of negligent conduct and as a basis for the rule that a combination of several acts of ordinary negligence may constitute sufficient evidence of gross negligence, relying upon Turner v. McCready, 190 Or 28, 222 P2d 1010 (1950).
The principle set forth in Turner v. McCready, supra, that a combination of negligent acts may be sufficient to make out a case of gross negligence, as explained in Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Or 366, 354 P2d 56 (1960), “was more specifically delineated” in Gonzalez v. Curtis, 217 Or 561, at 563-4, 339 P2d 713 (1959). Gonzalez made it clear that, “although it may be shown that the occurrence was preceded by several acts of ordinary negligence, it is only when all of these acts combined with the existing circumstances show a foolhardy attitude on the part of the driver that gross negligence has been established.”
Defendant proceeded through five intersections on Linn Street before he entered the intersection at Linn Street and 13th Avenue. Of the streets which formed these five intersections, three of them terminated at a dead-end not more than a block from Linn Street and consequently a relatively small amount of traffic moved across Linn Street at these intersections. At 12:30 a.m., the approximate time when defendant was travelling along this route, the traffic was light.
*612The circumstances relied upon by plaintiff evidence at best a failure to exercise reasonable care. The jury could not justifiably interpret such conduct as gross negligence. Burrows v. Nash, 199 Or 114, 259 P2d 106 (1953); Gonzalez v. Curtis, supra; Williamson v. McKenna, supra. Nor is the other conduct of the defendant relied upon by plaintiff as evidence of gross negligence sufficient to submit the case to the jury. At most, this evidence merely establishes that defendant was guilty of ordinary negligence as he approached and entered the intersection of Linn Street and 13th Avenue. There is no evidence from which the jury could conclude that defendant was reckless as that term is defined in Williamson v. McKenna, supra.
In our original opinion we held that “[t]he evidence recited would have been sufficient to permit the jury to find that the defendant must have seen both the stop sign and the other ear and decided that he would take the chance of beating the car through the intersection.” We are now of the opinion that the drawing of such an inference of fault is not permissible. In support of this conclusion we adopt the reasoning of Chief Justice McAllister’s dissenting opinion in the original case.
Our former opinion is withdrawn and we hold that the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.
Warner and Sloan, JJ., dissent.