dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s assertion that the language of the lease expressly negates a requirement of continuous operation, and because I would hold that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that there was in this case both an express covenant and an implied covenant of continuous operation, I must respectfully dissent to the majority’s reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
In addition to the facts set out in the majority opinion, it should be noted that the complete text of the lease provision on which appellees rely reads as follows:
Lessee is leasing the leased building for use as a supermarket and other parts of the leased property for parking and other uses incident to a supermarket business, but LESSEE’S use of the leased building and the leased property shall not be limited nor restricted to such purposes, and said building and property may be used for any other lawful business, without the consent of LESSOR.
Although the language of this lease with regard to appellant’s obligation to continue business operations in the leased premises during the term of the lease is not as clear as the language in non-abandonment clauses such as those quoted in Kroger Co. v. Bonny Corp., 134 Ga. App. 834 (216 SE2d 341) (1975),3 any ambiguity is dispelled by application of the rules governing the construction of contracts. One of the rules pertinent to this matter is
that an ambiguity in a document should be construed against its draftsman. “If the construction is doubtful, that which goes most strongly against the party executing the instrument or undertaking the obligation is generally to be pre*506ferred; . . .” OCGA § 13-2-2 (5). [Anderson v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 556, 557 (307 SE2d 499) (1983).]
Under the authority quoted above, since the lease with which this case is concerned was drafted by appellant, it must be construed most strongly against appellant. Another applicable rule is the one expressed in OCGA § 13-2-2 (4), requiring that a contract be considered in its entirety.
[A] contract should not be torn apart and construed in pieces, but the court should look to the entire instrument and so construe it as to reconcile its different parts and reject a construction which leads to contradiction, in order to ascertain the true intention of the parties, which is the real purpose of the judicial construction of contracts. [Cits.] [Sachs v. Jones, 83 Ga. App. 441, 444 (63 SE2d 685) (1951).]
In considering the entirety of the lease contract in the present case, I note that in addition to the provision for appellant using the premises for a supermarket business or any other lawful business, the lease provides for percentage rental payments, i.e., that appellant pay as rent in addition to a stated base rent, a percentage of its revenues over a specified amount.
Considering the percentage rental provision together with the provision quoted above relating to business use, which includes a right to assignment of the lease without consent of the lessor, and construing the lease most strongly against appellant as the drafter of the lease, I conclude, as did the trial court and the Court of Appeals, that the lease contains an express covenant by appellant that it would conduct business operations in the leased premises during the entire period of the lease.
Appellant and the majority rely on Kroger Co. v. Bonny Corp., supra, for the proposition that the provision in the lease for use of the premises for a business other than operating a supermarket does not amount to an express covenant of continuous operation. There is, however, an essential difference between the language used in the lease in Bonny and the language used in the lease in this case. In Bonny, the pertinent language provided only that the tenant would “use said premises in a lawful manner.” Paying the base rent and keeping the premises empty would certainly constitute using the premises “in a lawful manner.” The lease in the present case, in contrast, requires that appellant use the premises for a “lawful business.” Holding the premises empty cannot reasonably be construed as using the premises for a “business.” That distinction in the lease language renders Bonny inapplicable to the present case.
*507Decided June 28, 1991 — . Reconsideration denied July 26, 1991. Martin, Snow, Grant & Walker, George C. Grant, John C. Edwards, for appellant. Hall, Bloch, Garland & Meyer, Benjamin M. Garland, J. Sewell Elliott, for appellees.The majority rejects the possibility of the existence of an implied covenant with the simplistic assertion that the base rent provided for in the lease is “substantial.” What are the standards to be applied in determining whether the base rent is a “substantial” amount? Is substantiality of the base rent the only factor to be considered? These questions go unanswered in the majority opinion. A more reasoned approach than simply declaring that the base rent is substantial and that there cannot, therefore, be an implied covenant of continuous operation would be to apply the conditions enumerated by the Arizona Court of Appeals in First American Bank &c. Co. v. Safeway Stores, 729 P2d 938, 940 (151 Ariz. 584) (1986):
[C]ertain conditions must be satisfied before a covenant will be implied: “(1) the implication must arise from the language used; (2) it must appear from the language used that it was so clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it; (3) implied covenants can only be justified on the grounds of legal necessity; (4) a promise can be implied only where it can be rightfully assumed that it would have been made if attention had been called to it; (5) there can be no implied covenant where the subject is completely covered by the contract.”
I am persuaded that adoption of those standards in this state would lead to more certainty in the drafting and interpretation of commercial leases, and that the application of those standards to the present case would result in the conclusion that there was an implied covenant of continuous operation in the lease under consideration. Since that conclusion would require affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, I must dissent to the reversal mandated by the majority.
“ ‘[LJessee agrees not to abandon or vacate leased premises during the period of this lease.’ ” Id. at 838.