dissenting.
Both of these cases involve OCGA § 16-1-7 (b), double jeopardy. Both appellants were arrested and charged with a traffic violation and also a felony charge as part of the same transaction. 1 The traffic violation in each case was disposed of first, bringing OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) into play.
Case number 44262. When appellant Powe was tried for the traffic violation, he was asked by the court if he had other cases pending against him and he said “Yes, one in superior court.” Neither the judge nor solicitor asked him anything about the nature of the case pending in superior court and proceeded to try and sentence him for the misdemeanor. When the state court judge learned of the related felony pending in superior court, he “withdrew” the plea and nolle prossed the traffic case. When the felony came on for trial, appellant Powe pled double jeopardy. OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) states that crimes arising from the same conduct that are known to proper prosecuting officers at the time of prosecution, if both are in the jurisdiction of a *566single court, must be prosecuted in a single prosecution.
This Court in Coleman v. State, 256 Ga. 77, 78 (343 SE2d 695) (1986), held announcement of the sentence “ends any absolute statutory right to withdraw a guilty plea.” This certainly would be applicable to the pronouncement of a sentence by the Court. It is final and cannot be set aside except in unusual circumstances which are not present here. See Perkins v. State, 143 Ga. App. 124 (237 SE2d 658) (1977).
Case number 44543. Appellant Baker entered a guilty plea to a traffic violation on July 2, 1985. He was indicted October 15, 1985, on an habitual violator charge. Appellant Baker moved to dismiss based upon OCGA § 16-1-7 (b). His motion was denied on the ground that the prosecutor did not know about the habitual violator charge at the time of the guilty plea to the traffic charge.
The holding.in both cases is that OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) applies only to such crimes that are actually known to the prosecuting officer actually handling the proceedings.
The opinion states that the defendant can invoke the procedural protection of OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) by simply apprising the proper prosecuting officer of the existence of other crimes arising from the same conduct. If this is required before one can use OCGA § 16-1-7 (b), then obviously OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) has been repealed and is of no effect. I cannot imagine any prosecuting officer being so stupid as to prosecute the defendant for a lesser crime in the same transaction when he has been told by the defendant that he has a felony case pending in another court. The majority nullifies the legislative intent here by requiring the defendant to tell the court of all existing pending cases.
In appellant Powe’s case, he notified the court there was another case. Neither the court nor the solicitor bothered to inquire further. The majority would require that the defendant describe the crime by letter and verse.
In appellant Baker’s case, the majority stated that since he did not establish that the prosecutor had knowledge of the felony offense that arose from the same conduct, the double jeopardy plea could not prevail.
The ludicrous part of this is the state had already destroyed all of the records dealing with the prosecutor’s knowledge, thereby forestalling appellant Baker from proving anything.
The majority opinion puts forth two inescapable conclusions: (1) OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) is as worthless as a plugged nickel and only clutters up the code. (2) It makes of every defendant, unwilling though he be, an assistant prosecutor assigning to him the responsibility of *567keeping up with cases in court and informing the prosecutor of such.2
Decided November 5, 1987. Daniel, Batcheller & Hunt, J. Robert Daniel, for appellant. Donald F. Samuel, amicus curiae. Willis B. Sparks III, District Attorney, Vernon R. Beinke, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, amicus curiae.This result is not what was intended by the legislature when it enacted the statute. It was never intended that the defendant should do the work for the prosecuting attorney. This is the end result of the majority opinion.
Appellant Powe was charged with a traffic violation, trafficking in marijuana and possession of a firearm. Baker was charged with a traffic violation and as an habitual violator.
Is this not a violation of one’s Fifth Amendment rights? Does not this opinion require a defendant to testify and give evidence against himself?