(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. For all practical purposes, the state concedes in its brief that a “deal” may have existed. Indeed, the state argues that Johnophine Stalls’ testimony was not exculpatory nor material to appellant’s guilt or punishment and, therefore, not subject to disclosure. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. (2d) 215 (1963). The state also erroneously contends that Mrs. Stalls’ testimony was not subject to disclosure because it was impeachment evidence and that her testimony did not affect the outcome of the trial nor deprive appellant of his right to due process. See, Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. (2d) 104 (1972); United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. (2d) 481 (1985).
The chain of events which occurred during and immediately following the trial leads to the inescapable conclusion that at most, a promise was made to the witness, or at least, there was absence of adventitiousness in the solicitor’s decision not to prosecute his key witness. Mrs. Stalls testified that both the amount of her bond and the charges against her had been reduced, that she had been promised nothing in return for her testimony, that her case was going to trial, and that she hoped to get some leniency. The solicitor, in his closing argument, emphasized the testimony of Witness Stalls, and emphatically denied the existence of any agreement concerning either immunity, leniency or promises made to her. However, moments after the guilty verdict was rendered, he stated that Mrs. Stalls would not be prosecuted for her involvement in the crime.
The solicitor’s denial of an agreement in several instances and his perfunctory dismissal of the charges in the next *410instance cannot be rationalized, justified or tolerated in the judicial process. Such behavior provokes the indignation of the justiciable conscience and undermines public confidence in the system.
While the majority’s decision to affirm and remand to allow appellant to renew his motion for a new trial may conform proeedurally, it falls short of the high standards of justice mandated by the South Carolina system of jurisprudence. Such a course of action works to the potential detriment of the system; whereas reversal and a new trial would insure full protection of the appellant’s constitutional rights, and the triers of the fact would be fully apprised of the circumstances of Mrs. Stalls’ testimony without danger of compromising the integrity of our judicial system.
I, likewise, disagree with the majority’s decision to affirm without discussion appellant’s remaining exceptions as being without merit. I would specifically note the following issues:
A. The court’s failure to charge the lesser included offense of trafficking between ten and one hundred pounds of marijuana, see, State v. Mathis, 287 S. C. 589; 340 S. E. (2d) 538 (1986) (jury must be instructed on lesser included offense where there is evidence from which juror could infer that defendant committed lesser, rather than greater offense);
B. The failure of the court to allow the cross examination of Mrs. Stalls concerning prior testimony before a judicial body; and
C. The court’s limitation of appellant’s time for closing argument. See, S. C. R. Civ. P. 43(j); see also, State v. Rodgers, 269 S. C. 22, 235 S. E. (2d) 808 (1977). Under the circumstances of this case and particularly the severity of the penalty, in my opinion, the court’s allocation of a maximum of twenty minutes for closing argument was an abuse of discretion.
I would reverse and remand this case for a new trial.