(concurring specially).
Although I concur in the court’s opinion, I believe something more needs to be said about admission of the photographs of the homicide victims discussed in Division IV.
Our continued failure to delineate the principle by which trial court discretion is to be exercised in admitting such photographs may lead to problems for prosecu*9tors and trial judges which could otherwise be avoided.
Relevant evidence is not admissible without regard to its effects on the emotions of jurors. We have repeatedly said evidence, although relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Harmon, 238 N.W.2d 139, 144-145 (Iowa 1976), and citations. Photographs of homicide victims are not exempt from this principle.
In the present case, the photographs were not only relevant in showing the fact, cause, and location of death, all of which defendant admitted. Several black and white photographs showed the bodies where they were found in the park. They illuminated the testimony of Sandra Cheskey and the testimony of others who saw the bodies there. The remainder of the photographs were color pictures of the nude bodies of the victims in the morgue showing the extent and nature of the wounds. These photographs tended to confirm Sandra Ches-key’s testimony regarding the manner, sequence of events, and circumstances in which the wounds were inflicted. Although the photographs would inevitable affect the emotions of jurors, they had more than minimal relevancy.
Since I do not believe we can say as a matter of law that the probative value of the photographs was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, I join the majority holding that the trial court rulings admitting them were not an abuse of discretion.