(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the majority opinion.
For a considerable period of time prior to the proceeding before the Children’s Court, defendant was without persona! *399knowledge of the actions and conduct of his children. Therefore, to my way of thinking, he did not come into this State or appear before the Children’s Court with the thought in mind nor for the purpose of •giving testimony that would refute the •charge that his child was a juvenile delinquent. To the contrary, his purpose was to convince the Children’s Court that the child's delinquency was attributable wholly to the unsuitable environment in which the child was being reared by plaintiff ; that if defendant were given custody, the child would be reared in an en-vironment that would remove the temptations that brought about delinquency. The evidence fairly shows that defendant hoped to also gain custody of the other •children against whom no charge was •pending, through showing to the Children’s ■Court that they too were not being reared by plaintiff in a proper environment. See .20 O.S.Supp.1957 § 863, subds. 3, 4.
If as a result of coming into the State .and appearing before the Children’s Court defendant had obtained exclusive custody ■of the children, the matter of his paying child support to plaintiff would have become a dead issue. Therefore, in my opinion, the matter of defendant’s attempting to obtain custody of the children in the ■Children’s Court proceeding was directly connected with the matter of his paying •child-support payments to plaintiff, which payments were contingent, upon her retaining custody.
It is patent that in the proceedings before us, defendant could have asserted the ■rights that he sought to assert (Sec. 863, •supra), in the Children’s Court- — his right to custody of the children. So defendant, in effect, here asserts that while he wished to seek relief of an affirmative nature in the Children’s Court, he is immune from •process in an action in the District Court involving the same rights.
A well-founded exception to the rule •that a nonresident suitor or witness is immune from process while attending court is the rule that such immunity does not ex-..tend to process in an action or proceeding involving or connected with the subject matter of the litigation in connection with which the nonresident appears. At p. 130, Sec. 150, 42 Am.Jur., the referred-to exception is stated thus:
“The question whether process may be served on a nonresident party or witness may be determined by the nature of the proceeding in which process has issued and its relation to the suit which the party or witness has been attending. The rule of immunity from service does not extend to process in an action or proceeding involving or connected with the subject matter of the litigation during attendance upon which the nonresident suitor is served. Thus, it has been held that one who goes into another jurisdiction to prosecute habeas corpus proceedings to secure the custody of his child is not exempt from service of a petition by the custodian to adopt the child, its status being the question involved in both proceedings.”
While the mentioned exception is not recognized in all jurisdictions, this Court made clear in Livengood et al. v. Ball et al., 63 Okl. 93, 162 P. 768, L.R.A.1917C, 905, that it will be recognized and applied in this jurisdiction.
In Velkov v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County, 40 Cal.2d 289, 253 P.2d 25, 35 A.L.R.2d 1348, the court applied the above-mentioned exception to a nonresident who caused disciplinary proceeding to be instituted against an attorney, which proceedings were predicated on the proposition that the attorney had obtained from the nonresident an illegal assignment of an interest in oil properties in payment of a fee owing the attorney. Upon the nonresident’s appearing before the Bar Association in the disciplinary proceeding, she was served with process in an action instituted by the attorney for the purpose of determining his and her rights under the assignment. In denying the nonresident’s asserted immunity from service of process in the court proceeding, the court held in substance that both proceed*400ings in effect involved the same “subject matter”, the rights of the respective parties to the interest covered by the assignment.
For reasons stated herein, I respectfully dissent.