concurring specially.
.While I agree with the result, I cannot agree with the basis of the majority’s opinion. In Napper v. Ga. Television Co., 257 Ga. 156 (356 SE2d 640) (1987), relied on by the majority, the question was whether the closed investigatory files of the “Atlanta Child Murders” case were available to the media under the Public Records Act, OCGA § 50-18-70 et seq. Here, the two videotapes are undeniably “public” in that they had been played in open court prior to the time the media plaintiff made its request for access. The question here is whether the media is entitled to have access to, and reproduce, certain exhibits, in this case, two videotapes. That question is for the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, and in this case, that discretion was not abused.
Unlike the line of cases cited by the majority including Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723 (83 SC 1417, 10 LE2d 663) (1963), and contrary to the implication of the majority’s opinion, publicity resulting from the broadcast of the videotapes could not cause the reversal of the trial of this case, which is concluded. The majority strains the reasoning of Rideau and its progeny by applying it to the potential impact of publicity on a retrial which may or may not occur at some undetermined point in the future. While the majority’s concerns are not invalid, the possibility of a retrial in the future and the possibility that publicity now might affect any retrial are far too speculative to form the bases of the rule established by this case.
Moreover, the majority’s holding runs counter to the intent of Rule 22 of the Uniform Superior Court Rules, authorizing media broadcast of trials within the discretion of the trial court. The majority’s holding is not only unnecessary to a decision in this case, but it also places an unwarranted limitation on the discretion of the trial court in deciding what aspects of a trial may be broadcast.