concurring specially.
Because I agree that the trial court erred in failing to charge on accident in this case, I agree with the judgment of reversal. However, as I will explain below, I do not agree with all that is said in the proposed majority opinion.
1. First, I note that I agree with the Court’s shift to permitting inconsistent defenses (as accident is not, strictly speaking, a defense, I use the term “defenses” to mean generally any attempt by the defendant to defeat the state’s case against him). Whether we choose to permit or to prohibit a defendant from asserting inconsistent defenses is a matter of policy and not a matter of constitutional law. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U. S. 58, 69 (108 SC 883, 99 LE2d 54) (1988) (Justice White, dissenting). In the past our policy, as represented by Culbreath v. State, 258 Ga. 373 (4) (369 SE2d 29) (1988), has been to prohibit inconsistent defenses. Moreover, I note that other states follow the same inconsistent defenses rule that we do. See “Accused’s Rights, in Homicide Case, to Have Jury Instructed as to Both Unintentional Shooting and Self-Defense,” 15 ALR4th 983. However, on balance, I agree with permitting inconsistent defenses. I have some concern that doing so might encourage perjury, as, for instance, where a defendant testifies that the gun he was holding fired accidentally and killed the victim, but also testifies that he intentionally shot the victim in self-defense, but this concern is outweighed by the prosecutor’s freedom to use such inconsistent testimony to try to impeach the defendant’s credibility.
2. Although inconsistent defenses should be permitted, we must bear in mind that a charge on any defense is only warranted if there is some evidence to support the charge. Having examined the record in the instant case, I do not find evidence to support charges on both accident and self-defense, and find only evidence to support a charge on an accidental killing occurring in the context of self-defense. Hence, this is not a case involving inconsistent defenses.
More specifically, the defense of accident and self-defense are inconsistent. Pursuant to self-defense the defendant admits, but seeks to justify, the intentional commission of the act, whereas the essence of an accident defense is the defendant’s contention that he did not intentionally commit the act the state alleges constitutes a crime. Here, Turner testified that he obtained the gun initially to protect himself, but that the gun fired accidentally in his struggle with the victim. As the majority opinion notes, Turner never testified that he shot the victim intentionally to protect himself, and I find no other evidence that would support such an inference. Because the evidence supports the inference that Turner’s gun discharged accidentally, but does not support an inference that Turner intentionally shot the victim to protect himself, this case does not truly present a case of in*363consistent defenses.5 Instead, Turner’s testimony supports the theory that an accidental killing occurred in the context of self-defense. See generally Curry v. State, 148 Ga. 559, 560-564 (97 SE 529) (1918) (victim drew gun on Curry, and, according to Curry’s testimony, the gun accidentally discharged, killing the victim; we held that law of killing in self-defense did not apply; that killing was either murder or accident). For the foregoing reasons, a charge permitting the jury to find that the. killing was justified as self-defense is not warranted under the evidence in this case. Yet, this is the type of self-defense charge that the trial court gave and that the majority apparently would require to avoid error. Obviously, the giving of such a charge, which is favorable to the defendant, is not error. However, contrary to the majority, I would hold that in a case such as this one a trial court’s refusal to give such a charge would not be erroneous.
Decided July 16, 1992. Charles R. Sheppard, John Fleming, Danny L. Durham, for appellant. Michael C. Eubanks, District Attorney, Richard E. Thomas, G. Barksdale Boyd, Assistant District Attorneys, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen*364eral, Peggy R. Katz, Staff Attorney, for appellee.*3633. Although I do not believe the foregoing type of self-defense charge is warranted in this case, I do believe that a charge on accident in the context of self-defense is warranted.
Our accident statute provides that “[a] person shall not be found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or accident where it satisfactorily appears there was no criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal negligence.” In cases presenting an accidental killing in the context of self-defense, a trial court should give a charge making clear that, if the jury finds that, the defendant used reasonable force in self-defense, then the defendant’s use of that force does not constitute a “criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal negligence.” The reason such a charge is necessary is to insure that the jury does not infer some criminal intent, negligence, or scheme on the part of the defendant due to his use of such force. A trial court would be free to fashion the appropriate charge depending upon the facts of each particular case.
4. For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the judgment of reversal in the instant case.
Culbreath, supra, 258 Ga., involved a “true” instance of inconsistent defenses, in that the defendant’s equivocal testimony of the killing supported inferences that the shooting occurred either accidentally or intentionally in self-defense.