concurring.
I write in response to the state’s motion for reconsideration.
The state urges that we further delineate the limits of a hospital’s standing in cases like this one. In particular, the state asks us to hold, as did the trial court, that a hospital would not have standing to advocate an alternative course of treatment where the parents or legal guardians agree about the course of treatment for their child.10 We make no such holding, and our opinion should not be read to confer standing for a hospital under circumstances other than those presented here; that is, where the parents disagree about the course of such medical treatment. This is not to imply that, when a case presents the issue, we would interpret a hospital’s standing either more broadly or more narrowly than we have done here. Compare Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86 (274 SE2d 457) (1981).
*395Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, William C. Joy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William M. Droze, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. John E. Talmadge, Finch, McCranie, Brown & Thrash, Charles E. McCranie, Alston & Bird, Susan B. Devitt, Richard A. Snow, Long, Aldridge & Norman, Paula R. Miller, for appellee.In its motion for rehearing, the state says we should address this argument because the trial court ordered this appeal for that purpose — to provide the opportunity for this court to set the limits of a hospital’s standing. It is beside the point, but I note that in State of Ga. v. McAfee, 259 Ga. 579 (385 SE2d 651) (1989), a case involving similar issues of medical treatment, the trial court ordered an appeal. That a trial court has no such authority is beyond any legitimate challenge. It may, and sometimes should, suggest, request, and even encourage an appeal, but surely it cannot compel a party to do so. It cannot confer jurisdiction upon an appellate court, where jurisdiction would not otherwise lie.