(dissenting) — The majority holds the naming of an alternate optionee does not defeat the application of the anti-lapse statute to the bequest to Francis Niehenke, who predeceased the testator by 7 years. I respectfully dissent.
Article 4 of Raymond Niehenke's will granted to his nephew, Francis Niehenke, the option to purchase on contract a parcel of farmland known as the "Home Place":
I give, devise and bequeath unto the following relatives the option to purchase the farmlands as hereinafter set forth, upon the terms and conditions hereinafter provided:
1. My nephew, FRANCIS NIEHENKE, shall have the option to purchase on contract as hereafter provided, the farmland and buildings commonly described as the "Home Place" . . .
*158... In the event my nephew, FRANCIS NIEHENKE, does not exercise said option as hereinafter provided, my nephews, ALVIN GUSKE and ELMER GUSKE, shall have the option to jointly purchase said farmland upon the same terms and conditions.
Francis Niehenke died on March 7, 1980. Raymond Nie-henke died on February 12, 1987, without changing his will.
The paramount duty of the court in construing a will is to give effect to the testator's intent. In re Estate of Ber-gau, 103 Wn.2d 431, 435, 693 P.2d 703 (1985). The testator's intention is to be ascertained from the language of the will, considered in its entirety. Bergau, at 435; Saunders v. Callaway, 42 Wn. App. 29, 708 P.2d 652 (1985).
Although in particular circumstances the anti-lapse statute will be presumed to apply, it has no application if the testator provides for an alternative disposition. In re Estate of Button, 79 Wn.2d 849, 854, 490 P.2d 731, 47 A.L.R.3d 352 (1971). A bequest will not lapse if saved by an "appropriate testamentary . . . provision." T. Atkinson, Wills § 140, at 777 (2d ed. 1953).
Here, Mr. Niehenke provided an alternative disposition for the "Home Place" farm. Therefore, the anti-lapse statute has no application.
Through his testamentary scheme, Mr. Niehenke sought not only to keep the "Home Place" farm in his family, but intended to do so "for as long as possible." (Italics mine.) To accomplish his goal, Mr. Niehenke granted his nephew Francis Niehenke a first option, and if for any reason Francis did not exercise the option, then his nephews Alvin and Elmer Guske would have a joint option. In the event any of the three farm options in his will were not exercised, Mr. Niehenke's residuary clause provided 11 specifically designated nieces and nephews would have the right to bid on the property. The testator named only nieces and nephews as potential beneficiaries of his three farms. That is consistent with his expressed intention the farms remain in his family "as long as possible", an intent which would be frustrated if Francis' children, Mr. Niehenke's grandnieces *159and grandnephews, were allowed to exercise their deceased father's option. Grandnieces and grandnephews are mentioned in the will only in the residuary clause, where they may take by representation. Presumably to ensure a continued interest in the farm property and to guarantee its retention by the family as long as possible, Mr. Niehenke provided that only the "highest bidder" among the residuary takers would have the right to buy the property.
The majority states its holding "assures Francis' family is not disinherited by operation of the testator's will." That is not our role. Mr. Niehenke's testamentary scheme demonstrates a careful and specific selection of certain beneficiaries, including charities, to take under his will. To the intentional exclusion of other family members, he devised to some beneficiaries, such as Edward Niehenke and Alvin Guske, more than one option to purchase. However, if Francis Niehenke or Alvin Guske did- not exercise their options, Mr. Niehenke chose not to make any provision for their issue. In fact, neither Francis Niehenke nor Alvin Guske are named in the residuary. Additionally, Mr. Nie-henke did not make any provision for his brothers and sisters, as well as several of his nieces and nephews. Our role is limited to construing the will to give effect to the testator's expressed intention. In re Estate of Bergau, supra. In this light, it is evident the testator was not concerned with the possibility that Francis Niehenke's children, as well as other family members, might be "disinherited" because he made no provision for them, even in the residuary; however, he expressly provided that Alvin and Elmer Guske would have the right to the "Home Place" if, for any reason, Francis did not exercise the option. The majority's failure to allow the alternate named beneficiaries to exercise the option frustrates Mr. Niehenke's intended testamentary plan.
Reliance by the majority on two out-of-state cases to support its application of the anti-lapse statute is misplaced. In re Estate of Quigley, 37 Misc. 2d 320, 236 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1963) and Tuecke v. Tuecke, 257 Iowa 199, *160131 N.W.2d 794 (1964). Neither decision construes a bequest providing for an alternate beneficiary. In Quigley, the bequest provided:
It is my desire and I likewise direct that my son, Harry Quigley, shall have the right, if he so desires to purchase the Quigley Block located on the southwest corner . . ..
Quigley, 37 Misc. 2d at 321. Harry Quigley predeceased his father and left two surviving children. Although the anti-lapse statute in Quigley was applied, that bequest is clearly distinguishable because it did not provide for an alternative disposition. Here, Alvin and Elmer Guske were named alternative takers in Mr. Niehenke's will. Similarly, in Tuecke the will provision stated:
'"I further provide that my son, Alfred Tuecke, have the option and right to purchase the two-third (2/3rds) interest in my farm . . . and such right or option is herewith devised and bequeathed to him.'"
Tuecke, 257 Iowa at 201. Alfred predeceased his father. The testator in Tuecke failed to name an alternative taker and the anti-lapse statute was applied. Here, Mr. Niehenke named alternative takers and thus Tuecke is not persuasive. The remaining cases cited by the majority relate to other types of testamentary options, none of which are involved here. No decision is cited by the majority that applies an anti-lapse statute to the factual situation presented here.
The majority states that because 7 years elapsed between the death of Francis and Raymond Niehenke, it can be presumed had Raymond intended a result contrary to the operation of the anti-lapse statute, he would have revised his will. I find it more plausible that the testator believed he had named an alternative beneficiary and hence there was no need to revise the will.
Accordingly, I decline to apply a legislative presumption to contravene the intent of a testator when that intent is evidenced within the four corners of a will. Thus, in my *161view, Alvin and Elmer Guske were entitled to exercise the option.
For these reasons, I dissent.
Review granted at 115 Wn.2d 1015 (1990).