dissenting.
1. Wrongful Arrest
I agree with the majority that Brooks’s claim should be characterized as a Fourth Amendment challenge to her arrest rather than to the search of SafePlace. I also agree with the majority’s determination that an individual can violate Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.81d(1) by physically resisting any command or by refusing to comply with a lawful command. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Brooks did more than passively refuse to comply with Rothe’s order. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Brooks, as we must on summary judgment, I would conclude that Brooks did not use force to resist Rothe’s order. Although Brooks did not open the door, keeping a door closed is a non-violent way to resist a search; she did not slam the door on the police or force her body against it when they tried to enter. The fact that Brooks opened the door only a little bit, that she used her hand and foot to prevent it from opening entirely, and that she did not quickly back away from the door as soon as the Rothe ordered her to let them enter and search SafePlace does not indicate that she was using or threatening force to resist Rothe’s order. The majority’s holding would leave individuals with little room to passively resist unlawful police orders, as even keeping a door open a crack while speaking with officers is deemed physical obstruction under the majority’s misguided view.
Additionally, I would hold that Brooks has made a sufficient showing that she was resisting an unlawful command. Rothe and Weisenbach did not have a warrant to search SafePlace. The majority concludes that the search was justified by exigent circumstances, specifically the possibility that evidence would be destroyed and the risk of injury to other SafePlace residents. We have explained that “ ‘[wjhen there is neither a warrant nor consent, courts will only permit a search or seizure to stand under extraordinary circumstances.’ ” United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 960 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 565 (6th Cir.2005)). Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Brooks, I would hold that the government has not met its burden of establishing exigent circumstances. See id.
Significantly, the timeline belies the exigency; the initial 911 call was made at about 7:10 a.m., the ailing service participant had been removed from SafePlace by 8:00 a.m., and Rothe and Weisenbach did not leave the police station to search Safe-Place until 8:30 a.m. The fact that at least half an hour passed between the end of the incident and the arrival of the police makes it unlikely that there was any urgency related to the destruction of evidence; if someone planned to destroy anything, this window of time would have provided him or her with more than enough time to do so. Additionally, the only information that the police possessed at this juncture was that a drug overdose may have occurred at SafePlace and that Brooks may have tried to conceal the fact that an overdose occurred. They did not know what kind of drugs might have been taken, how much might have been taken, whether the individual had taken the drugs at SafePlace, or whether there were more drugs present at SafePlace. The paramedics did not report any dangerous conditions existing at Safe-Place, and Brooks does not have medical training that would permit her to diagnose accurately the medical complaints of a *711SafePlace resident. If the exigent-circumstances doctrine justifies a search under these facts, then almost any indication that a drug overdose has occurred in a structure in which other people are present will permit a warrantless search of that structure. Such an extension of warrantless searches violates our Constitution.
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Brooks, I would conclude that Rothe’s order that Brooks permit Rothe to search SafeHouse was an unlawful order because it was not supported by a warrant or by exigent circumstances. Additionally, I would conclude that Brooks has made a sufficient showing that her arrest was not supported by probable cause because § 750.81d(l) does not criminalize the passive, nonphysical opposition of such an unlawful order.
2. Qualified Immunity1
Because I would hold that the defendants-appellees violated Brooks’s Fourth Amendment rights by arresting her without probable cause, I must address the second aspect of qualified-immunity analysis; whether the defendants-appellees violated Brooks’s clearly established rights. Pearson v. Callahan, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). I believe that Brooks has sufficiently alleged that her clearly established rights were violated. First, it is abundantly clear that no arrest should take place without probable cause and that a warrantless search cannot be conducted in the absence of a warrant exception such as exigent circumstances. See Purcell, 526 F.3d at 960; United States v. Davis, 514 F.3d 596, 607 (6th Cir.2008). Additionally, delving into the specific facts of this case, I believe that a reasonable person would have known that he or she was violating Brooks’s clearly established constitutional rights. See Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 815.
At his deposition, John Bodis, the chief of police in Bad Axe, made the following statements regarding Brooks’s arrest:
Q: Does an officer in your department based on your policies have the right to arrest a citizen who has peacefully disobeyed an unlawful command issued by that officer?
A: So you’re saying there’s no law to support what his command is?
Q: I’m saying it’s an unlawful command.
A: If it’s unlawful, then they should not arrest.
Record on Appeal at 584 (Bodis Dep. at 39) (emphasis added). This statement by the man responsible for running the Bad Axe police department indicates that a reasonable officer should have known that it was not proper to arrest someone for nonviolently refusing to comply with an unlawful order. That is exactly what Brooks alleges happened at SafePlace. Accordingly, I would conclude that none of the defendants-appellees are entitled to qualified immunity.2
*712 3. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity
Weisenbach and Gaertner assert that they are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. This court has explained the boundaries of prosecutorial immunity as follows:
The Supreme Court has endorsed a functional approach for determining whether an official is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity, explaining that a court should look to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.
This functional approach focuses on whether the prosecutor’s activities are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Those acts that occur in the course of the prosecutor’s role as an advocate for the state, e.g., acts taken to prepare for the initiation of judicial proceedings or to prepare for trial, are protected by absolute immunity. By contrast, a prosecutor who performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer such as searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested is entitled only at most to qualified immunity.
Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 946-47 (6th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Weisenbach and Gaertner assert that' they are entitled to absolute immunity because they were acting in their prosecutorial roles when they consulted with the police and because they did not arrest Brooks themselves.
The Supreme Court has held that prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity when they are performing “the prosecutorial function of giving legal advice to the police.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495-96, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991). Much of what Weisenbach and Gaertner did in this case was to advise the police; Weisenbach did so from the scene, and Gaertner provided advice over the telephone. Similarly, Weisenbach’s actions were not in service of preparing a case; instead, she was helping the police conduct their investigation and hoping to use her position as a SafePlace board member to do so. Because neither Weisenbach nor Gaertner was acting within the advocacy-based prosecutorial role during this incident, I would hold that the district court correctly concluded that neither is entitled to absolute immunity.
I. Municipal Immunity
Huron County and Bad Axe assert that, as municipalities, they are immune from liability. The Supreme Court has explained that “[ljocal governing bodies ... can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where ... the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The Court later clarified this holding: “it is plain that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Such municipal liability attaches where “the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.” Id. at 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292.
As the district court noted, neither Bad Axe nor Huron County addressed the possibility that municipal liability can be predicated on a single action taken by a final decisionmaker. Brooks v. Rothe, No. 06-14939-BC, 2007 WL 3203761, at *7 (E.D.Mich. Oct.31, 2007). Nor do they confront this argument on appeal; Bad *713Axe failed to address municipal liability in its appellate brief, and Huron County’s appellate brief focuses on the fact that Brooks has not identified a municipal policy or custom or pattern of behavior that led to her alleged injuries. I believe that Bad Axe and Huron County may be liable for Brooks’s injuries because she has made a sufficient showing that her arrest and the search of SafePlace were the result of decisions made by the final decisionmaker for each municipality. Brooks has alleged that her arrest and the search of SafePlace were ordered and/or consented to by the police chief of Bad Axe and Huron County’s prosecuting attorney, both of whom had authority over such matters in their respective municipalities. Accordingly, I would conclude that it is inappropriate to grant Bad Axe or Huron County immunity as municipalities at this stage of litigation.
5. Conclusion
Because I conclude that the defendantsappellees violated Brooks’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free of arrest without probable cause and that immunity does not protect the defendants-appellees from liability, I would reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Brooks’s federal claims and remand for further proceedings. I would also reverse the district court’s dismissal of Brooks’s state-law claims and remand those claims so that the district court can reevaluate its decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction given that it should proceed on Brooks’s federal claims.
. As Bad Axe and Huron County are municipalities, they are not entitled to qualified immunity. See Pearson v. Callahan, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 808, 822, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).
. Although each of the individual defendantsappellees played a slightly different role in the incident, Brooks has sufficiently established that the actions of each individual combined to cause the violations of her constitutional rights. Indeed, the facts indicate that each defendant-appellee either participated in or determined that it was proper to order the search and the arrest. Rothe was the officer on the scene ultimately responsible for conducting the search and arresting Brooks, but he did not act without consulting Weisenbach and Bodis, and Bodis did not act without consulting Gaertner.