J.—I concur in the order to certify petitioner’s admission to the practice of law in California, and in the views expressed in the opinion of Justice Kennard. I write separately, however, to emphasize the limited basis upon which that concurrence takes place, and to express my disagreement with certain aspects of the court’s opinion.
In my view, the State Bar Court Review Department’s recommendation denying certification was not, as suggested in the court’s opinion, based “solely” on the discharged judgment. Rather, it appears the recommendation was based on the review department’s assessment of petitioner’s sustained pattern of misconduct, involving multiple acts of dishonesty and evasion. However, in view of the relative remoteness of petitioner’s past acts of moral turpitude and giving the benefit of the doubt to petitioner (Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners (1966) 65 Cal.2d 447, 451 [55 Cal.Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 76]), I agree that the State Bar’s presentation was insufficient to rebut petitioner’s evidence of his present good character and rehabilitation.
Facts
A brief recitation of the facts is sufficient to demonstrate the pattern of petitioner’s conduct.
The record indicates: (1) Petitioner unjustifiably caused the death of another in 1970 by his drunken driving, for which a judgment against him *1080was rendered, in 1974, for over $232,000. Petitioner tendered his policy limits of $10,000 on that judgment. (2) Petitioner made no payments on the balance of the judgment until 1975 when, under threat of wage garnishment, he began making the minimum payments required to avoid garnishment, approximately $42 every two weeks. (3) From 1975 to 1980, he paid only $4,685 on this obligation. During the same period of time, petitioner earned between $15,000 and $32,000 annually, totalling at least $100,000,1 while living rent-free and putting his wife through five years of college. (4) When petitioner was deposed in postjudgment debtor proceedings in 1979, he testified falsely that he did not have any joint bank accounts with his wife. (5) In 1980, petitioner misrepresented to the victims’ attorney that he was taking a leave of absence from his job and would contact the attorney on his return, or notify him if he settled permanently elsewhere, and attempt to settle the case. In fact, petitioner had already accepted a job in another state, with the intent of making his permanent home there, and never made any attempt to contact the victims’ attorney or inform the attorney of his whereabouts. (6) In 1979, petitioner applied for admission to the Florida State Bar. He represented on his application that the $10,000 automobile insurance policy was the only asset he had available to pay the judgment. The record indicates that in fact other assets were available. (7) Petitioner represented in an amended application to the Florida State Bar in February 1980 that he had paid approximately $1,200 per year on the judgment. Petitioner actually paid as much as $1,200 only in 1979 and paid significantly less in other years. (8) Petitioner represented in the amended application in February 1980 that he fully intended to continue all payments on the judgment in the future. Yet, on May 9, 1980, petitioner testified that he had stopped payment upon moving to Florida three and one-half months earlier, that is, in approximately February 1980. In addition, petitioner testified he stopped paying, not because of any inability to pay, but because his wages were not subject to garnishment under Florida law. He was at that time earning approximately $27,000 per year. (9) At a 1986 rehabilitation hearing before the Florida State Bar, petitioner was found to be less than candid, and could not satisfactorily explain why title to his New York home was held in his wife’s name only.
Discussion
The enumerated matters are serious, involving moral turpitude, and if committed by a member of the State Bar would constitute a statutory ground for disbarment. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6106.) Moreover, contrary to *1081the intimation of the court’s opinion (maj. opn., ante, pp. 1069-1070, 1072-1074), none of these considerations impinges improperly on the prophylactic purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. All relate to petitioner’s conduct connected to the debt while it was valid and legal, before it was discharged in bankruptcy, or to ancillary matters in which he showed a pattern of deception, evasion and falsehood.
Nor do I necessarily agree that the misconduct is unrelated to petitioner’s practice of law.2 (See maj. opn., ante, pp. 1069, 1073.) Petitioner’s misconduct involved a personal lawsuit, in which he testified falsely, made misrepresentations to opposing counsel, and failed to comply with the lawful judgment of the court. The misconduct also occurred in connection with petitioner’s application for admission as an attorney in another jurisdiction, in which he made a number of misrepresentations and displayed a lack of candor at his “rehabilitation” hearing.
Nevertheless, as the court’s opinion points out, most of these matters occurred in 1980 or earlier. Petitioner has established a prima facie case of his present good moral character. He introduced 15 character letters and testified that all but 3 of the references knew of his wrongful death judgment, subsequent bankruptcy, and Florida State Bar proceedings.3 He has never been the subject of a disciplinary proceeding in New York in 20 years of practice. Much of that practice was devoted to representation of indigent criminal defendants. He practiced competently in that capacity and gained a reputation among his colleagues and among the judges in whose courts he appeared for diligence, honesty and integrity. He volunteered to serve in a unit handling the most difficult cases, and he spent time training and advising younger attorneys.4 In addition, petitioner successfully fulfilled his duties as trustee of a $400,000 trust for his paraplegic cousin. He has also demonstrated a greater financial responsibility for the future by obtaining adequate liability insurance.
Petitioner has not maintained an entirely unblemished record since the discharge in bankruptcy. He was specifically found to be evasive and to lack *1082candor in regard to certain responses at his 1986 Florida State Bar rehabilitation hearing. This factor, however, while disturbing in light of his past misconduct, is not of itself sufficiently egregious to rebut his showing of present good moral character and his honesty and integrity in the 20 years that he practiced law in New York.5
As the record demonstrates, the State Bar here did not rely solely on petitioner’s discharge in bankruptcy of the wrongful death judgment in recommending that petitioner not be admitted to the bar. However, I agree with the court’s opinion that the evidentiary significance of petitioner’s misconduct may have been attenuated by the passage of time. (See Pacheco v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1041, 1051 [239 Cal.Rptr. 897, 741 P.2d 1138].)
Accordingly, I would hold that the State Bar’s evidence in rebuttal is not sufficient to demonstrate petitioner’s present lack of good moral character, and I concur in the order for petitioner’s admission to practice law in California.
Overall, petitioner paid about 4.6 percent of his income on the obligation during these five years. Petitioner failed to make even the $42 minimum payments on the obligation in at least three of the five years, and never increased his payments although he received raises in income during that time.
Most candidates for admission to the State Bar have not previously practiced law. In my view, we do not regard misconduct evidencing moral turpitude as any less important because it did not occur in the candidate’s practice of law. In re Kreamer (1975) 14 Cal.3d 524, 531 [121 Cal.Rptr. 600, 535 P.2d 728], does not establish such a lesser value for evidence of moral turpitude not actually committed in the practice of law. Rather, we were there evaluating the mitigating circumstances in disciplining an attorney who was already a member of the State Bar.
None of the letters, however, makes specific reference to knowledge of these facts.
It was brought out, however, at the 1986 Florida State Bar rehabilitation hearing that there were four attorneys of petitioner’s level of experience in petitioner’s department, and all four attorneys undertook, even though not expressly required by their job description, to train and counsel less experienced attorneys.
1 take issue with the court’s statement (maj. opn., ante, p. 1071) that independent review of the record does not indicate that petitioner was anything but candid in the California admission proceedings. My independent review of the record reveals, although the matter was not made the subject of findings, that petitioner represented on his application for admission that he left two jobs for the reason of “other employment” when in fact he had been terminated from those jobs and had not yet secured new employment. Petitioner testified at his 1988 review department hearing that he chose to use the language “other employment” as the reason for leaving those jobs because “It looks better.”